tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post115168747500513024..comments2024-03-28T12:34:14.649-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: The Problematic Presuppositions of the Argument from EvilVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-1151799344864613222006-07-01T17:15:00.000-07:002006-07-01T17:15:00.000-07:00Didn't we hash through this a while ago? The athei...Didn't we hash through this a while ago? The atheist is perfectly free to use a reductio against the theist that only relies on premises the theists believe in (which is basically what Franklin Mason said). This is a standard and perfectly legitimate method of argumentation. <BR/><BR/>Incidentally, Kirk (who first formulated the zombie-possibility argument against naturalism) has an <A HREF="http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=6823" REL="nofollow">interesting new book</A> out on zombies. He now thinks they are impossible, and is a naturalist.<BR/><BR/>Chalmers' whole argument rests on the assumption that zombies are logically possible, but he never really deals with the problem that this implies qualia are epiphenomenal (he does discuss it, extensively, in one chapter of the book, but doesn't alleviate the worries). I don't know many people who like epiphenomenalism, including zombie-philes, but they still tend to not realize this implication.<BR/><BR/>That said, consciousness is a difficult problem no matter what your metaphysics is. Like the theism question, there aren't any single knock-down arguments, but two (or ten!) suites of arguments, almost different worldviews, each with its own set of problems that make it look implausible right now. Consequently, most philosophy of consciousness ends up as a pie-throwing contest, with very few significant positive contributions.<BR/><BR/>Typically philosophy of consciousness paper:<BR/>This paper consists of two parts. In part I, I show damning arguments with position X about consciousness. In part II, I tentatively speculate about a potential avenue for future exploration that may or may not be complete BS, but which is a breathtakingly new solution to this age-old problem.<BR/><BR/>Part I is usually about 20 pages. Part II is usually about a sentence long.<BR/><BR/>:)Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-1151763623260909202006-07-01T07:20:00.000-07:002006-07-01T07:20:00.000-07:00"But what if the theist is a moral subjectivist? T..."But what if the theist is a moral subjectivist? Then the argument fails."<BR/><BR/> <BR/>As Franklin has already pointed out, the argument is dependent on the theist being a moral objectivist. It also is dependent on the type of god one believes in. If xians didn't insist that their god was all-powerful, all-good and intervened in history for the benefit of mankind then the argument from evil would lose much of its force. For example, I don't see it being a problem for a deist or a polytheist. Nor would it be a problem for a monotheist who believed in a god who was not all-good and all-powerful. <BR/>t.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-1151762623976287632006-07-01T07:03:00.000-07:002006-07-01T07:03:00.000-07:00Do you mean by 'moral subjectivism' the view that ...Do you mean by 'moral subjectivism' the view that moral goods vary from person to person? If so, then as you say the problem of evil is really no problem at all. But I know of no theist who defends such a moral subjectivism.Dr. Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00209597695197799059noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-1151733237518623182006-06-30T22:53:00.000-07:002006-06-30T22:53:00.000-07:00But what if the theist is a moral subjectivist? Th...But what if the theist is a moral subjectivist? Then the argument fails.Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-1151696078988499212006-06-30T12:34:00.000-07:002006-06-30T12:34:00.000-07:00One little quibble. Atheists need not presuppose o...One little quibble. Atheists need not presuppose objective moral value when they press the problem of evil. Rather they might argue like this:<BR/><BR/>"You theists say that there's a God and objective moral value. If this is so, surely pain is objectively evil. But then there's just to much pain about for God's existence to be at all likely. Thus likely God does not exist."<BR/><BR/>That is, the atheist as it were inserts herself into the theistic world-view and its assumption of objective value and attemtps to show that this world-view doesn't square with the facts on the ground. She thus doesn't herself assume anything about the real existence of objective value.Dr. Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00209597695197799059noreply@blogger.com