tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post4022365267358619681..comments2024-03-27T15:34:14.749-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: Arguing for Dualism: The Identity Defense (Not to be Confused with the Twinkie Defense)Victor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger149125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-41179009913499451212011-12-04T20:17:46.117-07:002011-12-04T20:17:46.117-07:00Mattghg (acting as devil's advocate): "I ...<b>Mattghg (acting as devil's advocate):</b> "<i>I don't think that this [the OP] is a strong argument. Surely it's a feature of functionism that the same mind could be instantiated in different physical systems?</i>" <br /><br /><b>Ilíon:</b> "<i>And, therefore, the "same" mind can be instantiated two or more times, simultaneously. Right?</i>"<br /><br /><b>Mattghg (acting as devil's advocate):</b> "<i>Of course, a lot of people (including me) think that this is a weakness of functionism, but it does address the 'Identity Defence' discussed here.</i>" <br /><br /><b>Ilíon:</b> "<i>Does it now? In what sense are two (or more) seperate instantiations of the "same" mind the same mind?<br /><br />It seems to me that Prokop's argument, far from being </i>answered<i> [by] this 'functionalism' (as you've presented it), shows it [functionalism] to be false; for taking the two together shows that the mind is not in the physical system.</i>"<br /><br />==<br /><b>Mattghg (acting as devil's advocate):</b> "<i>In what sense are two or more instantiations of the same book the same book? Are two or more instantiations of the same computer program the same computer program? If functionism true, so it is with minds.</i>"<br /><br /><b>Ilíon:</b> "<i>You instantiate 'adult human male'; I likewise instantiate 'adult human male': therefore, I am you.</i>"<br /><br /><b>Mattghg (acting as devil's advocate):</b> "<i>Nope. For that to be the case we'd have to instantiate <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/" rel="nofollow">all and only</a> the same properties - or at least, all of the properties relevant to the identity of a </i>person<i>. Which properties those are is precisely the point of this thread. A functionist will say that the relevant properties are precisely the functional ones.</i>"<br /><br />Tell me, again, why do I care *what* the functionalist <i>posits</i> (*)?<br /><br />Of course I am not you and you are not me; but on what ground does your hypothetical functionalist -- who is, after all, denying that <i>our identities</i>, our "self-ness", out minds, are a real things -- say this?<br /><br />What whould those "all and only" properties be? Recall, your hypothetical functionalist is <i>positing</i> this strange idea as a means to escape the argument of the OP -- basically, he's "arguing" in this manner: "<i>IF I can *posit* that 'the same mind could be instantiated in different physical systems', THEN the argument that the persistence of personal identity across physical/material changes to the body proves that 'identity' is a non-material and non-physical entity can be avoided or sidestepped</i>" -- so, he cannot point to merely physical/material properties.<br /><br />And, should he try anyway to use physical/material properties to logically differentiate you from me, then there goes his claim that "<i>the same mind could be instantiated in different physical systems</i>".<br /><br /><br /><br />(*) This is big problem -- and a constant annoyance to me: 'atheists' <i>posit</i> strange and silly stuff (**), and "theists" are "too polite" to call them on it.<br /><br />(**) For instance, consider Parbouj and his parboiled idea/assertion that by <i>positing</i> something he's calling 'Platonic', and duct-taping that to atheism, he somehow escapes being a materialist; and consider his further strange idea/assertion that that his private 'atheism' thereby escapes my proof that atheism is anti-rational and false, which incorrect belief has two parts:<br />1) the false idea/assertion that <i>his</i> atheism rises above materialism;<br />2) the false idea/assertion that my argument is <i>about</i> materialism, in the first place.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-37519320165423871162011-11-30T05:57:20.419-07:002011-11-30T05:57:20.419-07:00In case people don't know from other threads, ...In case people don't know from other threads, I should point out that I'm not a naturalist. I'm just trying to give the naturalist his due. Perhaps I'm not doing a very good job of it, but then no actual naturalist is here offering anything better (or so it seems to me).<br /><br />Anonymous,<br /><br />I don't disagree with your comments, your observation is one of my main issues with a thoroughgoing nominalism-pragmatism ... but that takes us a a fair way from the OP, especially as that argument didn't seem to be specifically about the first-person perspective only about identity over time.<br /><br />If the naturalist can solve the latter problem along the lines I've suggested, that certainly doesn't mean there aren't any problems left, and indeed may just be creating bigger problems elsewhere. Maybe the naturalist <b>need</b> a different answer to the ship of Theseus. Not because functionalism fails, but because nominalism-pragmatism has exhibits a parallel failure.Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-30899139380526143412011-11-30T02:35:36.197-07:002011-11-30T02:35:36.197-07:00Steve,
"But I'm very tempted by the nomi...Steve,<br /><br />"But I'm very tempted by the nominalist approach to things like ships, and believe it is perfectly consistent with our referring to them as things, even though they aren't "substances" or "natural kinds" ... and then it's difficult (for me) not to allow the naturalist to say the same thing is plausible for human persons, at least considered from a third person perspective."<br /><br />This sounds an awful lot like the claim that solipsism can account for everything we experience. Absolutely, so long as we put aside all first person (mental) considerations and treat all that we see as exhaustively described in the third person, we can account for everything. Except ourselves and our first person perspective. And in all cases it's our first person experience and mind that we're framing all other "explanations" in terms of.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-53763546914845664332011-11-30T01:48:46.479-07:002011-11-30T01:48:46.479-07:00Anonymous ...
I was vaguely thinking the same thi...Anonymous ...<br /><br />I was vaguely thinking the same thing myself. Something cannot maintain itself in existence unless there is something, some <i>thing</i>, there to be maintained.<br /><br />But is that really true? I can understand someone being suspicious of that. Indeed, to an extent I share those suspicions. But I'm very tempted by the nominalist approach to things like ships, and believe it is perfectly consistent with our referring to them as things, even though they aren't "substances" or "natural kinds" ... and then it's difficult (for me) not to allow the naturalist to say the same thing is plausible for human persons, at least considered from a third person perspective. Certainly if this view has problems it isn't clear that those problems really stem from the sort of considerations in the OP. Indeed, those are just the sort of issue that this sort of view handles incredibly well.<br /><br />To my mind the question is whether such a view is consistent with the first person perspective. The paper by Bill Vallicella that JSA mentioned earlier is rather interesting in this regard. To save you scrolling, you can find it <a href="http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2011/03/can-the-chariot-take-us-to-the-land-of-no-self.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>.Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-298796527581849402011-11-29T18:27:31.786-07:002011-11-29T18:27:31.786-07:00Steve,
"Functional integrity relates to a th...Steve,<br /><br />"Functional integrity relates to a thing's ability to maintain it's own existence in whatever environment it happens to exist. This weaker concept of functional integrity is strong enough to do the work required of it in the ship case, but weak enough to be naturalistically acceptable."<br /><br />But that seems to right away assume that "a thing" has some kind of intrinsic existence. There is objectively/intrinsically "a thing" X, and X is engaging in acts that are "maintaining its existence". Or if it's not objective and intrinsic, and we're just talking about what our minds are regarding as the functions and purposes of something relative to our own interests, then it seems nothing is being explained at all by the naturalist explanation.<br /><br />Maybe that gets into a line of questioning that your original argument wasn't meant to explore.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-63617317470084800022011-11-29T15:42:54.955-07:002011-11-29T15:42:54.955-07:00Ilion, what do you make of this? Do you accept tha...Ilion, what do you make of this? Do you accept that I was making a confusion? If so, you seem to have been making the same one. If it's not a confusion, how come?<br /><br />I've come up with two possible rejoinders for you:<br /><br />(1) We can't talk about the functional integrity of something which doesn't have a function. And either a person doesn't have a function, or if they do naturalism is false as this implies a "meta-teleology".<br />(2) It doesn't make any difference whether we are talking about functional integrity of people as a whole or the functions of individual mental states. Both are extrinsic qualities which are ascribed <i>by</i> persons. Without bootstrapping it's therefore impossible for these to be constitutive <i>of</i> persons.<br /><br />I guess the naturalist replies as follows:<br /><br />(1') Yes we can. Functional integrity relates to a thing's ability to maintain it's own existence in whatever environment it happens to exist. This weaker concept of functional integrity is strong enough to do the work required of it in the ship case, but weak enough to be naturalistically acceptable.<br />(2') It does make a difference. Functional integrity in the sense of (1') is not ascribed.Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-20440528661663995552011-11-29T15:42:34.239-07:002011-11-29T15:42:34.239-07:00A clarification:
Stirred to further thoughts by P...A clarification:<br /><br />Stirred to further thoughts by Parbouj's comment about the function of the heart, I now wonder if I've (we've?) made a natural but incorrect slide in the discussion of functions. The "functional" response to the ship of Theseus (and allied cases) involves the functional integrity of the ship as a whole. Functional<i>ism</i> is about the functions of individual mental states.<br /><br />To answer the "original argument" the naturalist need only be able to say what the functional integrity of a person consists in, and presumably that (according to the naturalist at least) will mostly be a relatively non-mysterious medical matter.<br /><br />Sorry to anyone who feels they've been led on a wild-goose chase.Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-9129402316470535562011-11-29T10:56:11.696-07:002011-11-29T10:56:11.696-07:00Mattghg:
++
For that to be the case we'd have ...Mattghg:<br />++<br />For that to be the case we'd have to instantiate all and only the same properties - or at least, all of the properties relevant to the identity of a person. <br />==<br /><br />And, from physics, we know that two electrons that are not at all discernible in their intrinsic properties are different electrons if they can be added together to form an object with twice the charge. Thus, an exact duplicate of you is not you if when you are next to one another you are two objects, not one.<br /><br />Individuality does not require mental properties.Williamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12533263841520213358noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-65300042242319332602011-11-29T10:26:06.605-07:002011-11-29T10:26:06.605-07:00Steve, I think functions are not intrinsic, but th...Steve, I think functions are not intrinsic, but that doesn't mean they depend upon the intentional stance. E.g., I think there are objective functions that are not intrinsically characterized (e.g., fnct of heart is to pump blood, whether I know it or not).<br /><br />I'm thinking of Millikan, Fodor, Dretske.<br /><br />Obviously the question is whether this ship will sail when it comes to consciousness...I am doubtful, but I am a panpsychist/property dualist.parboujhttp://parb.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-16425118564313105582011-11-29T07:03:15.945-07:002011-11-29T07:03:15.945-07:00The problem is that function is not intrinsic
Ind...<i>The problem is that function is not intrinsic</i><br /><br />Indeed; it's possible to <a href="http://www.davidchess.com/words/poc/lanier_zombie.html" rel="nofollow">find</a> just about anything with the same 'function' as just about anything else.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07342391408412861663noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-15160224261769364602011-11-29T06:58:09.859-07:002011-11-29T06:58:09.859-07:00Troylion, I will again try to help you with condit...Troylion, I will again try to help you with conditional reasoning. In the meantime, you might pick up a logic book or take a class aimed at freshmen.<br /><br />You said simple organisms disprove materialism, I gave a counterargument to show this is false. Iliotroy as usual completely misses the logical flow and responds:<br />"Anyone who is not committed to lying to himself ought to be able to see that such an event would not, and cannot in principle, support or provide evidence for naturalism/materialism"<br /><br />Again, missing the logical flow. <br />A-->B<br />does not imply<br />~A-->~B<br />I gave no indication that I supported materialism, only that your claim does not work as a refutation of materialism. Not the same thing. I'm sorry Ilion you have such trouble keeping up.<br /><br />You embarass yourself in every thread here. Literally. Go take a freshman logic class, and then come back. Not everyone has the patience I do to explain week-one propositional logic to you, to build the ramp for you so you can understand simple arguments.parboujhttp://parb.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-9604473065867586412011-11-29T06:17:24.791-07:002011-11-29T06:17:24.791-07:00You instantiate 'adult human male'; I like...<i>You instantiate 'adult human male'; I likewise instantiate 'adult human male': therefore,</i><br /><br />We are the same species and the same sex.<br /><br /><i>I am you.</i><br /><br />Nope. For that to be the case we'd have to instantiate <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/" rel="nofollow"><i>all and only</i></a> the same properties - or at least, all of the properties relevant to the identity of a <i>person</i>. Which properties those are is precisely the point of this thread. A functionist will say that the relevant properties are precisely the functional ones.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07342391408412861663noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-27337150481212738702011-11-29T02:17:22.325-07:002011-11-29T02:17:22.325-07:00Thanks Ilion,
You're quite right, I rather mi...Thanks Ilion,<br /><br />You're quite right, I rather misremembered your earlier comments. Anyway, I was still keen to have your take on the ship, which you've now kindly provided in your long and (to me) helpful comment.<br /><br />If I understand you rightly, you are saying that the "function" response to the ship of Theseus case is incoherent. It attempts to say the original ship is the same as the later one, but it ends up also denying this. Again, if I read you rightly this is because it makes the ship's "identity" extrinsic to the ship. I'm not sure that's how I would describe it, but it certainly makes it extrinsic to the ships parts, even when taken in total.<br /><br />I don't think that necessarily makes it a bad response to the case of the ship, but I agree with you that it's a difficult to see that this can be coherent applied to ourselves. Indeed, I've never managed to see that as a coherent view.<br /><br />The problem is that function is not intrinsic, and is read-into the ship; it's a projection, as it were, of the human mind. The mind "smearing itself" on the world (whose phrase was that again?). But to say the same thing about the mind itself seems incoherent. How can the mind be a useful fiction created minds which are themselves useful fictions? The bootstrapping involved looks simply non-sensical.<br /><br />This has always been what bothered me about, for example, Dennett's "intentional stance". How can the mind merely be such a useful fiction when viewing people from a third person perspective? What enables us to take such a perspective if the "intentional stance" really is a fiction? Charity makes me think this can't really be what Dennett meant, but he certainly gives the impression of thinking this.<br /><br />Where does this leave the original argument?<br /><br />(A1) The original argument against naturalism of the mind could be accepted as sound if one takes a functionalist approach to the mind.<br />(A2) But a functionalist approach to the mind seems incoherent on other grounds (as per the above).<br />(A3) Therefore if naturalism is to be defended, naturalists need a different response to the orginal argument.<br /><br />Ok, so naturalists out there, you have three options:<br /><br />(i) Find another response to the original argument.<br />(ii) Defend functionalism against these charges of bootstapping.<br />(iii) Find another option, but I don't see one.<br /><br />Any takers?Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-53321379529855957532011-11-28T22:06:08.674-07:002011-11-28T22:06:08.674-07:00Mattghg (acting as devil's advocate): "In...<b>Mattghg (acting as devil's advocate):</b> "<i>In what sense are two or more instantiations of the same book the same book? Are two or more instantiations of the same computer program the same computer program? If functionism true, so it is with minds.</i>"<br /><br />You instantiate 'adult human male'; I likewise instantiate 'adult human male': therefore, I am you.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-69183608144622437642011-11-28T21:56:19.219-07:002011-11-28T21:56:19.219-07:00Son-of-Confusion: "One thing unites the paran...<b>Son-of-Confusion:</b> "<i>One thing unites the paranoid left-wing Atheist called J & the right wing one note Theistic Personalist named Ilion. <br /><br />Obsessive hatred of Edward Feser.</i>"<br /><br />I begin to wonder whether there is any limit to the foolishness of Son-of-Confusion.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-67845794124545833252011-11-28T21:45:54.336-07:002011-11-28T21:45:54.336-07:00The foolish Half-Boiled reveals his commitment to ...The foolish Half-Boiled reveals his commitment to being a fool and demonstrating his foolishness (and demonstrates, once again, his disinclination to think logically and rationally): "<i>And when scientists construct a living cell in the lab, will that cell also disprove materialism? Or will it not have the magical vital dust? Will it necessarily leave something out?</i>"<br /><br />When is this miraculous event, always just over the horizon, going to happen? <br /><br />[Never, in fact] But, let us pretend that some scientists do actually bring into being a living organism "from scratch". Anyone who is not committed to lying to himself ought to be able to see that such an event would not, and cannot in principle, support or provide evidence for naturalism/materialism: for, this novel organism was <i>intended</i>.<br /><br />Ths Half-Boiled materialist, who dishonestly denies that he is a materialist, refuses to understand (for, after all, he *is* intellectually dishonest) that the AfR (at any rate, my formulation of it) applies even to the magical materialism+Platonism he imagines he has discovered: for the issue at the base of my argument isn't the existence of physical/material entities, but rather whether they exist <i>intentionally</i>.<br /><br /><br />And, by the way, 'vitalism' is actually a statement of materialism/naturalism; and I am not a materialist.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-37198805991492301432011-11-28T20:28:10.241-07:002011-11-28T20:28:10.241-07:00Iliotroy reveals his vitalism:
" even an amoe...Iliotroy reveals his vitalism:<br />" even an amoeba disproves materialism/naturalism/atheism."<br /><br />And when scientists construct a living cell in the lab, will that cell also disprove materialism? Or will it not have the magical vital dust? Will it necessarily leave something out?parboujhttp://parb.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-49998770127769930992011-11-28T16:37:27.460-07:002011-11-28T16:37:27.460-07:00Steve Lovell: "Way back up there somewhere yo...<b>Steve Lovell:</b> "<i>Way back up there somewhere you said that you'd seen several responses to the ship of Theseus issue and weren't convinced ...</i>"<br /><br />I did? Well, I <a href="http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2011/11/arguing-for-dualism-identity-defense.html#c7983013269025315037" rel="nofollow">certainly *meant* to say:</a> "<i>Moreover, the solution (at any rate, the only one I've seen offered) to the 'Theseus' Ship Paradox' isn't really available for this variation on it. In this regard, it's like Swinburne's observation that having turned, say, 'redness' into a subjective mental state, the modernist/materialist cannot then sweep the </i>subject<i> under the same rug.</i>"<br /><br /><b>Steve Lovell:</b> "<i>... But you didn't say what responses you were thinking of or why you weren't convinced.</i>"<br /><br />Myself, I've seen exactly one proposed "Yes, it's the same ship" solution to the paradox, which went something like this: <i>since the *function* of the ship-in-toto, and of the individual parts of which it is comprised, remains the same, the ship we can see and touch is the same ship that Theseus could see and touch centuries ago.</i><br /><br />But, this "solution" *actually* denies that the ship the philosophers were discussing is/was the same ship in which Theseus sailed. For this "solution" admits that the ship's (supposed) identity is not <i>intrinsic</i> to the ship, but is rather extrinsically <i>ascribed</i> to the ship by purposful agents. In reality, this "solution" amounts to "<i>It's the same ship because we say it's the same ship</i>".<br /><br /><b>Steve Lovell:</b> "<i>... or why you weren't convinced.</i>"<br /><br />I am not simply unconvinced by the proffered solution; I know that the correct answer is: "<i>No, it's not the same ship.</i>" For the ship, as with most (or even all) non-living physical entities, has no intrinsic identity, no self-hood.<br /><br />If you were to take a carefully selected rock, and pulverize it into its constituent molecules and atoms, taking exacting care to let not one single atom escapre from you, would you still have the same rock? Why not? If, instead, you merely broke it into to halves of equal mass, would you still have the same rock? Why not? Trick question: if, instead, you merely broke off one miniscule chip of the rock, would you still have the same rock?<br /><br />And the self-hood that makes me to be me and not you is utterly non-physical and immaterial, it cannot be found in the physical, it cannot be reduced to the physical. Thus, not only does the fact that you are a rationla being disprove materialism/naturalism/atheism, but so does that fact that you are a living organism: even an amoeba disproves materialism/naturalism/atheism.<br />========<br />The functionalism "solution" that Mattghg offers as a way that atheists might escape the sting of the OP fails in the same way that the Theseus' Ship "solution" fails. And, look at that! even before he offered it, I had already pointed out that it fails.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-84706990114209166382011-11-28T15:43:33.508-07:002011-11-28T15:43:33.508-07:00"Ilíon/Troy ..."
Aww! Isn't that ju..."<i>Ilíon/Troy ...</i>"<br /><br />Aww! Isn't that just so touching, and rather darling, in a creepy, off-putting sort of way? Can't you just see little Parboil (*) excitedly jumping about: "<i>Look at me! Pick me! Pay attention to me! Oooo, you're so dreamy: I think I'll go draw your name, again!</i>"<br /><br />That fellow seems to be a member of the League of Ilíon Loving / Ilíon Obsessed Trolls (I mean, hasn't he used their "secret" code-word a couple of times already?); as such, it's a pretty safe bet that he keeps a journal in which, at least once per day, he draws my Christian name and blogging handle, surrounded by hearts and flowers, starbursts and (lots! of) exclamation marks. And, when he's feeling really daring, he tries to fit his own name into the charming little composition.<br /><br />(*) What a fitting name, when you consider it: his Big Idea For Protecting God-Denial From Rational Evaluation doesn't even rise to the level of half-backed; at best, it's just half-boiled.<br /><br />On the other hand, that one Anonymouse appears to belong to the League of Independently Deranged Ilíon Obsessed Trolls.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-41799392161032764092011-11-28T13:55:37.133-07:002011-11-28T13:55:37.133-07:00Some people never learn that citations aren't ...<i>Some people never learn that citations aren't arguments.<br /></i><br /><br />Indeed - especially when the relevance of the citation in question to the discussion at hand is impossible to decipher.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07342391408412861663noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-37379342769377651412011-11-28T11:13:36.202-07:002011-11-28T11:13:36.202-07:00Bob is also good for useful insights, and others I...Bob is also good for useful insights, and others I'm not mentioning (pretty much just J and Ilion are the two I see as here for comic relief).parboujhttp://parb.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-73674717233508919292011-11-28T11:02:38.664-07:002011-11-28T11:02:38.664-07:00Ilion/Troy good to see you are finally learning pr...Ilion/Troy good to see you are finally learning propositional logic. You are <a href="http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2011/11/who-are-most-literal-readers-of.html#c2203181751847559880" rel="nofollow">almost ready for the conditional</a>, it seems. <br /><br />Steve Lovell schooled me, Ben Yachov has taught me some things. Ilion...just gets us all a little more dumb.parboujhttp://parb.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-84316578969521583232011-11-28T10:21:10.462-07:002011-11-28T10:21:10.462-07:00"Some people never learn that citations aren&..."<i>Some people never learn that citations aren't arguments.</i>"<br /><br />No doubt.<br /><br />At the same time, in what will doubtless be a mind-blowing revelation, some persons seem never to learn that "Nuh-uh!" isn't an argument.<br /><br />And, even more anazingly, some persons seem never to learn that no matter how many other propositions one may AND to a FALSE proposition, the composite proposition remains FALSE.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-84984205347680540852011-11-28T07:06:10.337-07:002011-11-28T07:06:10.337-07:00Some people never learn that citations aren't ...Some people never learn that citations aren't arguments.parboujhttp://parb.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-21076761935666909462011-11-28T04:12:19.081-07:002011-11-28T04:12:19.081-07:0001010101,
I've already said perhaps I don'...01010101,<br /><br />I've already said perhaps I don't understand. And maybe I don't, but like J you haven't made anything explicit about how this relates to the issue under consideration or my argument in particular. I offered one possible way in which the quote from Hume might be relevant to the issue, which J said wasn't right but then failed to explain (at least in a way a mere PhD in philosophy can understand) how the quote from Hume was relevant. Perhaps you can help. Which premise of my argument is being denied, on what basis? Or is the argument sound but benign to naturalism as I've suggested?Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.com