tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post32681573036972104..comments2024-03-28T12:34:14.649-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: The path to total skepticismVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger71125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-11154104091833831322012-10-01T22:54:16.775-07:002012-10-01T22:54:16.775-07:00Rank,
“But the argument is that, even if the macr...Rank,<br /><br />“But the argument is that, even if the macroscopic features are the same, that doesn't entail that we mean the same things by referring to them. These macroscopic features are clearly not the same things, since it is impossible for different things to be identical. Unless, of course, you are going to argue against this trivial truth.”<br /><br />That’s what they mean when they say water. It doesn’t matter if they apply to two different chemical compositions; they are using the label in a macro sense so it doesn’t matter what the chemical substance is; they are both water just like how two samples of blood can have two different compositions. If you want a word to mean H2O, then you have to create a new one or add onto the existing definition, but that would then violate the terms of the thought experiment. You’re completely missing the issue. The issue is not whether they are the same substance, but whether they mean the same or can coherently mean the same thing when they use the term water. The answer to that question is yes, evident by the hypothetical response in the thought experiment and by real world examples.<br /><br />“I am saying that he intends option A and means something akin to option B. He must necessarily mean something different than he intends unless A) intention wholly determines meaning; or B) it is possible for different things to really be identical. The first option nets us total relativism, while the second violates the law of non-contradiction.”<br /><br />False dichotomy; I’ve outlined a third option, but you seem content in ignoring it.<br /><br />“I asked you to imagine a world in which no law of logic could be trusted. Descartes and David Hume both did this without too much trouble. And, as Hume would tell you, your models are worthless in this environment.”<br /><br />And I asked you to outline such a world because I could not imagine it and I think Descartes or Hume could either. How would A!=A translate into sense data? I can’t imagine how it would. Oh, and if you could quote Descartes or Hume explaining how it could, that would be appreciated.<br /><br />“These definitions presuppose the triangles and squares to which you're referring. For example, even if you defined a "square" as "a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles", it would not follow that the "square" that you intend to discuss really does fit that description. Instead, it would mean that you intended "square" and meant "triangle", just like the Twin Earth clones intend "water" and mean H2O or XYZ. A triangle is a triangle no matter what you intend or what you name it, just like H2O and XYZ are H2O and XYZ regardless of what anyone on either Earth claims.”<br /><br />Perhaps I explained this poorly. At no time was I referring to an actual object and trying to see if the definition fit some sense data and came to the wrong conclusion that way. This was simply a change in definition, as if I were to go into the dictionary and swap the definitions for square and triangle. So, from now on, when I and everyone else says “square” we mean a three sided polygon and when we say “triangle,” we mean a four sided polygon with right angles. We have changed the usage of the labels so as to change the meaning of the words, correct?<br /><br />Also, this “Instead, it would mean that you intended "square" and meant "triangle", just like the Twin Earth clones intend "water" and mean H2O or XYZ” doesn’t make any sense to me. I didn’t intend “square” and mean “triangle”. When I said square before, I meant a four sided polygon with right angles. From now on, I mean a three sided polygon. The same applies for triangle. At no point in time did I intend square and mean something other than what I specified as to what square meant. Square doesn’t mean something other than how I defined it. This is the definition of meaning so I don’t know why you are arguing against this trivial truth.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-34571057758116347552012-09-29T09:24:24.454-07:002012-09-29T09:24:24.454-07:00If you had your way, we wouldn’t be able to have a...<i>If you had your way, we wouldn’t be able to have any conversation because any idea you want to convey could be sabotaged by anyone who thinks you intended to say something different.</i><br /><br />This isn't true, because Putnam's theory places meaning outside of interpretation. Even if I <i>intended</i> to refer to water, I would <i>mean</i> something else; and, even if someone listening to me interpreted my statement in a third way--"water" as "beef jerky", for instance--, it would not follow that he was correct. The meaning is not determined (at least, not entirely determined) by our own intentions or interpretations. <br /><br /><i>Again, go back to the thought experiment, just ask them what they intend to mean and then that would answer the question.</i><br /><br />But it doesn't, because the very idea is that they mean different things regardless of their intentions.<br /><br /><i>If I define X as “A plane figure with three straight sides and three angles” and then change that definition to “A plane figure with four equal straight sides and four right angles” and you don’t think that changes the meaning of X, then I give up.</i><br /><br />These definitions presuppose the triangles and squares to which you're referring. For example, even if you defined a "square" as "a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles", it would not follow that the "square" that you intend to discuss <i>really does</i> fit that description. Instead, it would mean that you <i>intended</i> "square" and <i>meant</i> "triangle", just like the Twin Earth clones <i>intend</i> "water" and <i>mean</i> H2O or XYZ. A triangle is a triangle no matter what you intend or what you name it, just like H2O and XYZ are H2O and XYZ regardless of what anyone on either Earth claims.<br /><br /><i>I asked whether this was coherent and asked for an example where it is not even self-referentially coherent. The examples you gave would still follow the laws of logic and the individual would still have access to and be able to model the inputs. You can call it illusory as much as you want, but it is still a territory that can be modeled and understood.</i><br /><br />I asked you to imagine a world in which no law of logic could be trusted. Descartes and David Hume both did this without too much trouble. And, as Hume would tell you, your models are worthless in this environment.<br /><br /><i>Now it’s being insinuated that the discussions I have concerning philosophy are with laymen, yet they tend to be with those with philosophy degrees.</i><br /><br />Who said that your friends were laymen? I said that your debates with friends were not logically sound. And, if your friends are philosophy majors, then I can only assume that you lose <i>a lot</i>.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-83479775192733110992012-09-29T09:24:14.117-07:002012-09-29T09:24:14.117-07:00I shouldn’t have to explain it. I used it as an an...<i>I shouldn’t have to explain it. I used it as an analogy, not as an argument. I could’ve used an example from evolution, but that doesn’t mean that I would be obligated to give you a biology lecture along with it. By the way, they did not meet their burden of proof because they didn’t offer any evidence, it was assumed to be agreed upon and then they equivocated with the word. It would be like me and you going to a magic show and agreeing that magic exists and then you claiming that I couldn’t be a naturalist because I believe in the supernatural (i.e. real magic). Also, I fail to see how rejecting this line of attack is an argument from personal incredulity.</i><br /><br />It should be obvious by now. It's because you haven't actually argued for anything on this front. "That can't be true!" is all you've had. And, from the above, it's still the only argument you're using. <br /><br /><i>I asked you to answer for them as to what they mean when they say water. They answer with the same response. They, as in both of them, mean (Insert Macroscopic Feature Here). Because it is stipulated by the thought experiment that the substances are empirically identical, (Insert Macroscopic Feature Here) would apply to the substances of both worlds, as in, both H2O and XYZ. I never had to explain why they were the same, since it’s stipulated in the thought experiment that they are both water as defined by the inhabitants. I didn’t have to assert it, Putnam asserted it.</i><br /><br />But the argument is that, even if the macroscopic features are the same, that doesn't entail that we <i>mean</i> the same things by referring to them. These macroscopic features are clearly not the same things, since it is impossible for different things to be identical. Unless, of course, you are going to argue against this trivial truth.<br /><br /><i>Are you saying here that when Human H2O says that he means (Insert Macroscopic Feature Here), he actually intends to mean (Insert Chemical Composition Here)?</i><br /><br />I am saying that he intends option A and means something akin to option B. He must necessarily mean something different than he intends unless A) intention wholly determines meaning; or B) it is possible for different things to really be identical. The first option nets us total relativism, while the second violates the law of non-contradiction.<br /><br /><i>How can he intend on referring to the chemical composition when he doesn’t know anything about chemistry to begin with?</i><br /><br />He doesn't intend it at all--he merely means it. rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-66119199954691867672012-09-27T15:40:53.692-07:002012-09-27T15:40:53.692-07:00(cont.)
“This relies on your claim that changing ...(cont.)<br /><br />“This relies on your claim that changing a definition changes meaning. But you have not argued for that position; you've merely asserted it.”<br /><br />If this isn’t obvious to you, I give up. If I define X as “A plane figure with three straight sides and three angles” and then change that definition to “A plane figure with four equal straight sides and four right angles” and you don’t think that changes the meaning of X, then I give up. If you can’t tell the difference between a triangle and a square, I give up. If you need me to hold your hand through something as simple as this, then I can’t bring you up to speed over the internet. The other way to explain it would be through programming, but that would simply be a waste of time.<br /><br /><br />“If the territory is a total illusion, and if there are no laws of logic or regularity imposed on this illusory territory, then my syllogism is not false. You cannot show otherwise with empiricism.”<br /><br />I asked whether this was coherent and asked for an example where it is not even self-referentially coherent. The examples you gave would still follow the laws of logic and the individual would still have access to and be able to model the inputs. You can call it illusory as much as you want, but it is still a territory that can be modeled and understood.<br /><br /><br />“You said earlier that you were not into formal philosophy. It shows. Time and time again you have casually offered up fallacious arguments, perhaps thinking that the off-hand debates you've had with friends are logically sound. But, if this is their level of rigor, then it is clear that they are not.”<br /><br />It’s funny how people around here criticize other’s credentials so easily and how incorrect it has been in this thread. Before I was told that I didn’t have the faintest idea of what mathematics is, yet that is what I majored in. Now it’s being insinuated that the discussions I have concerning philosophy are with laymen, yet they tend to be with those with philosophy degrees. I said that I am not a big fan of philosophers and ‘sophisticated’ philosophy (statements that seem profound simply by virtue of being obscured through language, Dennett calls these deepities); I am not necessarily against all philosophy. I am half expected to be charged with another logical fallacy here, perhaps mere assertion for the degree in math?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-82734385650778195982012-09-27T15:39:45.359-07:002012-09-27T15:39:45.359-07:00Rank,
“Hey, look. Another argument from personal ...Rank,<br /><br />“Hey, look. Another argument from personal incredulity. Why haven't they met their burden of proof? You have yet to explain this.”<br /><br />I shouldn’t have to explain it. I used it as an analogy, not as an argument. I could’ve used an example from evolution, but that doesn’t mean that I would be obligated to give you a biology lecture along with it. By the way, they did not meet their burden of proof because they didn’t offer any evidence, it was assumed to be agreed upon and then they equivocated with the word. It would be like me and you going to a magic show and agreeing that magic exists and then you claiming that I couldn’t be a naturalist because I believe in the supernatural (i.e. real magic). Also, I fail to see how rejecting this line of attack is an argument from personal incredulity.<br /><br />“We never agreed that they were the same. You never explained why they were the same, outside of your endless question-begging assertions.”<br /><br />::Face palming:: I asked you to answer for them as to what they mean when they say water. They answer with the same response. They, as in both of them, mean (Insert Macroscopic Feature Here). Because it is stipulated by the thought experiment that the substances are empirically identical, (Insert Macroscopic Feature Here) would apply to the substances of both worlds, as in, both H2O and XYZ. I never had to explain why they were the same, since it’s stipulated in the thought experiment that they are both water as defined by the inhabitants. I didn’t have to assert it, Putnam asserted it.<br /><br />“As above, you have not provided a reason to explain how "X intends Y" equals "X means Y", and Putnam has argued in detail that the two are not necessarily connected. You have failed to rebut him, other than by asserting that "X intends Y" really does equal "X means Y", which is not an argument but a fallacy.”<br /><br />Are you saying here that when Human H2O says that he means (Insert Macroscopic Feature Here), he actually intends to mean (Insert Chemical Composition Here)? How can he intend on referring to the chemical composition when he doesn’t know anything about chemistry to begin with? And you have basically said that he means to mean something other than what he said he means, how is this even occurring in a conversation about meaning? If you had your way, we wouldn’t be able to have any conversation because any idea you want to convey could be sabotaged by anyone who thinks you intended to say something different. Again, go back to the thought experiment, just ask them what they intend to mean and then that would answer the question. However, since they don’t know anything about chemistry and by the fact that they have to answer the same exact way, their answer won’t validate your hypothesis.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-42165248193161924482012-09-27T15:39:28.018-07:002012-09-27T15:39:28.018-07:00Rank,
“Hey, look. Another argument from personal ...Rank,<br /><br />“Hey, look. Another argument from personal incredulity. Why haven't they met their burden of proof? You have yet to explain this.”<br /><br />I shouldn’t have to explain it. I used it as an analogy, not as an argument. I could’ve used an example from evolution, but that doesn’t mean that I would be obligated to give you a biology lecture along with it. By the way, they did not meet their burden of proof because they didn’t offer any evidence, it was assumed to be agreed upon and then they equivocated with the word. It would be like me and you going to a magic show and agreeing that magic exists and then you claiming that I couldn’t be a naturalist because I believe in the supernatural (i.e. real magic). Also, I fail to see how rejecting this line of attack is an argument from personal incredulity.<br /><br />“We never agreed that they were the same. You never explained why they were the same, outside of your endless question-begging assertions.”<br /><br />::Face palming:: I asked you to answer for them as to what they mean when they say water. They answer with the same response. They, as in both of them, mean (Insert Macroscopic Feature Here). Because it is stipulated by the thought experiment that the substances are empirically identical, (Insert Macroscopic Feature Here) would apply to the substances of both worlds, as in, both H2O and XYZ. I never had to explain why they were the same, since it’s stipulated in the thought experiment that they are both water as defined by the inhabitants. I didn’t have to assert it, Putnam asserted it.<br /><br />“As above, you have not provided a reason to explain how "X intends Y" equals "X means Y", and Putnam has argued in detail that the two are not necessarily connected. You have failed to rebut him, other than by asserting that "X intends Y" really does equal "X means Y", which is not an argument but a fallacy.”<br /><br />Are you saying here that when Human H2O says that he means (Insert Macroscopic Feature Here), he actually intends to mean (Insert Chemical Composition Here)? How can he intend on referring to the chemical composition when he doesn’t know anything about chemistry to begin with? And you have basically said that he means to mean something other than what he said he means, how is this even occurring in a conversation about meaning? If you had your way, we wouldn’t be able to have any conversation because any idea you want to convey could be sabotaged by anyone who thinks you intended to say something different. Again, go back to the thought experiment, just ask them what they intend to mean and then that would answer the question. However, since they don’t know anything about chemistry and by the fact that they have to answer the same exact way, their answer won’t validate your hypothesis. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-76237942365796623122012-09-26T04:10:20.233-07:002012-09-26T04:10:20.233-07:00But as we agreed earlier, they are not only referr...<i>But as we agreed earlier, they are not only referring to the stuff on their planet when they use the term “water.” That is the entire point. When you say that they do, you are begging the question.</i><br /><br />This relies on your claim that changing a definition changes meaning. But you have not argued for that position; you've merely asserted it.<br /><br /><i>That is still self-referentially coherent and you still have access to the territory. If this is what you mean by inaccurate senses, then the conclusion of your syllogism is simply a non-sequitor.</i><br /><br />If the territory is a total illusion, and if there are no laws of logic or regularity imposed on this illusory territory, then my syllogism is not false. You cannot show otherwise with empiricism.<br /><br /><i>Seriously, what is it with you pointing out logical fallacies where none exist? I wasn’t even using that point for my argument so I have trouble taking you seriously. It’s gotten to the point where it looks like you’re re-enacting the scene from Supper Troopers, but instead of saying “Meow” you’re using logical fallacies, although it’s more tragic than funny.</i><br /><br />You said earlier that you were not into formal philosophy. It shows. Time and time again you have casually offered up fallacious arguments, perhaps thinking that the off-hand debates you've had with friends are logically sound. But, if this is their level of rigor, then it is clear that they are not.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-82148148879842526682012-09-26T04:10:09.843-07:002012-09-26T04:10:09.843-07:00It is what I mean when I use the term. I am no mor...<i>It is what I mean when I use the term. I am no more begging the question than whenever someone uses a word. If this is you’re criteria for begging the question, then we would be guilty of it tens of thousands times over. By the way, Putnam begged the question 376 times in his thought experiment. Do you think its invalid now?</i><br /><br />I don't care what you mean by it. You were trying to cash out my definition in a way favorable to your argument, and I called you on it. Now just drop it.<br /><br /><i>This is another example of the phrase being misused. You asked me a question that begged the question so I responded that it would be true by definition. That is what it means to beg the question so if you want a better answer, please don’t beg the question.</i><br /><br />You don't seem to understand what begging the question means. It means assuming what is under debate. It's a form of circular logic. If I engaged in any fallacy--which I did not--, it would have been the false dichotomy (or trichotomy, in this case).<br /><br /><i>It’s a shame that I reject a claim because it hasn’t met its burden of proof? Sorry, but that’s reasoning 101.</i><br /><br />Hey, look. Another argument from personal incredulity. <i>Why</i> haven't they met their burden of proof? You have yet to explain this.<br /><br /><i>No, I’ve given up all hope of convincing you since you’re uninterested in what I have to say. The point of mentioning the paradox is that someone is saying that something is possible even when it has been shown to be otherwise. They were unable to update their assumptions and remained fixed into their incorrect position. You’re saying I can’t do something when I have already done so, hence Zeno’s paradox.</i><br /><br />I think you've given up hope because you've lost this debate. And, no; you have not done anything remotely similar to Zeno's paradox. What you're suggesting is sloppy thinking, which can of course be done. But that isn't a justification. "X <i>can</i> do Y" does not entail "X <i>should</i> do Y", nor does it entail "X is <i>justified</i> in doing Y".<br /><br /><i>I’ve already explained this many times over. At this point I would simply be repeating myself. If you want an answer I recommend that you refer back to what they are referring to/mean when they use the terms (Hint: we both agreed and they were the same).</i><br /><br />We never agreed that they were the same. You never explained why they were the same, outside of your endless question-begging assertions. The argument is about whether "X intends Y" is equal to "X means Y", and you have not explained how or why this can be true. <br /><br /><i>I don’t see much force behind his argument, other than mere assertion that they are referring to different things. If it is on my onus to show that Putnam’s argument fails, then we’ve just gotten to the point where you have given up trying to justify your system and have begun trying to shift the burden of proof onto me.</i><br /><br />Actually, we've gotten to the point where you have utterly given up, because you've lost. As above, you have not provided a reason to explain how "X intends Y" equals "X means Y", and Putnam has argued in detail that the two are not necessarily connected. You have failed to rebut him, other than by asserting that "X intends Y" <i>really does</i> equal "X means Y", which is not an argument but a fallacy.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-59401630831043663652012-09-23T07:49:13.315-07:002012-09-23T07:49:13.315-07:00(cont.)
“How could they not be referring to diffe...(cont.)<br /><br />“How could they not be referring to different things?”<br /><br />I’ve already explained this many times over. At this point I would simply be repeating myself. If you want an answer I recommend that you refer back to what they are referring to/mean when they use the terms (Hint: we both agreed and they were the same).<br /><br />“The only conceivable alternative is to assert that meaning is wholly invented by us. But the onus is on you to show that. The Twin Earth argument is an argument against the very theories of meaning that you espouse, and you have failed to explain how your system stands up under Putnam's scrutiny.”<br /><br />I don’t see much force behind his argument, other than mere assertion that they are referring to different things. If it is on my onus to show that Putnam’s argument fails, then we’ve just gotten to the point where you have given up trying to justify your system and have begun trying to shift the burden of proof onto me.<br /><br />“I'm not begging any question, here. I have demonstrated that it would be impossible for the Oscar twins to refer to the same thing, because those two things are different in reality.”<br /><br />But as we agreed earlier, they are not only referring to the stuff on their planet when they use the term “water.” That is the entire point. When you say that they do, you are begging the question.<br /><br />“It doesn't matter what you assume--pretend someone's cast a spell over you, or that you're on a perpetual LSD high. You can't trust sense information in any way, shape or form. That's the only point, here.”<br /><br />That is still self-referentially coherent and you still have access to the territory. If this is what you mean by inaccurate senses, then the conclusion of your syllogism is simply a non-sequitor.<br /><br />“In other words, you are reduced to argument by assertion.”<br /><br />If by arguing by assertion you mean pointing out a straw man, yes. Seriously, what is it with you pointing out logical fallacies where none exist? I wasn’t even using that point for my argument so I have trouble taking you seriously. It’s gotten to the point where it looks like you’re re-enacting the scene from Supper Troopers, but instead of saying “Meow” you’re using logical fallacies, although it’s more tragic than funny.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-91813188332948190332012-09-23T07:48:32.137-07:002012-09-23T07:48:32.137-07:00Rank,
“Our names for things, on my view, are conn...Rank,<br /><br />“Our names for things, on my view, are connected to mind-independent propositional content that cannot be changed by a mere change of language. You deny this.”<br /><br />This is false; I never claimed that our labels change the content of mind-independent content.<br /><br />“However, this is what's at issue, and so, by describing it as a "label with variables attached", you most certainly beg the question.”<br /><br />It is what I mean when I use the term. I am no more begging the question than whenever someone uses a word. If this is you’re criteria for begging the question, then we would be guilty of it tens of thousands times over. By the way, Putnam begged the question 376 times in his thought experiment. Do you think its invalid now?<br /><br />“Begs the question again. Whether or not meanings work like this is what's at issue.”<br /><br />This is another example of the phrase being misused. You asked me a question that begged the question so I responded that it would be true by definition. That is what it means to beg the question so if you want a better answer, please don’t beg the question.<br /><br />“Well, that's a shame. Because you have not presented an argument against them other than one from personal incredulity.”<br /><br />It’s a shame that I reject a claim because it hasn’t met its burden of proof? Sorry, but that’s reasoning 101.<br /><br />“So, in essence, you have given up all pretense of rational justification for your system.”<br /><br />No, I’ve given up all hope of convincing you since you’re uninterested in what I have to say. The point of mentioning the paradox is that someone is saying that something is possible even when it has been shown to be otherwise. They were unable to update their assumptions and remained fixed into their incorrect position. You’re saying I can’t do something when I have already done so, hence Zeno’s paradox.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-20806304929304276142012-09-23T03:28:28.145-07:002012-09-23T03:28:28.145-07:00Apparently my objection hasn’t sunk in yet. Demons...<i>Apparently my objection hasn’t sunk in yet. Demonstrate that they are referring to two different things, don’t just beg the question. In case I need to be clearer, I disagree on this point; please provide some sort of justification for it.</i><br /><br />How could they <i>not</i> be referring to different things? The only conceivable alternative is to assert that meaning is wholly invented by us. But the onus is on you to show that. The Twin Earth argument is an argument against the very theories of meaning that you espouse, and you have failed to explain how your system stands up under Putnam's scrutiny. I've shown how your arguments that Putnam's system is inconsistent fail, but you have not defended the theory that must be false if Putnam's is true. It seems, then, that Putnam wins by default.<br /><br />I'm not begging any question, here. I have demonstrated that it would be impossible for the Oscar twins to refer to the same thing, because those two things are different in reality. Your response has been to assume that what we mean is determined entirely by intention. But <i>how</i> is that the case when there's clear evidence to the contrary? You can't just assume that truth is definitional: you have to argue for it. Thus far, you have not.<br /><br /><i>Is this even coherent? I can’t make sense of it. How can something that is not self-referentially coherent be translated into sense data? Have any examples?</i><br /><br />It doesn't matter what you assume--pretend someone's cast a spell over you, or that you're on a perpetual LSD high. You can't trust sense information in any way, shape or form. That's the only point, here.<br /><br /><i>Like I said, we don’t. In order to see two objects, we don’t need to postulate the abstract number two floating in some mathmativerse. The implications of what we mean are transparent through simulated sense data.</i><br /><br />In other words, you are reduced to argument by assertion.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-35969558072363436502012-09-23T03:27:54.606-07:002012-09-23T03:27:54.606-07:00You don’t know what this means, or at a minimum, k...<i>You don’t know what this means, or at a minimum, know when to say it. I merely restated your position back at you. If I was begging the question, then you were the one that is guilty for using the fallacy.</i><br /><br />The begged question in question was the statement about "labels". A name is a name, and it's subject to change; this I admit. However, the semantic content--whether or not our names are merely "labels with variables attached"--is not open to change. Our names for things, on my view, are connected to mind-independent propositional content that cannot be changed by a mere change of language. You deny this. However, this is what's at issue, and so, by describing it as a "label with variables attached", you most certainly beg the question.<br /><br /><i>Sorry, I don’t recall anything about showing that the senses are in anyway accurate, especially by using logic alone.</i><br /><br />I was invoking Putnam's brain in a vat argument. It's an argument from semantics that shows, through logic alone, that our senses cannot be an illusion. It is far too complicated to replicate here--trust me.<br /><br /><i>It would be true by definition.</i><br /><br /><i>Begs the question again</i>. Whether or not meanings work like this is what's at issue. You have not presented an argument to support this view--in fact, you could not, because it presupposes so many other variables. <br /><br /><i>Also, your repeated misuse of the term begging the question is getting old already.</i><br /><br />What's getting old is your inability to argue for points before asserting their truth. <br /><br /><i>When I talk to someone about morality, whenever “viable theory of morality” comes up, I suddenly become a non-realist because they include elements that I don’t think exist. The most I can say is that what I have put forward is consistent and accurately describes how we would refer to objects in ways to convey information.</i><br /><br />Well, that's a shame. Because you have not presented an argument against them other than one from personal incredulity.<br /><br /><i>However, I can’t say that you would think it to be a viable theory of meaning without knowing your specifications for that phrase. If you don’t think this is a valid theory of meaning, then this is going to be a case like Zeno’s paradox where Zeno says I can’t fire the arrow and I say, “just watch me.”</i><br /><br />So, in essence, you have given up all pretense of rational justification for your system.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-14859941070978162902012-09-20T22:08:04.634-07:002012-09-20T22:08:04.634-07:00Rank,
“You've only begged the question again....Rank,<br /><br />“You've only begged the question again.”<br /><br />You don’t know what this means, or at a minimum, know when to say it. I merely restated your position back at you. If I was begging the question, then you were the one that is guilty for using the fallacy.<br /><br />“Never held that view. What are you talking about? As above, I believe that the senses are grounded in logic, and that we can use logic to prove that the senses are not illusory.”<br /><br />Sorry, I don’t recall anything about showing that the senses are in anyway accurate, especially by using logic alone.<br /><br />“You've begged the question again. Think about this. If I defined a human as "a ball of wax that can jump", and we all agreed that this was true, then would my application of this label to humans be true, false or indeterminate? If it's true, then it follows that science is relative. If it's false, then there are "labels" that are true or false outside of the mind. If it's indeterminate, then you've entered skepticism. Make up your mind.”<br /><br />It would be true by definition. You’ve taken a label, given it a definition and then asked when applied to the label whether its definition matches its definition. The answer is yes. However, your implication that this means that science is relative is a non-sequitor. Also, your repeated misuse of the term begging the question is getting old already. Using it when I repeat a fact that we’ve agreed on, define a word, or when I restate your position back to you is just ridiculous.<br /><br />“Their knowledge of water is based entirely on macroscopic features, which, in this thought experiment, would be the same. Even if they defined "water" as you say, the question is whether or not this is a viable theory of meaning.”<br /><br />“Viable theory of meaning” is throwing up a red flag for me. When I talk to someone about morality, whenever “viable theory of morality” comes up, I suddenly become a non-realist because they include elements that I don’t think exist. The most I can say is that what I have put forward is consistent and accurately describes how we would refer to objects in ways to convey information. However, I can’t say that you would think it to be a viable theory of meaning without knowing your specifications for that phrase. If you don’t think this is a valid theory of meaning, then this is going to be a case like Zeno’s paradox where Zeno says I can’t fire the arrow and I say, “just watch me.”<br /><br />“But the substances to which they are referring are different, regardless of how they define those substances. This means that the meaning of their statements to some extent is independent of intention. “<br /><br />Apparently my objection hasn’t sunk in yet. Demonstrate that they are referring to two different things, don’t just beg the question. In case I need to be clearer, I disagree on this point; please provide some sort of justification for it.<br /><br />“Specifically, I'm thinking of Descartes's "evil demon", who fed Descartes wholly false sense information that could not even be trusted to be self-referentially coherent.”<br /><br />Is this even coherent? I can’t make sense of it. How can something that is not self-referentially coherent be translated into sense data? Have any examples?<br /><br />“Then how do we posit the existence of the models?”<br /><br />Like I said, we don’t. In order to see two objects, we don’t need to postulate the abstract number two floating in some mathmativerse. The implications of what we mean are transparent through simulated sense data.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-70749510800647115602012-09-20T20:22:01.511-07:002012-09-20T20:22:01.511-07:00So it’s a label with a bunch of variables attached...<i>So it’s a label with a bunch of variables attached to it. You could have just said so and left out all the flowery language.</i><br /><br />Whether it's a label or a metaphysical fact is what we're debating. You've only begged the question again.<br /><br /><i>Also, this undermines your stance that we know anything about gold without sense data.</i><br /><br />Never held that view. What are you talking about? As above, I believe that the senses are grounded in logic, and that we can use logic to prove that the senses are not illusory.<br /><br /><i>Also, could you please demonstrate how this label exists outside the mind?</i><br /><br />Already did, above. Proof by contradiction: all systems that posit it inside of the mind are incoherent, from Hume to Kant to Quine.<br /><br /><i>Like I said, they could be using a definition which refers to both substances from both planets, similar to how we use the term blood.</i><br /><br />You've <i>begged the question again</i>. Think about this. If I defined a human as "a ball of wax that can jump", and we all agreed that this was true, then would my application of this label to humans be true, false or indeterminate? If it's true, then it follows that science is relative. If it's false, then there are "labels" that are true or false outside of the mind. If it's indeterminate, then you've entered skepticism. Make up your mind.<br /><br />By the way, if it's false, then it follows that Earth-Oscar and Twin Earth-Oscar are referring to different things. Their knowledge of water is based entirely on macroscopic features, which, in this thought experiment, would be the same. Even if they defined "water" as you say, the question is whether or not this is a viable theory of meaning.<br /><br /><i>I didn’t say that because they are using the same label that they are referring to the same thing. I said that because they are defining the substance by its macroscopic features (to which you agree as well) that they would be referring things that fit that definition as the same like we do with the term blood.</i><br /><br />But the substances to which they are referring are different, regardless of how they define those substances. This means that the meaning of their statements to some extent is independent of intention. <br /><br /><i>If “territory” means something more removed than the Matrix, then you’ll have to explain what you mean more clearly.</i><br /><br />Specifically, I'm thinking of Descartes's "evil demon", who fed Descartes wholly false sense information that could not even be trusted to be self-referentially coherent. <br /><br /><i>No, they don’t. I simply don’t understand how you are coming to that conclusion. I already said that models don’t exist on the map so asking how I justify them existing on the map is somewhat ingenuous.</i><br /><br />Then how do we posit the existence of the models? There are only two options.<br /><br />1. We use science to verify or falsify their existence.<br />2. We use logic to posit their existence.<br /><br />(1) is impossible, as you agree. (2) means that empiricism is false, and that logic is prior to sense data. Further, if you hold that logic is a "model", then you've entered circular territory again. You cannot use a model to prove the existence of models. <br /><br />How, then, do you justify your model-dependent realism? Seems like there's no way other than bare assertion, which is a fallacy.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-37124808217749423392012-09-20T14:06:42.174-07:002012-09-20T14:06:42.174-07:00“It's not that complicated. A is A: gold is go...“It's not that complicated. A is A: gold is gold. As above, A is A outside of the mind. Therefore, gold is gold outside of the mind. What we're left asking is what makes gold gold. As of right now, our best knowledge tells us that "being a metal with atomic number 79" is what makes gold the kind of thing that it is. If it no longer had atomic number 79, it would not have the various attributes that it did. <br /><br />If we found out that something more thoroughly defined gold than atomic number 79, then it would still follow that gold = gold, because the law of identity would still be true. From what we know, X is gold if and only if it is "a metal with atomic number 79". If, somehow, we discover something more fundamental, it would follow that that was the essence of gold--not that gold had no essence.”<br /><br />So it’s a label with a bunch of variables attached to it. You could have just said so and left out all the flowery language. Also, this undermines your stance that we know anything about gold without sense data. Like I asked before, how do we know that the number of protons gold has is 79 without relying on sense data to count them? Without these findings from sense data, gold is no more descriptive than an empty label. Also, could you please demonstrate how this label exists outside the mind?<br /><br />“You appear to have missed the point of the thought experiment. Here it is, simplified: Earth-Oscar has only encountered Earth-water, whose composition he does not know. When he says "water", he must necessarily be referring to Earth-water, because he could not possibly be referring to Twin Earth-water--the difference is in a composition that he does not know.”<br /><br />I understand the point of the thought experiment (you’ve conveniently missed the part where I described what Putnam is saying and my objection to it). It doesn’t follow necessarily. Like I said, they could be using a definition which refers to both substances from both planets, similar to how we use the term blood. You have to argue for your conclusion, not just assert it. <br /><br />“It is not about the content of positive labels, but about mind-independent semantics. Merely asserting that a similarity in labels accounts for a similarity in meaning just begs the question against Putnam's argument, which is that labels are determined by the environment, and not vice versa.”<br /><br />I didn’t say that because they are using the same label that they are referring to the same thing. I said that because they are defining the substance by its macroscopic features (to which you agree as well) that they would be referring things that fit that definition as the same like we do with the term blood. <br /><br />“1. My senses tell me that there is a "territory".<br />2. My senses are inaccurate.<br />3. Therefore, the existence of a "territory" is uncertain.”<br /><br />Right, but what do you mean by “territory” and inaccurate senses? For example, if we are simply a computer simulation (for ease, Matrix style); do you consider our senses to be inaccurate for that hypothetical? Or would you say that we simply do not have access to the whole of reality and can just model a subset of that reality? If we are in the Matrix, then we can still model the flow of bits and bytes and how they manifest to our senses so we would still be able to learn and interact with some sort of reality with “inaccurate” senses so I don’t know what you would mean by inaccurate senses. If “territory” means something more removed than the Matrix, then you’ll have to explain what you mean more clearly.<br /><br />“If models are part of science, then their existence must be provable or falsifiable by science.”<br /><br />No, they don’t. I simply don’t understand how you are coming to that conclusion. I already said that models don’t exist on the map so asking how I justify them existing on the map is somewhat ingenuous.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-29362648004230488722012-09-20T08:45:10.054-07:002012-09-20T08:45:10.054-07:00This entire discussion reminds me of that wonderfu...This entire discussion reminds me of that wonderful final scene in the movie <i>Dark Star</i>, in which the captain of the spaceship argues with an artificially intelligent nuclear bomb that the orders it received to go off (inside the ship) shouldn't be followed because the bomb cannot prove that it receives valid data through its sensory inputs.<br /><br />I won't tell you how the argument turns out. You really need to watch the movie!B. Prokophttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10548980245078214688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-19552297318569210972012-09-20T02:04:10.492-07:002012-09-20T02:04:10.492-07:00They would define water not by its chemical compos...<i>They would define water not by its chemical composition so when they say the term water, they both refer to and mean the same thing when they use the term water. If they say that water is a liquid between 0 and 100 degrees Celsius, then they are referring to both H2O and XYZ as water and they would consider both samples to be water.</i><br /><br />It is not about the content of positive labels, but about mind-independent semantics. Merely asserting that a similarity in labels accounts for a similarity in meaning just begs the question against Putnam's argument, which is that labels are determined by the environment, and not vice versa.<br /><br /><i>Each referent is not identical, but the label will refer to each referent equally.</i><br /><br />Begs the question. Whether or not labels determine meaning is what's being debated.<br /><br /><i>What do you mean by this?</i><br /><br />1. My senses tell me that there is a "territory".<br />2. My senses are inaccurate.<br />3. Therefore, the existence of a "territory" is uncertain.<br /><br /><i>Models aren’t prior to science, they are a part of science.</i><br /><br />Then you've merely entered circularity, and the argument is over.<br /><br />If models are part of science, then their existence must be provable or falsifiable by science. But it can't be, because that's circular. As a result, we have no reason to posit the existence of these "models", since their existence cannot be tested without begging the question. And, because there is nothing outside of the senses and science on your view, we have no further logical recourse for positing their existence. Model-dependent realism: dead again.<br /><br /><i>Also, if you don’t understand a model, then you couldn’t use it as a model. For example, Newtonian mechanics is one such model. It hasn’t changed since it was first created. However, the model that we consider to be the best can change depending on new observations, but those observations don’t change the model.</i><br /><br />There are no models. Why? Because we cannot say that they exist without going beyond sense data and/or begging the question. You can assert their existence until the end of the world, but, unless you have some kind of justification, no one has a reason to listen to you.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-55981427485553557042012-09-20T02:04:02.339-07:002012-09-20T02:04:02.339-07:00You just said that “If gold was not a metal with a...<i>You just said that “If gold was not a metal with atomic number 79, then it would not be gold.” Now you’re saying that if gold is not a metal with atomic number 79, it would still be gold. I don’t know how to interpret these statements coherently.</i><br /><br />It's not that complicated. A is A: gold is gold. As above, A is A outside of the mind. Therefore, gold is gold outside of the mind. What we're left asking is what makes gold <i>gold</i>. As of right now, our best knowledge tells us that "being a metal with atomic number 79" is what makes gold the kind of thing that it is. If it no longer had atomic number 79, it would not have the various attributes that it did. <br /><br />If we found out that something more thoroughly defined gold than atomic number 79, then it would still follow that gold = gold, because the law of identity would still be true. From what we know, X is gold if and only if it is "a metal with atomic number 79". If, somehow, we discover something more fundamental, it would follow that <i>that</i> was the essence of gold--not that gold had no essence.<br /><br /><i>They are not the same chemical composition (i.e. substance), but when the twins say the term water, they are both referring to and mean the same thing.</i><br /><br />You assert this but cannot back it up. Present an argument.<br /><br /><i>To dispute Putnam’s conclusion, I am simply disputing how the term is being used in regards to referencing, not whether XYZ and H2O are compositionally the same. If we are talking about the same thought experiment, this has everything to do with imposing labels. We can talk about the chemical composition of the objects, but that would be outside the scope of the thought experiment so you would need to present something else in order to do so.</i><br /><br />You appear to have missed the point of the thought experiment. Here it is, simplified: Earth-Oscar has only encountered Earth-water, whose composition he does not know. When he says "water", he must necessarily be referring to Earth-water, because he could not possibly be referring to Twin Earth-water--the difference is in a composition that he does not know. Ditto for Twin Earth-Oscar. But they must be referring to different things, because Earth-water and Twin Earth-water are different even if Earth-Oscar and Twin Earth-Oscar don't realize it. Hence, meaning is mind-independent.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-26255783075277567732012-09-19T05:26:40.789-07:002012-09-19T05:26:40.789-07:00(cont.)
“The senses don't sense any territory...(cont.)<br /><br />“The senses don't sense any territory: they're completely untrustworthy, in this scenario.”<br /><br />What do you mean by this?<br /><br />“Then we are left in Kantianism, and it follows that we cannot really ever know the outside: we can only know our representations of the outside, which have been bent and distorted to fit our "models". “<br /><br />If that is Kantianism, then I’ll add that to the list of things I disagree with Kant about.<br /><br />“Models can't be guesses if they're prior to science. Everything that we know about the outside world--all of science--is really just a set of models that we cannot change or understand, because they are prior to all science or observation. As a result, it follows that empiricism is false, because unchangeable models such as logic and reason become the very possibility of empiricism. In the end, then, we're stuck in transcendental idealism.”<br /><br />Models aren’t prior to science, they are a part of science. The models themselves do not change (since they are merely definitions, they don’t change because I said so, good ol’ semantics), but whether we accept them or not changes depending on empirical observation. Also, if you don’t understand a model, then you couldn’t use it as a model. For example, Newtonian mechanics is one such model. It hasn’t changed since it was first created. However, the model that we consider to be the best can change depending on new observations, but those observations don’t change the model. I’m not sure why you think this is contrary to empiricism; I find your reason to be grammatically confusing.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-7500118323659103492012-09-19T05:26:03.591-07:002012-09-19T05:26:03.591-07:00(cont.)
“You couldn't. It's impossible. I...(cont.)<br /><br />“You couldn't. It's impossible. If you said that Twin Earth water was "water", in that it was the same as Earth water, then you would be stating a falsehood.”<br /><br />They are both water: a liquid substance when between 0 and 100 degrees Celsius (or other superficial feature by the inhabitants). Each referent is not identical, but the label will refer to each referent equally. If you change the label, then you might be able to say it’s impossible to say that they’re the same. I never said that they are identical; I simply said that I would apply the term to both substances and that seems to be a perfectly valid statement to make. <br /><br />“If, without knowing about the existence of blood types, you said that "my blood is compositionally identical to yours"--if you were Type A and the other was Type B--, then you would be stating a falsehood. Both are blood, but they are not identical. If no one knew about blood types, it would still follow that the "propositional content" of your statement was mind-independently false. Likewise, if you called Twin Earth water "water", then you would mean something different than we do when we say "water", because we are referring to two different things. We would not be aware that we were referring to different things, but these differences would change our meaning anyway.”<br /><br />Here, we are no longer talking about the label blood, but a certain variable that we have assigned to the blood label. However, in the thought experiment, the term water is treated like a label, not a variable. If we treat the term water like a label, as the inhabitants do, then your point is not analogous. It is only analogous if it is treated like a variable. However, when it is treated like a variable, then the thought experiment fails to prove its point.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-39271439178898908612012-09-19T05:25:15.763-07:002012-09-19T05:25:15.763-07:00Rank,
“It would follow that gold was not a metal ...Rank,<br /><br />“It would follow that gold was not a metal with atomic number 79, because some other, more fundamental aspect was the source of all of the features of gold. Nothing more, nothing less.” <br /><br />You just said that “If gold was not a metal with atomic number 79, then it would not be gold.” Now you’re saying that if gold is not a metal with atomic number 79, it would still be gold. I don’t know how to interpret these statements coherently. <br /><br /><br />“It has nothing to do with imposing labels. H2O and XYZ are not the same substance, regardless of our names for them. We could define them as whatever we wanted, but it would not change the fact that they are fundamentally different things. “<br /><br />They are not the same chemical composition (i.e. substance), but when the twins say the term water, they are both referring to and mean the same thing. The conclusion of the thought experiment depends on the fact that the terms refer to different things, but they don’t. Here’s what I see as happening. Putnam say that the term water from H2O Earth refers to H2O and the term water from XYZ Earth refers to XYZ. I’m saying that water from H2O Earth refers to H2O U XYZ and that water from XYZ Earth refers to H2O U XYZ. Yes, they are chemically different, but it doesn’t matter because, despite what Putnam says, the inhabitants mean the same thing when they say water, regardless of the compositional difference. <br /><br />From the wiki: “Yet, at least according to Putnam, when Oscar says water, the term refers to H2O, whereas when Twin Oscar says 'water' it refers to XYZ.” To dispute Putnam’s conclusion, I am simply disputing how the term is being used in regards to referencing, not whether XYZ and H2O are compositionally the same. If we are talking about the same thought experiment, this has everything to do with imposing labels. We can talk about the chemical composition of the objects, but that would be outside the scope of the thought experiment so you would need to present something else in order to do so.<br /><br />“Since the thought experiment is predicated on the assumption that neither Oscar nor his twin knows the chemical structure of the substances in question, it would follow that both would answer by describing macroscopic features.”<br /><br />Right, this is precisely my point. They would define water not by its chemical composition so when they say the term water, they both refer to and mean the same thing when they use the term water. If they say that water is a liquid between 0 and 100 degrees Celsius, then they are referring to both H2O and XYZ as water and they would consider both samples to be water. It appears like you are taking the definition of water being H2O and projecting that definition onto the inhabitants by saying that they wouldn’t say that XYZ is water, that it’s something different. But it’s not; XYZ is also being referred to by H2O inhabitants as water.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-22967998817252552952012-09-18T15:36:32.062-07:002012-09-18T15:36:32.062-07:00No, I won’t tell you that because our senses aren’...<br /><i>No, I won’t tell you that because our senses aren’t the map. The model is the map and our senses test the model. Senses are no more the map than a test is a hypothesis and I hope you wouldn’t say.</i><br /><br />There is no territory. The senses don't sense any territory: they're completely untrustworthy, in this scenario. So, how do models escape from this problem? Let's find out.<br /><br /><i>Option 1, but there’s no dilemma here.</i><br /><br />Then we are left in Kantianism, and it follows that we cannot really ever <i>know</i> the outside: we can only know our representations of the outside, which have been bent and distorted to fit our "models". <br /><br /><i>Like I said before, models are guesses so we don’t have to have them verified at the point of creating the model and since they are not knowledge, there’s no need to forgo empiricism.</i><br /><br />Models can't be guesses if they're prior to science. Everything that we know about the outside world--all of science--is really just a set of models that we cannot change or understand, because they are prior to all science or observation. As a result, it follows that empiricism is false, because unchangeable models such as logic and reason become the very possibility of empiricism. In the end, then, we're stuck in transcendental idealism.<br /><br /><i>This is just a tad annoying. I was responding to a point totally unrelated to whether there is a territory. I was responding to your question of where do labels appear in the territory and the answer is that they don’t. Also, I wasn’t aware that the question was whether there is any territory; I thought the question we were talking about was the reliability of our senses. However, before we start to talk about the territory, how do you define it?</i><br /><br />We are talking about the relationship between the map and the territory: the "senses and models" and the "exterior world". You were assuming that our labels could be confirmed in the "exterior world", but my position is that, with untrustworthy senses, it's impossible to say whether or not a territory (objective, mind-independent reality) even <i>exists</i>. With your affirmation of Kantianism, though, you agree with that assessment: there <i>isn't</i> anything knowable other than our <i>a priori</i> models, which determine and categorically limit all possible knowledge. The "territory" is then reduced to Kant's "noumena": an unknowable, unreachable, indescribable set of entities that must be utterly warped by our models or categories before we can understand them.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-73577364254664744332012-09-18T15:36:23.647-07:002012-09-18T15:36:23.647-07:00What if, overturning a very clumsy mistake; we dis...<i>What if, overturning a very clumsy mistake; we discovered that gold actually has 78 protons? What consequences would this have? Would we say that because Atomic number 79 defines gold, that gold doesn’t exist?</i><br /><br />It would follow that gold was not a metal with atomic number 79, because some other, more fundamental aspect was the source of all of the features of gold. Nothing more, nothing less. But we know inductively that this is not the case, because science shows that atomic number 79 <i>really does</i> determine gold's aspects. If future findings suggested otherwise, then all we would say is that gold is defined by something else: not that gold has no definition. That's a non sequitur.<br /><br /><i>Of course they can mean the same thing. Define water as any substance that is a liquid between 0 and 100 degrees Celsius and then H2O and XYZ are both water.</i><br /><br />It has nothing to do with imposing labels. H2O and XYZ are not the same substance, regardless of our names for them. We could define them as whatever we wanted, but it would not change the fact that they are fundamentally different things. <br /><br /><i>Similarly, we can have many types of water.</i><br /><br />Even if we had "many types of water", we would merely be calling different substances by the same name. Further, blood is not defined by its type. Blood type could be compared to the levels of hardness or softness in water: it is an additional but not fundamental aspect of the substance in question. So, we can have "multiple types of blood" in the sense that various types fall under the blanket "blood", and we can have "multiple types of H2O" in the sense that various levels of mineral content fall under the blanket "water". This does not solve the H2O-XYZ disparity.<br /><br /><i>Let’s see if this helps, answer this question as if you are part of the thought experiment, “How do you define water?” If the answer is different for your twin, please answer for him as well.</i><br /><br />Since the thought experiment is predicated on the assumption that neither Oscar nor his twin knows the chemical structure of the substances in question, it would follow that both would answer by describing macroscopic features.<br /><br /><i>I would.</i><br /><br />You couldn't. It's impossible. If you said that Twin Earth water was "water", in that it was the same as Earth water, then you would be stating a falsehood. <br /><br /><i>Like I said before blood is defined by its ability to transport necessary substances through a body, it doesn’t matter what the chemical composition is. Everyone has blood even though they are different mixtures because we don’t define blood by its composition.</i><br /><br />If, without knowing about the existence of blood types, you said that "my blood is compositionally identical to yours"--if you were Type A and the other was Type B--, then you would be stating a falsehood. Both are blood, but they are not identical. If no one knew about blood types, it would still follow that the "propositional content" of your statement was mind-independently false. Likewise, if you called Twin Earth water "water", then you would mean something different than we do when <i>we</i> say "water", because we are referring to two different things. We would not be aware that we were referring to different things, but these differences would change our meaning anyway.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-15338548662997996952012-09-18T08:53:55.447-07:002012-09-18T08:53:55.447-07:00(cont.)
“Tell me this. Our senses are the map.”
...(cont.)<br /><br />“Tell me this. Our senses are the map.”<br /><br />No, I won’t tell you that because our senses aren’t the map. The model is the map and our senses test the model. Senses are no more the map than a test is a hypothesis and I hope you wouldn’t say.<br /><br />“You have two options, here. Either the models are prior to all investigation, which means that their existence is neither verifiable nor falsifiable nor subject to scientific inquiry, or they can be and have been discovered by scientific hypothesis and testing. With the first option, you forgo empiricism and admit that there are places into which science and the senses cannot tread; with the second, you're left in circularity. These are your only two options. Choose wisely.”<br /><br />Option 1, but there’s no dilemma here. Like I said before, models are guesses so we don’t have to have them verified at the point of creating the model and since they are not knowledge, there’s no need to forgo empiricism.<br /><br />“Also, these labels don’t ‘exist’ in any meaningful sense inside of the territory, only on the map. Basically, these parts that you are saying are circular don’t fall inside of empiricism because they are not considered (or at least I don’t consider them to be) knowledge.<br /><br />But this begs the question, because what's at issue is whether or not there is any territory. Given inaccurate senses, it seems impossible to say one way or the other. You can't just presuppose it.”<br /><br />This is just a tad annoying. I was responding to a point totally unrelated to whether there is a territory. I was responding to your question of where do labels appear in the territory and the answer is that they don’t. Also, I wasn’t aware that the question was whether there is any territory; I thought the question we were talking about was the reliability of our senses. However, before we start to talk about the territory, how do you define it?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-7165872146972061062012-09-18T08:53:01.692-07:002012-09-18T08:53:01.692-07:00“Further, you could not have "just as easily&...“Further, you could not have "just as easily" defined it like that, because that would not be true. Atomic number 79 defines gold, because we know for a fact that all of gold's traits are born from that essential part.”<br /><br />What if, overturning a very clumsy mistake; we discovered that gold actually has 78 protons? What consequences would this have? Would we say that because Atomic number 79 defines gold, that gold doesn’t exist? Would this mean that we will have to update our naming conventions concerning pawn shops and normal conversation? Does the substance we used to call gold vanish into thin air? No. That wouldn’t happen because we don’t define gold by its atomic number and gold is not defined by its atomic number (whatever that means). We observe a particular substance, give it a label, assign it a bunch of unknown variables and then try to discover those variables through empirical means. We might be wrong about those variables, but that doesn’t mean the thing we labeled doesn’t exist.<br /><br />“When each of them says "water", the "waters" to which they are referring are totally different compounds, and so they literally cannot mean the same thing.”<br /><br />Of course they can mean the same thing. Define water as any substance that is a liquid between 0 and 100 degrees Celsius and then H2O and XYZ are both water. They could consider XYZ and H2O to be water and be referring to the same thing: a substance that is liquid when between two given temperatures. As with blood, we don’t define it by its chemical composition, we define it by its capacity to carry necessary substances through an organism so it doesn’t matter what the chemical composition is so we can have many types of blood. Similarly, we can have many types of water. Let’s see if this helps, answer this question as if you are part of the thought experiment, “How do you define water?” If the answer is different for your twin, please answer for him as well.<br /><br />“Blood remains the same substance even if its type changes. If every type of blood wasn't really a type of blood, then it would follow that some humans had blood, but others had something else that was not blood. This is ridiculous. Water, in Putnam's example, would have totally different chemical structures on each planet. One would be water (H2O); the other would be something (XYZ) that the "Twin Earth" people called water. So, would we mean the same thing when we referred to these things as "water"? Of course not--that's the point. They're totally different substances, regardless of what we think about them.”<br /><br />I would. This is exactly how blood is typed, whether it gets a positive result on some test. The same could be done for water. Like I said before blood is defined by its ability to transport necessary substances through a body, it doesn’t matter what the chemical composition is. Everyone has blood even though they are different mixtures because we don’t define blood by its composition. Yes, Type A and Type B are types of blood, but it would be equally valid to say that Type H2O and Type XYZ are types of water.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com