tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post4282217018311383711..comments2024-03-28T08:58:27.412-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: When does a fetus become human?Victor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger52125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-61469864844217657432015-12-23T11:21:36.332-07:002015-12-23T11:21:36.332-07:00M.E:
Just to be clear, when I say I don't thi...M.E:<br /><br />Just to be clear, when I say I don't think that's what it (i.e., "human being") means, I mean in the most common usage, and in particular, in the sense in which it's immoral to kill a human being for the usual reasons for abortion. <br />But as I said, this is not a morally relevant issue, though it probably has an impact on the effect of the arguments on many people.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-58660600922221177252015-12-23T10:53:19.492-07:002015-12-23T10:53:19.492-07:00M.E.:
"I'm not sure the mother's int...M.E.:<br /><br />"I'm not sure the mother's intention is relevant here - suppose she has no intention either way, she neither intends it to develop into a child, nor intends the contrary. It would still be immoral for her to take the pill."<br /><br />Probably. If she doesn't intend either way, then what is her intention? <br />If she intends to have a baby without a hand, I'd say that's still probably immoral (again, it depends on other factors; why is she actually doing that? does or at least should she expect the baby to develop further? etc.). <br /><br />"So the follow-up question is: what's worse: being painlessly deprived of a hand, or being painlessly deprived of life?"<br />That's loaded language, suggesting the entity in both cases is relevantly similar. Even if it's "numerically identical" in some kind of obscure sense not relevant here, that's only a game on words. <br /><br />A much more precise description: What's more immoral, to kill a human embryo that cannot feel pain or feel any sort of emotions or perform any cognitive task - a brainless embryo -, in order not to have a child, or to modify it so that it develops in a far more complex being that is likely to suffer due to the modification?" <br /><br />That description is still not good enough (e.g., it doesn't explain motive: was it to save the world from an alien attack? Was it for fun? etc.), but the former is not immoral, and the latter very probably is - which I reckon intuitively. <br /><br />"Suppose the technology allows him to develop a brain just like the one he used to have, with all his memories, skills, etc. intact. If I filled out the case this way, would you have the same intuition?"<br /><br />The info had to be stored elsewhere, otherwise the tech is not possible, so it seems the memories are somewhere else. Maybe there is another copy? <br />But regardless, then I would say that it may be immoral to destroy that information, depending on the case. Again, I would need more info about motivations, how the situation developed, etc. The situation is too unusual for me to fill in the blanks as I normally would. <br />However, at any rate, it's about destroying the info. <br />For example, let's say that not one, but 100 copies of his brain are being grown in 100 different bodies. Then, killing one or 50 to - say - save energy required for other copies of other brains, would not be immoral, unless there is a previous promise or something (i.e., it still depends on a lot of other factors, but the killing of a brainless human organism per se is not one of them). <br /><br />"True, but the point is to undermine the idea that the steep drop mentioned above can be based on brain development."<br /><br />But that's not undermined. On the contrary, my point is that there is a relevant difference if the brain is sufficiently developed. <br />At any rate, your example was meant to test my intuitions, and my intuitions remain consistent with the idea that cognitive development <i>is</i> probably a key factor - though, again, that's speculation: intuitions come first. If I were to (weirdly) find that that's not relevant, then I would still hold that it's not immoral to abort an embryo for the usual reasons.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-12101698412100296302015-12-23T10:34:03.406-07:002015-12-23T10:34:03.406-07:00M.E.:
"That's what I mean, and that'...M.E.:<br /><br /><br />"That's what I mean, and that's a typical definition of "human being"."<br />Sorry, I misspoke. What I meant to say is "I don't think that's what <i>it</i> means", and no, I don't think that's the most common usage, not that you didn't mean that. <br />Yes, I know you disagree about what the most common usage is. That's not going to change.<br /><br />"How are they using it differently? I still don't understand what you mean by "human being" such that pro-lifers are using the term differently from how you're using it. Given your examples of human beings, I'd say pro-lifers are using the term the same way you are."<br /><br />They're using it differently from the most common usage. And I already explained what I meant. Given the examples I have given - and the examples of non-human beings -, people will likely grasp the term intuitively, and that would not include embryos. Now, granted, there are differences in the way people grasp the terms. But in this case, the vast majority of people who claim that embryos are human beings already have a religion that supports banning killing embryos, and furthermore are strongly committed to at least part of their religious agenda, indicating a different source for their usage (i.e., not just usual variation in the way people grasp a meaning given similar examples). <br /><br />"If X=Marcos, and X is killed, then Marcos is killed. Where is the inaccuracy or imprecision here? I also don't see how pointing this out is loaded."<br /><br />The description "Marcos is killed" is compatible with Marcos being a child, an adult, etc.; moreover, given that there already is a person named "Marcos" (we assume), it gives the impression that the person in question (the person <br />others may already be familiar with, a being capable of complex emotions, etc., like the rest of the members of a community) is getting killed, not that a bunch of cells with no brain that eventually grew into that person, would be killed. <br />Even in cases in which it does not cause confusion (but it would often do), it gives very little info about what's happening, so it's imprecise. <br /><br />On the other hand, the description "<i>D1: At some time t0 (not necessarily an instant; it can be an interval), there was a pregnant woman - say, María, to give her a name -, and human embryo E4, in her uterus. María's pregnancy continued, and the human embryo E4 developed, eventually turning into a human fetus (say, F4), at some time t1. The fetus F4 continued to grow, and eventually, at t2, María gave birth to a baby - say, Marcos. <br />Marcos grew up and became a toddler, then an older child, and eventually an adult, at t3. <br />Presently, Marcos is an adult. <br />If María had decided that she did not want a child, and for that reason she had had an abortion at t0, or at some other time earlier than t1, then E4 would have died, and would not have become F4. There would be no adult Marcos. </i><br />", provides <b>a lot</b> more info about what is really going on, and also doesn't cause confusion. <br /><br />"But this is ad hoc. In the case of twinning, we have reason to say E1 no longer exists, but in the case of E4, we aren't talking about twinning. "<br />So you say. I say on the contrary, your reply is ad-hoc. There is no good reason to make that distinction. <br /><br />""Organism" refers to the thing in my mother's womb before I was born. The argument then proceeds to show that I am identical to that thing. It is only when we introduce the claim that depriving me of life is immoral that moral evaluation comes into the picture. "<br />No, it doesn't show anything of the sort. It's a semantic argument, and not a good one. One might as well say "organism" refers to the thing in your mother's body before fertilization (i.e., the ovum), and that a similar argument then proceeds to show that you're identical to that thing.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-29937642250881723862015-12-23T03:26:11.283-07:002015-12-23T03:26:11.283-07:00Angra,
"I don't think that's what yo...Angra,<br /><br />"I don't think that's what you mean, if by "member" you include embryos."<br /><br />That's what I mean, and that's a typical definition of "human being". <br /><br />"some people who want to ban abortion (or keep it banned, etc.) use the expression "human being" differently"<br /><br />How are they using it differently? I still don't understand what you mean by "human being" such that pro-lifers are using the term differently from how you're using it. Given your examples of human beings, I'd say pro-lifers are using the term the same way you are.<br /><br />"If you say that depriving Marcos of his life is morally relevant, you are again replacing the more precise description for the loaded "depriving Marcos of his life""<br /><br />If X=Marcos, and X is killed, then Marcos is killed. Where is the inaccuracy or imprecision here? I also don't see how pointing this out is loaded. <br /><br />"If so, then we can at least say that E4 no longer exists."<br /><br />But this is ad hoc. In the case of twinning, we have reason to say E1 no longer exists, but in the case of E4, we aren't talking about twinning.<br /><br />"If it's not morally relevant, in which sense is it relevant?"<br /><br />"Organism" refers to the thing in my mother's womb before I was born. The argument then proceeds to show that I am identical to that thing. It is only when we introduce the claim that depriving me of life is immoral that moral evaluation comes into the picture.<br /><br />"You mean, without a left hand?"<br /><br />Yes, that's what I meant, sorry.<br /><br />"Then the answer is very probably "yes, that would be immoral", at least if she intends for the embryo to develop into a child and/or an adult."<br /><br />I'm not sure the mother's intention is relevant here - suppose she has no intention either way, she neither intends it to develop into a child, nor intends the contrary. It would still be immoral for her to take the pill.<br /><br />So the follow-up question is: what's worse: being painlessly deprived of a hand, or being painlessly deprived of life?<br /><br />"Jack no longer exists."<br /><br />Suppose the technology allows him to develop a brain just like the one he used to have, with all his memories, skills, etc. intact. If I filled out the case this way, would you have the same intuition?<br /><br />" The new developing organism - unlike the fetus - is not in a woman's body"<br /><br />True, but the point is to undermine the idea that the steep drop mentioned above can be based on brain development.Mika's Piano Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14546069684545773784noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-82228920975526265602015-12-22T22:06:33.854-07:002015-12-22T22:06:33.854-07:00M.E.:
"Suppose a pregnant mother takes a pi...M.E.: <br /><br />"Suppose a pregnant mother takes a pill (which has no negative side-effects on her) which she knows will cause the embryo in her to develop with a left hand. Would that be wrong?"<br />You mean, <i>without</i> a left hand? (else, what's the problem?)<br />Or did you mean with only a left hand? (i.e., no right hand)<br />Anyway, I'll assume it will have only one hand, right? <br /><br />Then the answer is very probably "yes, that would be immoral", at least if she intends for the embryo to develop into a child and/or an adult. I say "very probably" because the scenario is unusual and you fail to specify motivations, information available to her, etc., and if we're talking unusual scenarios, maybe she does it because she knows if she does not, then (say), the entire population of the planet will be eaten alive by aliens. <br />But if the motivation is just for fun, or because she wants a one-handed child, that's intuitively immoral. <br />If I were to speculate, I would say that's because of the highly increased probability that the resulting child will have a worse life than she would with both hands (again, leaving aside other potential features of the scenario). <br /><br />"Depends on the suffering. What kind of suffering do you have in mind, such that it would be permissible to kill the fetus?"<br />I wasn't talking about making the killing permissible. Rather, I was talking about making the ban impermissible, or more immoral than what other reasons (like the restriction of autonomy alone, leaving suffering aside, might yield) - and the killing less immoral, even if still so. <br />But for example, being forced to sustain a fetus she wants out of her body can be terrifying, and her lack of bodily autonomy can inflict serious suffering. Without really figuring how much the suffering might be, it's hard to tell whether that is enough to make the killing permissible, but it's not hard to tell that it can make it less immoral. <br /><br />"Suppose Jack has to have his brain removed due to cancer, and technology allows him to develop a new brain. Would it be immoral to kill him at a point when his brain is as underdeveloped as a fetus's?"<br />Jack no longer exists. The new developing organism - unlike the fetus - is not in a woman's body, so the killing is akin to a fetus in an incubator, and it would be equally immoral, leaving other factors (like the expected suffering of third parties) aside. It may be just a bit immoral, or none at all if (say) the "brain" is only a few cells.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-66297593191961259742015-12-22T22:05:25.104-07:002015-12-22T22:05:25.104-07:00M.E.:
"That can be disputed too, but at the...<br />M.E.: <br /><br />"That can be disputed too, but at the very least we can say E1 no longer exists."<br />If so, then we can at least say that E4 no longer exists. Of course, I expect you to dispute that. But it wouldn't matter substantially - the description is less precise. <br /><br />"The relevant sense of organism is the one being used in the argument - we're talking about the organism in my mother's womb several months before I was born. I'd say the ovum isn't an organism, but at the very least, we can say that it isn't an organism in the sense being used by the argument. The argument's use of "organism" isn't morally relevant, it's just used to pick out whatever that thing was in my mother's womb before I was born."<br />If it's not morally relevant, in which sense is it relevant? <br />For that matter, I could say that the relevant sense in my reply includes ova as well, so you were something in your mother's womb before fertilization (of course, none of this is morally relevant). <br /><br />"Yes."<br />People who claim so do not actually behave as if they actually made that assessment. In particular, it's obvious that if there were such factories, there would be war over that, whereas most activists who support abortion bans do not get nearly as angry over fertility clinics. <br />But if your prima facie intuition is actually so different from mine, that's that (i.e., no way around this). <br /><br />"I agree motivations matter, but do they always matter? If John kills Marcos out of good motives, that would still be wrong. "<br /><br />I said "motivations, whether he is negligent, etc.", not only "motivations". <br />But that aside, if the scientist kills a mosquito in order to make Bob suffer, and just for fun (because Bob irrationally believes that the mosquito is actually his daughter Sarah who was transformed by a witch, and will turn back at midnight), then the scientist in question behaved immorally, even if it's not generally wrong to kill mosquitoes. <br />My point is that in my assessment, it's not generally wrong to kill a brainless human organism. That is my answer to your question. I get that you disagree, but you wanted to know what I reckoned (i.e., what my position was), so I was answering your question. <br />Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-61395063271228275682015-12-22T22:04:58.967-07:002015-12-22T22:04:58.967-07:00M.E.:
"But since "human being" me...M.E.: <br /><br />"But since "human being" means "a member of the species Homo sapiens" the inference is valid. As far as I can remember, you don't deny that this is one sense of "human being", or that this sense is natural and valid - you seem to only dispute how common it is. So let's go to the issue of what you mean by "human being", and the issue of how common your sense of the term is."<br />I don't think that's what you mean, if by "member" you include embryos. <br /><br />"Can you give a rough idea of what that meaning is?"<br />Yes. As I said, the rough idea is the meaning of the word in the way native English speakers learn the meaning of the word, or native speakers or other languages learn the meaning of terms translated as "human being" into English, at least assuming translation is correct.<br />So, I would say that Obama is a human being, Merkel is a human being, Tina Fey is a human being, Putin is a human being, Napoleon was a human being, etc. (I don't need to post links, since you know whom I'm talking about). <br />Then, I tell you some of the things that aren't human beings, like any of the beings that played "Lassie" on TV, and then point to other things, like chairs, dogs, cats, stars (astronomy), etc. <br />Usually, one does not learn the meaning of a term by means of reading a definition in terms of other, known terms. Nor are common-language terms defined in that manner. <br />Rather, meaning is determined by usage. <br /><br />"But your argument in the following paragraph works only if it's assumed that the meaning people intuitively grasp is what you have in mind when you use "human being". But why make that assumption? I also can't tell if that assumption is intuitively plausible given that it isn't clear to me what you mean by "human being.""<br />As with the case of other terms, I learn the meaning of an expression by means of watching other people use the term. That's also the way I would use to convey the meaning. I reckon it's the usual meaning first because I see no good reason to suspect that, unusually, I failed to grasp the meaning. <br />Now, people who assert otherwise gave me some reason to doubt that, but after looking more carefully as how others tend to use the expression "human being" (something I wouldn't do for most terms), I conclude that's the most common usage, though some people who want to ban abortion (or keep it banned, etc.) use the expression "human being" differently, and sometimes, others also use it differently. <br /><br />"E4 *is* Marcos, ie numerically identical to Marcos. So to kill E4 is to deprive Marcos of his life. I have argued for this identity claim, and you have disputed it by saying:"<br />That's not my point. <br />Even if it were correct, to say it's "numerically identical" may provide some info about the meaning of the terms. It does not provide any new info about <i>what actually happened</i>: it adds info about the meaning of a word not required for a precise description of the situation. <br />What happened was what I described in D1. <br />Again, what does that tell me to say it's "numerically identical" to Marcos, that is morally relevant? <br />If you say that depriving Marcos of his life is morally relevant, you are <i>again</i> replacing the more precise description for the loaded "depriving Marcos of his life", which does not provide nearly an accurate a description, and would give the impression (to many) of an adult being deprived of his life.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-32946122148933164592015-12-22T20:46:09.911-07:002015-12-22T20:46:09.911-07:00Angra,
"That depends on his motivations, whe...Angra,<br /><br />"That depends on his motivations, whether he's negligent, etc."<br /><br />I agree motivations matter, but do they always matter? If John kills Marcos out of good motives, that would still be wrong. <br /><br />"But suppose the scientist makes brainless adults of different ages with the purpose of testing drugs on them, and it turns out that this is the most efficient means of testing drugs. Let's further stipulate that the practice is legal, publicly known and accepted. In that case, I don't think it's immoral. So, I don't think it's immoral per se."<br /><br />Our intuitions differ here. Let me try another case:<br /><br />Suppose a pregnant mother takes a pill (which has no negative side-effects on her) which she knows will cause the embryo in her to develop with a left hand. Would that be wrong?<br /><br />The follow-up question: intuitively, what's worse: being painlessly deprived of a hand, or being painlessly deprived of life?<br /><br />"The problem in that case (i.e., one of the locations is the uterus) is that while the fetus is similar to the newborn, the difference is the burden, and more precisely, the suffering the pregnant person may have to endure due to the restriction to her freedom, as well as the restriction to a person's autonomy."<br /><br />Depends on the suffering. What kind of suffering do you have in mind, such that it would be permissible to kill the fetus?<br /><br />"Actually, my speculation is based on evidence for a quick cognitive development after birth, resulting - for example - in capacity for self-awareness after only three months, and capacity for complex emotions also grows more or less quickly. However, it's probably not as steep as one day. <br />But that's highly speculative; if development is slower, then the slope is smaller."<br /><br />Suppose Jack has to have his brain removed due to cancer, and technology allows him to develop a new brain. Would it be immoral to kill him at a point when his brain is as underdeveloped as a fetus's?Mika's Piano Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14546069684545773784noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-66370960052063718622015-12-22T20:30:08.935-07:002015-12-22T20:30:08.935-07:00Angra,
"The point of that was to show that ...Angra, <br /><br />"The point of that was to show that from the premise that "human being" and "human embryo" refer to members of the same species, it does not follow that their respective referents have any members in common."<br /><br />But since "human being" means "a member of the species Homo sapiens" the inference is valid. As far as I can remember, you don't deny that this is one sense of "human being", or that this sense is natural and valid - you seem to only dispute how common it is. So let's go to the issue of what you mean by "human being", and the issue of how common your sense of the term is.<br /><br />"The rough idea is the meaning of the word in the way native English speakers learn the meaning of the word, or native speakers or other languages learn the meaning of terms translated as "human being" into English, at least assuming translation is correct."<br /><br />Can you give a rough idea of what that meaning is? <br /><br />"The reason I think that's the most common sense is precisely because that's how people regularly learn how to use the words."<br /><br />But your argument in the following paragraph works only if it's assumed that the meaning people intuitively grasp is what you have in mind when you use "human being". But why make that assumption? I also can't tell if that assumption is intuitively plausible given that it isn't clear to me what you mean by "human being."<br /><br />"What morally relevant info does D1 left aside?"<br /><br />E4 *is* Marcos, i.e. numerically identical to Marcos. So to kill E4 is to deprive Marcos of his life. I have argued for this identity claim, and you have disputed it by saying:<br /><br />"E1's did not die, in the usual sense of the terms, as far as I can tell."<br /><br />That can be disputed too, but at the very least we can say E1 no longer exists.<br /><br />"The ovum is an organism, in a sense of "organism". But then, you can say it's not an organism in some other sense."<br /><br />The relevant sense of organism is the one being used in the argument - we're talking about the organism in my mother's womb several months before I was born. I'd say the ovum isn't an organism, but at the very least, we can say that it isn't an organism in the sense being used by the argument. The argument's use of "organism" isn't morally relevant, it's just used to pick out whatever that thing was in my mother's womb before I was born.<br /><br />"Do you reckon, intuitively, that the behavior of the people running the factory in S1, or willingly working in it, is morally similar to the behavior of the people running the factory in S2, or willingly working in it?"<br /><br />Yes.Mika's Piano Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14546069684545773784noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-75583800695565112152015-12-16T18:53:38.424-07:002015-12-16T18:53:38.424-07:00M.E.
"More or less - say the scientist inter...M.E.<br /><br />"More or less - say the scientist interferes with the embryo's development so that it doesn't develop a brain. You would say there's nothing immoral with his actions?"<br />That depends on his motivations, whether he's negligent, etc. Developing an adult without a brain (i.e., adult in everything but the brain) may be (usually) immoral. But the problem here does not appear to be the preventing of the development of the brain, but rather, why it's done. In fact, the original question was whether it was immoral to kill the adult in question, not whether it was immoral to make the brainless adult. I don't think there is anything immoral about it per se - though, again, motivation may play a role. <br /><br />But suppose the scientist makes brainless adults of different ages with the purpose of testing drugs on them, and it turns out that this is the most efficient means of testing drugs. Let's further stipulate that the practice is legal, publicly known and accepted. In that case, I don't think it's immoral. So, I don't think it's immoral per se. <br /><br />"But why make a difference here, given you think it's very immoral to kill a newborn baby? Is it less immoral if the baby is only partly outside the mother, as in partial-birth abortions? The location of the baby seems irrelevant."<br />If by "partial-birth abortions" you mean cases in which the head of the fetus is already out, that seems to me like a newborn, except in case there is risk to the woman. But there is also psychological risks, so I would have to consider the specific case you have in mind in greater detail. <br /><br />But generally, if we're talking about cases not involving partial delivery, the location per se would not be the relevant if one of the locations were not "in the uterus of a person", or some other location that imposes heavy burdens on someone. The problem in that case (i.e., one of the locations is the uterus) is that while the fetus is similar to the newborn, the difference is the burden, and more precisely, the suffering the pregnant person may have to endure due to the restriction to her freedom, as well as the restriction to a person's autonomy. <br /><br />However, if her goal is only not to have a child and there is no increased risk or suffering involved, then I would say it's about as immoral as doing it 5 minutes after or 5 minutes before birth (leaving aside externalities, like the immorality of breaking the law). But on the other hand, a ban would impose a burden even on pregnant women who <i>would</i> suffer a lot if they're not allowed to end the pregnancy, and that's the burden I'm against imposing, even if that means people get away with very immoral behavior (though in practice, abortions like that would be extremely rare). <br /><br />All that said, if it were possible in those cases to deliver the fetus alive instead of killing it, without increasing the risks to the pregnant woman or her suffering (and the woman can actually access the procedure), I would be in favor of banning killing the fetus (not so with embryos). <br /><br />"This implied steep drop before birth is puzzling. For around the time birth we have the very same object - a baby - why should there this steep drop when there is no dramatic change in the baby? It's like saying it's very immoral to kill Ben today but much less immoral to have killed him yesterday."<br />After birth, not before. <br />Actually, my speculation is based on evidence for a quick cognitive development after birth, resulting - for example - in capacity for self-awareness after only three months, and capacity for complex emotions also grows more or less quickly. However, it's probably not as steep as one day. <br />But that's highly speculative; if development is slower, then the slope is smaller.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-42916232820338805132015-12-16T18:20:35.196-07:002015-12-16T18:20:35.196-07:00M.E.,
With regard to the intuitions, you say &qu...M.E., <br /><br />With regard to the intuitions, you say "Your initial description didn't say "human embryos", but merely "embryos". If you were to ask me about human embryos, my intuition is that it would be wrong to kill them."<br /><br />I thought it was clear in context, but fair enough. But let me try again: <br /><br />S1: <br /><br />Imagine a future factory that - by means of artificial wombs, etc. - makes embryos, then grows them into babies, etc., just because there are people who want to adopt a child with some specific traits, without the trouble of having to <br />go through a pregnancy. Let's say many customers ask for a number of different variants (i.e., that several children be actually made), so that they can pick and choose the one or ones they like the best. The children that are made but are not adopted by the age of five, are all swiftly killed.<br /><br />S2:<br /><br />A fertility clinics offers human female/male couples to make human embryos from their eggs and sperm cells, implant two or three in the human female's uterus, freeze the rest, and later ask them whether to implant more embryos, or destroy the rest - i.e., kill them and dispose of the dead embryos. In most cases, where implantation is successful and the female carries the pregnancy to term, they ask that the rest of the embryos be destroyed. <br />The clinic complies, as previously agreed. <br /><br />Do you reckon, intuitively, that the behavior of the people running the factory in S1, or willingly working in it, is morally similar to the behavior of the people running the factory in S2, or willingly working in it? <br />If not, what's the morally relevant difference? <br /><br />But let me ask another question: after I stipulate that the embryos are human, etc., or make a description like D1, I reckon that the behaviors involved are not immoral. I make that assessment on the basis of my own sense of right and wrong - i.e., my moral intuitions. I further reckon that banning the killing of embryos in those cases, in order to protect their lives, would be immoral, but much more so in the case of an ongoing pregnancy than in the case in which the embryos are not in the uterus of a human female. <br /><br />What sort of evidence do I have, on the basis of which I should discard my moral intuitions? <br />Granted, moral intuitions aren't infallible. But they are the only way I have to ascertain moral truth, so in absence of conflicting moral intuitions, why should I reject mine?Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-3268317189042339382015-12-16T18:19:24.062-07:002015-12-16T18:19:24.062-07:00M.E.,
What morally relevant info does D1 left as...M.E., <br /><br />What morally relevant info does D1 left aside? <br /><br />Going by your objection here, you would say that the morally relevant part would be that Marco was the embryo E4. But what does that mean? More to the point, what sort of information is added by saying that Marco was the embryo E4? <br />Is it information about the meaning of identity terms?<br />I don't think so. I don't see how the question of whether the matter of the meaning of identity terms would be relevant. It's a matter of the meaning of a word, but it does not add anything to the description of what actually happened. In other words, even if you're right that Marco was E1 in some sense of identity terms, or even in the only common sense (assuming there is a unique one) of identity terms, that does not add any new info <i>about what actually happened</i>: it adds info about the meaning of a word not required for a precise description of the situation. <br /><br />However, you might think some other piece of info is added, so I would ask what that is. <br /><br />"The splitting of E1 into two distinct organisms E2 and E3 was E1's ceasing to exist, and so E1's death. Not only does this sound plausible, but we can also argue that E1 can't be E2 and E3 since the latter two will live distinct lives. Neither can E1 be E2 (or E3), for what non-arbitrary ground could there be for E1 to be E2 as opposed to E3? So the only option is that E1 ceases to exist upon splitting."<br />But that seems false. E1's did not die, in the usual sense of the terms, as far as I can tell. <br />What you're assuming is that identity terms in this context are transitive. I don't think they are. <br /><br />Still, there isn't much I can add in this regard, so I'll leave it at that, at least for now. <br /><br />"But the ovum isn't an organism. Sorry, I didn't make this point clear earlier - the argument is talking about the organism that was in my mother's womb several months before I was born."<br />The ovum is an organism, in a sense of "organism". But then, you can say it's not an organism in some other sense. But even if that's true, this is a matter of terminology, which does not seem to have a moral impact, given the more accurate description (see above).Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-90604104340760854852015-12-16T18:18:46.201-07:002015-12-16T18:18:46.201-07:00M.E.,
"Even if you don't have a definit...M.E., <br /><br />"Even if you don't have a definition, can you give some rough idea of what you have in mind? And why think that sense is the *most* common sense? In fact, I wonder if there are really two senses here, as opposed to one sense which biology tells us also applies to embryos. Just because a term applies to more than one object, it doesn't follow that the terms has more than one sense. This is why I'm asking what you mean by "human being"."<br />Biology doesn't tell us that even if there is one sense, but I already argued that before. <br />Now, I do have a rough idea. The rough idea is the meaning of the word in the way native English speakers learn the meaning of the word, or native speakers or other languages learn the meaning of terms translated as "human being" into English, at least assuming translation is correct. <br />The reason I think that's the most common sense is precisely because that's how people regularly learn how to use the words. <br /><br />So, how do people learn the meaning of a term, in this case "human being"? <br />Usually, they will hear others say "human being" in different contexts in which the matter appears not contentious - or read what others say, etc. -, and then also perhaps hear others say that such-and-such thing is not a human being, etc. <br />From that, they'll grasp intuitively the meaning of the term. Now, it may be that some of the cases were not actually human beings; a person can hear a term being misused and still eventually grasp the meaning as long as she also sees other people using the term properly and more often. <br /><br />It might happen, however, that there are different subgroups of a linguistic community that use the term differently. If that were to happen, it might be that not only there is more than one meaning, but one is prevalent among some people, and others more prevalent among others, resulting in miscommunication in case people from the different groups do not realize that. <br /><br />A way to avoid miscommunication when one suspects that's what's happening, or alternatively in cases in which for one reason or another, the meaning of a term is disputed, is to "taboo" the term in question and describe the matter in other, non-contentious terms. <br /><br />"But the description misses out something morally relevant: I was that embryo. You deny my argument for this, so I'll turn to that argument."<br />The description does not mean anything. <br />Let me describe it in greater detail, changing also the name (i.e., not you specifically) in order to reduce the chance of personal bias (most of us, if not all, have a tendency like that). <br /><br />I offer the following description D1: <br /><br /><i>D1: At some time t0 (not necessarily an instant; it can be an interval), there was a pregnant woman - say, María, to give her a name -, and human embryo E4, in her uterus. María's pregnancy continued, and the human embryo E4 developed, eventually turning into a human fetus (say, F4), at some time t1. The fetus F4 continued to grow, and eventually, at t2, María gave birth to a baby - say, Marcos. <br />Marcos grew up and became a toddler, then an older child, and eventually an adult, at t3. <br />Presently, Marcos is an adult. <br />If María had decided that she did not want a child, and for that reason she had had an abortion at t0, or at some other time earlier than t1, then E4 would have died, and would not have become F4. There would be no adult Marcos. </i><br />After reading the description, I intuitively reckon it would not have been immoral on María's part to have an abortion at t0, or at some other time earlier than t1.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-24342551192266894842015-12-16T16:00:20.992-07:002015-12-16T16:00:20.992-07:00M.E.,
In re: oak tree, accorn, etc., my point ab...M.E., <br /><br />In re: oak tree, accorn, etc., my point about "young oak tree" and "adult oak tree" is precisely that "oak tree" does not refer to something like "adult oak tree". We may compare - for instance - "adult oak tree" to "adult human being", and "oak tree" to "human being". <br /><br />However, that's a side issue (even within the semantic issue): the analogy does not need anything like that. <br />Rather, the point of the analogy - which I originally made <a rel="nofollow">in an earlier post in this thread</a> - is that even though the terms "oak tree" and "acorn" refer to members of the same species, their respective referents have no members in common. <br /><br />The point of that was to show that from the premise that "human being" and "human embryo" refer to members of the same species, it does not follow that their respective referents have any members in common. <br />Instead of "acorn", perhaps it would have been more clear to say that "oak tree", and "oak embryo" refer to the same species, but their respective referents have no members in common.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-41513270900588789522015-12-16T02:24:05.947-07:002015-12-16T02:24:05.947-07:00Angra,
"You mean, like a human organism with...Angra,<br /><br />"You mean, like a human organism without a brain, but with a computer that is not intelligent just keeping the rest of the body working?"<br /><br />More or less - say the scientist interferes with the embryo's development so that it doesn't develop a brain. You would say there's nothing immoral with his actions?<br /><br /><br />"in the limit case (i.e., right before birth), the difference is what is at stake for the woman: keeping an unwanted fetus inside her, or having to take the risk of delivery, may impose a much heavier burden than just not killing a newborn. "<br /><br />But why make a difference here, given you think it's very immoral to kill a newborn baby? Is it less immoral if the baby is only partly outside the mother, as in partial-birth abortions? The location of the baby seems irrelevant. <br /><br /><br />"I think there is a continuum. But I don't think I need to show that. I don't know the answer (though I would say that how immoral it is to kill a being depends on what the killer knows or should know about that being). <br />But if I am to speculate, in the case of a newborn, it's not self-aware, and also lacks many of the capacities for emotions that people have. Even so, it seems what it has is enough to make it very immoral to kill it, even if less so than a 3 years old child (assessing that intuitively). Even after a few months, that seems to have changed (i.e., there is self-awareness, and a lot more of a range of emotions). So, I would suspect the slope is rather steep after birth."<br /><br />This implied steep drop before birth is puzzling. For around the time birth we have the very same object - a baby - why should there this steep drop when there is no dramatic change in the baby? It's like saying it's very immoral to kill Ben today but much less immoral to have killed him yesterday. Mika's Piano Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14546069684545773784noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-5119171619729821832015-12-16T02:17:34.530-07:002015-12-16T02:17:34.530-07:00Angra,
"I don't have a definition, but...Angra, <br /><br /><br />"I don't have a definition, but I'm talking about the sense people usually talk about when they say "human being"."<br /><br />Even if you don't have a definition, can you give some rough idea of what you have in mind? And why think that sense is the *most* common sense? In fact, I wonder if there are really two senses here, as opposed to one sense which biology tells us also applies to embryos. Just because a term applies to more than one object, it doesn't follow that the terms has more than one sense. This is why I'm asking what you mean by "human being".<br /><br /><br />" my description is much more accurate: as I said, what would have been killed was an embryo, which ended up growing to become you. "<br /><br />But the description misses out something morally relevant: I was that embryo. You deny my argument for this, so I'll turn to that argument.<br /><br />"1. There was an embryo once, call it E1. It never died. Now, there is Mary Kate and Ashley Olsen. Are they identical?<br />If not, how do you make it work, within your rationale? <br />The fact that there are two animals now does not change the fact that there was only one embryo, and that embryo didn't die. Yes, you said earlier that "In the case of twinning, we could say that the pre-split individual ceases to be.". But that's just not true: there was nothing like E1's death."<br /><br />The splitting of E1 into two distinct organisms E2 and E3 was E1's ceasing to exist, and so E1's death. Not only does this sound plausible, but we can also argue that E1 can't be E2 and E3 since the latter two will live distinct lives. Neither can E1 be E2 (or E3), for what non-arbitrary ground could there be for E1 to be E2 as opposed to E3? So the only option is that E1 ceases to exist upon splitting.<br /><br /><br />"2. There was an ovum once. It eventually grew into you. If you're going to say it transformed when it was fertlized, I will point out that: <br />a. The ovum didn't die, either. It developed, even undergoing DNA modifications. The sperm cell apparently died. <br />b. The embryo also underwent radical transformations in its development before there was you. <br />If you don't consider those transformations radical enough, but consider getting DNA from another source radical enough for the purposes of identity language, I would disagree, at least in a context that is relevant here."<br /><br />But the ovum isn't an organism. Sorry, I didn't make this point clear earlier - the argument is talking about the organism that was in my mother's womb several months before I was born.<br /><br /><br />"You already have the description of human embryos, and that wouldn't trigger the intuition that it's impermissible to kill them. Adding to that a less precise description - namely, saying that they're human beings (which they aren't in the most usual sense, but even assuming otherwise) adds only rhetoric."<br /><br />Your initial description didn't say "human embryos", but merely "embryos". If you were to ask me about human embryos, my intuition is that it would be wrong to kill them. Mika's Piano Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14546069684545773784noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-87904029578290246682015-12-16T02:16:55.788-07:002015-12-16T02:16:55.788-07:00Angra,
" a seed (or the seed minus the prote...Angra,<br /><br />" a seed (or the seed minus the protective coat) is an early stage of the development of an oak tree, but not an oak tree, and similarly, an early (the earliest or not) stage human organism is not a person, or in the most common sense, a human being. "<br /><br />But the analogy doesn't work since "oak tree" and "human being" are not analogous. In reply to this, you say:<br /><br />"It's also informative to say "young oak tree" or "adult oak tree" (e.g., http://www.prekinders.com/pdf/TreeLife.pdf ); an expression may refer to more than one stage in the development of an organism. On that note, in the case of human organisms, the word "child" covers many stages, and so does the word "adult", etc."<br /><br />which is true, but is compatible with my point which is that "oak tree" refers to the late stage of an oak plant's development, while "human being" doesn't refer to such a late stage, and so for the analogy to work, we would need both terms to refer to a late developmental stage. We should be comparing, not "oak tree" and "human being," but "oak tree" and "adult human being", in which case, the argument shows us that embryos are not adult human beings, which isn't the conclusion you wanted.<br /><br /><br />To return to the question which led to this oak tree analogy: when did each human being begin to exist? In response to this, you asked: when did each oak tree begin to exist?<br /><br />But the two questions aren't parallel, at least if we take "oak tree" to mean "an oak plant at a late developmental stage", since I'm not asking when a human being enters a late developmental stage. For the questions to be parallel, you need to ask: when did each oak plant begin to exist? Whatever the answer is, obviously it will be earlier than the point/interval it became an oak tree.<br /><br />So again: when did each human being begin to exist? This isn't to be answered by linguistic intuition - whether something is a human being or not doesn't depend on how we use words. Mika's Piano Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14546069684545773784noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-26997144509862315252015-12-15T12:03:28.444-07:002015-12-15T12:03:28.444-07:00M.E.,
"On minds, suppose a scientist clones ...M.E.,<br /><br />"On minds, suppose a scientist clones human beings in such a way that they never develop minds in whatever sense you consider relevant. Suppose he takes the adults he's developed and kills them - would you say this killing is immoral?"<br />You mean, like a human organism without a brain, but with a computer that is not intelligent just keeping the rest of the body working? <br />Generally, the killing would not be immoral, though I guess it depends on the circumstances. <br />Examples like that are those in which the brain is dead for the most part - at least, if we have conclusive evidence of that, killing would not be per se immoral (it might be for other reasons, e.g., others would be psychologically hurt and there is no good reason for that). <br /><br />I did specify they don't need to be able to exercise their mental capacities at all time: an unconscious person with a brain still has a human mind, even if dormant. <br /><br />I will add some points about newborns and abortion - just to be thorough: <br /><br />a. I think it would be very immoral for a woman to kill her newborn baby - though how much depends on the circumstances, including her state of mind-, but not as much as killing, say, a 10 or 12 years old. <br />That's enough to justify a ban, and even prison time, though not as much as for murder. <br />b. Late-term abortions are usually still much earlier than that. But in the limit case (i.e., right before birth), the difference is what is at stake for the woman: keeping an unwanted fetus inside her, or having to take the risk of delivery, may impose a much heavier burden than just not killing a newborn. That could make her behavior less immoral - while still immoral -, and a ban too burdensome. <br />So, that's why I don't support a ban before birth - but I do think that's immoral behavior -, but I do after birth. <br /><br />"On anti-abortion activists, I can't speak for them. I live in a country where abortion is illegal. Over here, the focus of pro-lifers is the prevention of the legalization of abortion, so I haven't thought much about this issue. But it definitely is food for thought, thank you for pressing me on it."<br />I thought we were debating the US case, but I too live in a country like that. <br />In that case, the matter is actually <i>much more puzzling</i>, since abortion is <i>already</i> criminalized where you live (and where we live), but on the other hand, <i>making embryos in large numbers and then killing them is legal</i> - well, at least it is where I live, and in most countries where abortion is illegal (including nearly all if not all of Latin America, as far as I can tell). <br /><br />So, nearly all (save for some infrequent rulings with no lasting effects) of those so-called pro-lifers are focusing activism on preventing the legalization of abortions, mostly ignoring the embryos already being legally produced and killed. <br /><br />"Maybe we have a continuum here and it is vague where this point is located. Even so, we would still need to show why the vague area is, say, from 3 years old and below, as opposed to 2 years old and below. "<br />I think there is a continuum. But I don't think I need to show that. I don't know the answer (though I would say that how immoral it is to kill a being depends on what the killer knows or should know about that being). <br />But if I am to speculate, in the case of a newborn, it's not self-aware, and also lacks many of the capacities for emotions that people have. Even so, it seems what it has is enough to make it very immoral to kill it, even if less so than a 3 years old child (assessing that intuitively). Even after a few months, that seems to have changed (i.e., there is self-awareness, and a lot more of a range of emotions). So, I would suspect the slope is rather steep after birth.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-72152841626694737122015-12-15T12:02:54.339-07:002015-12-15T12:02:54.339-07:00M.E.,
"Moreover, consider the embryo in my ...M.E., <br /><br />"Moreover, consider the embryo in my mother's womb several months before my birth - call it E. At no point during the pregnancy can we say that E died - rather, throughout the pregnancy we see E's continuous development and growth, nothing like E's death. But if E hasn't died, then E is still alive. If so, then where is E, but where I am now. E grew into an animal, and I myself am an animal, and since there is only one animal where I am now, E are I are identical."<br />1. There was an embryo once, call it E1. It never died. Now, there is Mary Kate and Ashley Olsen. Are they identical?<br />If not, how do you make it work, within your rationale? <br />The fact that there are two animals now does not change the fact that there was only one embryo, and that embryo <i>didn't die</i>. Yes, you said earlier that "In the case of twinning, we could say that the pre-split individual ceases to be.". But that's just not true: there was nothing like E1's death. <br /><br />2. There was an ovum once. It eventually grew into you. If you're going to say it transformed when it was fertlized, I will point out that: <br />a. The ovum didn't die, either. It developed, even undergoing DNA modifications. The sperm cell apparently died. <br />b. The embryo also underwent radical transformations in its development before there was you. <br />If you don't consider those transformations radical enough, but consider getting DNA from another source radical enough for the purposes of identity language, I would disagree, at least in a context that is relevant here. <br /><br />But again, given a more accurate description that is also easy, what is the purpose of the imprecise language? <br /><br />"Moral intuitions are fallible, as you mention. One way moral intuitions can fail is if they are based on inadequate evidence. So if my evidence tells me (mistakenly) that Jack is guilty of rape, then my intuition would say "Jack should be punished." But upon acquiring better evidence, my moral assessment of the scenario may (and should) change contrary to my initial intuitions. This adjustment given new evidence isn't incompatible with reliance on intuitions, given that intuitions aren't infallible.<br /><br />In the case of abortion, without the evidence that tells me that embryos are human, my intuition would say "It is permissible to kill embryos." I need that evidence to support my assessment that it's immoral to kill embryos."<br />That's not more evidence. <br />You already have the description of human embryos, and that wouldn't trigger the intuition that it's impermissible to kill them. Adding to that a less precise description - namely, saying that they're human beings (which they aren't in the most usual sense, but even assuming otherwise) adds only rhetoric. <br /><br />But let me try another way: even when I (and many, probably most of us) are told that the embryos are human embryos, and even when we know in considerable detail how they developed, we still reckon, intuitively, that it's not immoral to kill them. Further calling them "human beings" does not add any piece of data to the biological description of the entity: it adds either a false description, or at best a less precise one. <br /><br />"It is also worth noting that intuitions can still *seem* to be true even if we have defeaters for those intuitions. For example, even after grasping Russell's paradox, one may still have the intuition that any definable collection is a set, or even after knowing a pencil is not crooked, one may still have the visual seeming that that pencil submerged in a glass is crooked, and so on."<br />I don't have that intuition in the Russell case, but in any case, those prima-facie intuitions are in conflict with other, stronger intuitions (e.g., after getting further info, we assign very low probability to the hypothesis that the pencil is crooked). On the other hand, we don't have any defeaters for our moral intuition in this case.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-26978592652494130372015-12-15T11:59:27.840-07:002015-12-15T11:59:27.840-07:00M.E.,
"Thinking over this analogy, I wonde...M.E., <br /><br /><br />"Thinking over this analogy, I wonder if "acorn" and "embryo" are really analogous. Acorns are nuts that contain one or two oak seeds, so perhaps the more precise analogy is between "oak seed" and "embryo". But is being an oak seed the earliest, or an early, stage of a plant's life? If not, then "oak seed" and "embryo" are not analogous. "<br />Well, the seed is an embryo covered in a protective coat, as far as I know, and it's not the earliest stage. That's the zygote, and the same applies to humans, so we've been somewhat imprecise here. But even so, the relevant part of the analogy does hold: namely, a seed (or the seed minus the protective coat) is an early stage of the development of an oak tree, but not an oak tree, and similarly, an early (the earliest or not) stage human organism is not a person, or in the most common sense, a human being. <br /><br />"But another disanalogy is between "oak tree" and "human being", since the former refers to a particular stage in an oak plant's development, while the latter doesn't refer to any particular stage in a human's development (which is why it isn't redundant, but informative, to say "adult/mature/fully grown human being")."<br />It's also informative to say "young oak tree" or "adult oak tree" (e.g., http://www.prekinders.com/pdf/TreeLife.pdf ); an expression may refer to more than one stage in the development of an organism. On that note, in the case of human organisms, the word "child" covers many stages, and so does the word "adult", etc.<br /><br />"If this sense isn't the most usual one, what would you say is?"<br />I don't have a definition, but I'm talking about the sense people usually talk about when they say "human being". <br /><br />"To deprive me of life assumes that I am alive prior to that deprivation, so if my parents hadn't met, it isn't the case that I was deprived of my life."<br />I considered that option, since your statement had more than one potential interpretation. <br /><br />"Of course, this assumes that the embryo in my mother's womb several months before my birth was identical to me, which you reject. But why do you reject this identity claim? You say "I think identity expressions have different meanings in different contexts. In this context, I wouldn't use it, as it gives the wrong impression." But to say it gives the wrong impression seems assume that the identity claim is false, which is question-begging."<br />I might was well say that claiming identity is question-begging. Both you and I are making our own assessments, given our linguistic intuitions, and sometimes backing them up, though I'm not saying it's false, but rather, ambiguous: there is a sense in which it's true, and one in which it's not. <br />I reject it in the sense in which identity is generally used in the context of expressions like "depriving X of life", given that those terms give the wrong impression - those expressions are, at best, too ambiguous for the context. <br />On the other hand, my description is much more accurate: as I said, what would have been killed was an embryo, which ended up growing to become you. That describes the situation more precisely, reducing the chance of confusion about what's actually going on by means of describing it in much less precise terms. <br /><br />Given that a more precise description is available and easy, a less precise one seems to be useful only for rhetorical purposes. But those rhetoric is precisely what might convince people by confusion - what a person gets in their head is the killing of <i>you</i>, and by "you" they think about, well, <i>you</i>, not an embryo. <br /><br />In a sense, you were alive even before fertilization, when you were an ovum.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-18878676724542435072015-12-15T07:32:30.573-07:002015-12-15T07:32:30.573-07:00Angra,
"But I'd say that's the wron...Angra, <br /><br />"But I'd say that's the wrong way to assess a moral matter. It ignores precisely our moral intuitions, that tells us that it's not wrong to kill embryos"<br /><br />Moral intuitions are fallible, as you mention. One way moral intuitions can fail is if they are based on inadequate evidence. So if my evidence tells me (mistakenly) that Jack is guilty of rape, then my intuition would say "Jack should be punished." But upon acquiring better evidence, my moral assessment of the scenario may (and should) change contrary to my initial intuitions. This adjustment given new evidence isn't incompatible with reliance on intuitions, given that intuitions aren't infallible. <br /><br />In the case of abortion, without the evidence that tells me that embryos are human, my intuition would say "It is permissible to kill embryos." I need that evidence to support my assessment that it's immoral to kill embryos.<br /><br />It is also worth noting that intuitions can still *seem* to be true even if we have defeaters for those intuitions. For example, even after grasping Russell's paradox, one may still have the intuition that any definable collection is a set, or even after knowing a pencil is not crooked, one may still have the visual seeming that that pencil submerged in a glass is crooked, and so on. <br /><br /><br />On minds, suppose a scientist clones human beings in such a way that they never develop minds in whatever sense you consider relevant. Suppose he takes the adults he's developed and kills them - would you say this killing is immoral? <br /><br /><br />On anti-abortion activists, I can't speak for them. I live in a country where abortion is illegal. Over here, the focus of pro-lifers is the prevention of the legalization of abortion, so I haven't thought much about this issue. But it definitely is food for thought, thank you for pressing me on it.<br /><br /><br />One last point: hopefully we can agree that killing a 10 year old is as immoral as killing 9 year old. Is killing a 9 year old as immoral as killing an 8 year old? How about killing an 8 year old vs. killing a 7 year old? And so on. At what point does it cease being immoral to kill the child, and why? Maybe we have a continuum here and it is vague where this point is located. Even so, we would still need to show why the vague area is, say, from 3 years old and below, as opposed to 2 years old and below.Mika's Piano Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14546069684545773784noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-33675259237643962862015-12-15T07:30:08.666-07:002015-12-15T07:30:08.666-07:00Angra,
I understand, there are a lot of points to...Angra,<br /><br />I understand, there are a lot of points to cover here, and not enough time and space. So I appreciate the long and detailed replies. :)<br /><br />"But the acorn is not an oak tree, and the embryo is not a human being."<br /><br />Thinking over this analogy, I wonder if "acorn" and "embryo" are really analogous. Acorns are nuts that contain one or two oak seeds, so perhaps the more precise analogy is between "oak seed" and "embryo". But is being an oak seed the earliest, or an early, stage of a plant's life? If not, then "oak seed" and "embryo" are not analogous. <br /><br />Not being a botanist, let's assume for the sake of argument that oak seeds are oak plants at an early stage of their existence. (If this turns out to be false, then we can replace "oak seed" with whatever turns out to be an early stage of an oak plant's existence.) <br /><br />But another disanalogy is between "oak tree" and "human being", since the former refers to a particular stage in an oak plant's development, while the latter doesn't refer to any particular stage in a human's development (which is why it isn't redundant, but informative, to say "adult/mature/fully grown human being"). For the analogy to work, we would need to compare "oak tree" with "adult human being" - in which case the uncontroversial conclusion is "embryos are not adult human beings" - or "oak plant" with "human being" - in which case the oak seed *is* an oak plant, and by parity of reasoning, the embryo *is* a human being.<br /><br />All in all, I'm not sure the acorn analogy helps falsify the claim that embryos are human beings. Moreover, it should be emphasized that there's a natural sense in which embryos are human beings, though admittedly we disagree about how common this sense is. If this sense isn't the most usual one, what would you say is?<br /><br /><br />" If the embryo in question had been aborted, you would not be alive. Sure. For that matter, if your parents hadn't met, you would not be alive"<br /><br />To deprive me of life assumes that I am alive prior to that deprivation, so if my parents hadn't met, it isn't the case that I was deprived of my life. Of course, this assumes that the embryo in my mother's womb several months before my birth was identical to me, which you reject. <br /><br />But why do you reject this identity claim? You say "I think identity expressions have different meanings in different contexts. In this context, I wouldn't use it, as it gives the wrong impression." But to say it gives the wrong impression seems assume that the identity claim is false, which is question-begging. <br /><br />Moreover, consider the embryo in my mother's womb several months before my birth - call it E. At no point during the pregnancy can we say that E died - rather, throughout the pregnancy we see E's continuous development and growth, nothing like E's death. But if E hasn't died, then E is still alive. If so, then where is E, but where I am now. E grew into an animal, and I myself am an animal, and since there is only one animal where I am now, E are I are identical.Mika's Piano Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14546069684545773784noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-73962624727362301392015-12-15T00:07:54.821-07:002015-12-15T00:07:54.821-07:00M.E:
Just one more point, with respect to fetuses...M.E:<br /><br />Just one more point, with respect to fetuses: while it's not always intuitively clear to me whether it would be immoral for a woman to kill a fetus because she does not want to later have a child, it's intuitively clear that killing it would not be nearly as immoral as killing, say, a 10 years old for the same reason. Also, I support (all other things equal) allowing abortion at any stage in the pregnancy even if it's immoral in the final stages, considering the burden that otherwise would be imposed on the woman, and the degree of immorality of the killing (i.e., not high enough to justify such a burden). Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-74485886217395542272015-12-14T23:54:04.116-07:002015-12-14T23:54:04.116-07:00"Let me ask you too: since you have appealed ..."Let me ask you too: since you have appealed to the notion of personhood often in this discussion, roughly, what are your criteria of personhood, and why think personhood in your sense is morally relevant here?"<br /><br />I don't have an explicit criteria; as with other words, I think I'm linguistically competent to use them, but giving a definition that matches usage is extremely difficult (dictionaries give approximations that are usually good enough for the purposes of the people looking them up). <br />As for this thread, you used it too (e.g., you said "One reason is that it is wrong to deprive people of their lives for the purposes cited in most abortion cases"), and perhaps the main reason I often discuss it is that many anti-abortion activists claim that embryos are persons. <br />But still, if you ask me to speculate, I think personhood probably has something to do with the sort of mind an entity has, and - given different scenarios - that seems to be at least a close match to the hypothetical scenarios usually considered in these contexts and in which it turns out it's very immoral to kill entities (which I assess intuitively). In other words, it might be that the ordinary concept of personhood roughly tracks a sort of mind such that it's very immoral to kill entities who have it (i.e., killing them for the already sketched reasons, and others). <br />Even so, there are other minds such that killing entities with that sort of mind is immoral (albeit perhaps to a lesser extent), so at a more basic level, it seems to me it's about the sort of mind an entity has (including cases of instrumental value, etc.).<br /><br />All that said, even though my point about minds is speculative, the one about personhood is considerably more so. In particular, if it turned out that I'm mistaken about the meaning of "person" and embryos properly qualify despite lacking minds, I would say that personhood was not an important factor, but minds probably are.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-16233301454414940632015-12-14T23:53:37.838-07:002015-12-14T23:53:37.838-07:00"No, but I do think they should be punished. ..."No, but I do think they should be punished. If capital punishment is permissible, then maybe they should be given the death penalty, I don't know. I haven't pursued this idea much."<br />1. I'd like to ask, why haven't you, or most activists? <br />Those clinics make and kill thousands of embryos. You seem to propose banning abortion in the US, and - given your answer - probably imposing either long prison sentences or the death penalty for doctors, nurses, etc., who practice abortions. And - given the debate here -, you seem quite committed to that view. <br />But you don't seem to be arguing (at least, without prompting) for the imprisonment or execution of those involved in fertility clinics. <br />This does not seem to be a personal preference: in fact, anti-abortion activists in general seem almost entirely unconcerned about all of those clinics that make embryos and then kill them, except perhaps to remove federal funding, but there is no push for prison or death. <br />However, given the usual rationales, it's puzzling that anti-abortion activists are not more generally anti-killing-embryos/fetuses activists, or why they don't try to ban fertilization clinics - which, after all, probably can't use Roe v. Wade or similar rulings in their favor if they face a state law banning them. <br /><br /><br />2.Your answer is "no". Would you give the same answer if we were talking not about fertility clinics, but a factory like the one I described earlier, assuming it's legalized? <br />In other words, do you think it wouldn't be justified to kill the people who run the factory or those who willingly work there (because they'd deserve it and also in order to stop them from doing it again), if it were legal to have such factory? <br />Personally, I think it would be justified to kill them in that context - not the people running or working in fertility clinics, of course, but the nightmarish scenario I outlined earlier; from the perspective you seem to be proposing, the two would appear morally similar at least. <br /><br />"Besides having a strong intuition about the value of human life (don't you think human life has great value?) I also find alternatives - for example, personhood theory - arbitrary."<br />That depends. <br />I don't think the lives of human ova, muscle cells, or embryos are morally important, other than instrumentally (e.g., if a woman has some of her ova frozen for later use, destroying them would be immoral without a good reason, because she values them). <br />I do think the lives of adult humans, 10 year old kids, etc., are important morally - that's an intuitive assessment. <br />My speculative hypothesis is that that's because of the sort of mind they have, so it would be immoral to take those lives for the sketched reasons, as long as the killer is a moral agent who knows or should know what sort of mind they have, or at least should realize that he or she does not know that they <i>don't</i> have the right sort of mind. <br /><br />I would go with c. here. If I find all theories other than X implausible for one reason or another, and X is against moral intuitions, then I also find X implausible, I recognize I don't know why it's immoral, as is the case for most people and with respect to most immoral behaviors.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.com