Sunday, September 10, 2017
Why physicalism isn't true
My argument is an attempt to show, not assume, that minds exist first, on the grounds that if they don't exist first, they cannot emerge. Mental states have to be a complexity-fact about the physical world if physicalism is true. But let's take the claim that "I am Victor Reppert" and the claim "I am Hugo Pelland." It seems perfectly conceivable that there is a world physically identical to this one in which you are me and I am you. If you say that such a world is impossible, you need to prove it, since it is conceivable. There is nothing about the physical world that guarantees that I will be me and you will be you. So physicalism cannot be true.
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I can't conceive of a world where I am you and you are me. *you* couldn't be me. If you were me, you would be me, not you *being* me. Only I can be me. That's just a tautology. I can imagine worlds in which you look like me, or worlds in which you take my place, or worlds on which you are a Cartesian soul inhabiting my body. But those aren't worlds in which you are me. It seems like a contradiction for someone to be someone else, because if they were someone else they wouldn't be themself anymore. It's like saying you can imagine a world where a triangle is a square. You can't imagine that, because if t were a square it wouldn't be a triangle
It's not possible to conceive things that are logically impossible. I can't conceive of something as X and at the same time and in the same sense conceive of it as non-X.
@Hal,
It is possible to conceive things that are impossible. Am curious to learn why you would think otherwise.
I can imagine impossible things, but I can't conceive of them being possible. I think that is the sense Victor is using the word conceive.
But of course, I defer to Victor.
Thanks for the answer Victor. This is short but actually a great summary I think. It shows where we disagree and why. Here's how I see it:
"My argument is an attempt to show, not assume, that minds exist first, on the grounds that if they don't exist first, they cannot emerge."
I have said exactly the same before, in the opposite direction. On the primacy of physical existence, by assuming the material as basic existence first, minds don't exist from the start and emerge from physical processes. The assumption can indeed be proven wrong if it can be shown that minds do not exist in such a world. i.e. it's falsifiable.
So the question is 'can minds emerge from the physical?' In that same sentence, the answer was already included: that if they don't exist first, they cannot emerge. Given that they exist, this is the definition of the primacy of consciousness; minds exist first, regardless of the physical existing.
However, I don't think the case can be made that minds cannot emerge from the physical. On the contrary, their existence is completely explained by the physical existence we are part of. The only things our minds can think of are physical things. To think of non-physical things, we need to first conceptualize physical things and play around with the concepts and labels we get from these objects.
The best defense of that claim is children's development, in my opinion. They are like sponges; their minds do pretty much nothing but register what they are physically experiencing. The more they experience, the more they can self-reflect on what they now not only experience, but know. And it takes a while for these minds to realize they are not alone, in the sense that others also have minds that experienced different things. If you have never done it, do that test with a 4-year-old. It's even more amazing when you do it with the same child a few times and they finally get it! My 5-year-old niece did not understand why we were so proud of her when she got it the first time. She did not believe us when we said she got it wrong for the past 2 years!
Anyway, I digress, back to the post...
"But let's take the claim that "I am Victor Reppert" and the claim "I am Hugo Pelland." It seems perfectly conceivable that there is a world physically identical to this one in which you are me and I am you. If you say that such a world is impossible, you need to prove it, since it is conceivable. There is nothing about the physical world that guarantees that I will be me and you will be you."
The "perfectly conceivable" world you conceive here is a world where minds exist independently of the physical bodies you are talking about. Therefore, you are not truly trying to start with the physical and show that minds cannot emerge; you are already stating that minds exist independently of the physical.
The correct thought experiment, if we start with a physical world, has 2 separate bodies, one we label as 'Hugo' and one as 'Victor'. Each of these physical bodies is able of abstract thinking; they have minds that allow them to conceptualize the physical world around them. Now, we have another physical world, identical in every single way, to the exact atom. Is it conceivable that 'Hugo' is now 'Victor' and vice versa? No, because the labels, the names, are attached to the physical body.
Even if we cannot explain how they got there, the thought experiment does not prove that minds cannot emerge from the physical. It remains possible. In other words, no, we cannot conceive of the world you are talking about. We can, however, think of a world where minds are independent of their physical bodies. In such world, it is possible to have physically identical copies with just the non-physical parts exchanged, somehow. But that's exactly what you said you are attempting to prove... that there's something completely non-physical about us. What is it?
" TL;DR" No, it's not conceivable that there is a world physically identical to this one in which you are me and I am you. Because my body is what makes me, me. The body I have, the experiences I feel, the mind I have, are all 100% the result of this body. A physically identical copy would be the same as me for a second, and then start to experience a different reality, and we would slowly drift apart. That's the closest I can come to your 'conceivable' world where minds can be exchanged.
I personally like emergence as an explanation for the formation of consciousness, but I think I can see Victor's issue. The "complexity-fact" of consciousness means that there must be a fact about the universe that makes consciousness able to emerge, that is, there is in the design or form-prior-to-consciousness of the universe a law or potential rule about the contents of the universe that pertains to the formation or origination of consciousness.
This means that, historically, even before there was consciousness in the universe there had to be a "law of emergence" of consciousness as a feature of that ancient universe. Such a law of emergence of consciousness is in a way a law that only kicks in at the complexity level of certain things that have consciousness. Why should there be such a law of emergence?
Theists have it easy here, naturalists not so much.
Hal,
First, you seem to use a different definition of "mental" and "consciousness" than the one I generally take these words to mean. I generally invert the meanings of "mental" and conscious" from your usage. But I think I see what you are saying-- by your idiosycratic usages, fish have "consciousness" but are not "mental" or some such.
Yes, it may be that the laws of physics, and regularities like the emergent laws of things like hydrodynamics or life are mere human descriptions, and are not causally efficacious. In such a situation, there are still regularities of emergence that may have explanations. So, there may be some other fact of the regularities of the universe that historically allowed consciousness to form.
Not to speak for him but, Victor does in fact talk about causally efficacious laws, and he does not believe there was ever a universe devoid of consciousness, given that God existed all along. This is consistent with Theism of course.
But I don't see how this is 'easier' for Theists. It goes against many things we know of, from a scientific perspective. We know there were no humans at some point in the past, yet the universe existed without humans. So the definition of what minds are necessarily imply some sort of non-human minds, which is assumed, never proven. It also reverses the correct order for the 'laws' of nature, which are in fact descriptive, not prescriptive. They are our best approximation of how the universe works, but they are entirely human-made and thus 'not' causally efficacious.
Theism states that they are prescriptive because they are God's work, but I don't see reasons to believe that. It's self-fulfilling; the laws are labeled as causally efficacious and thus requiring a creator, but the creator's existence is justified because of the existence of such laws (among many other pieces of evidence of course).
In other words, we have humans who stated that the universe must be designed because they could describe the stuff around them with these precise equations, which they called laws. And then they used the existence of these so-called laws to argue that a god must have created them. But they ignore the fact that they created these laws in the first place, based on their observations of the world. And for some reason, when these laws were proven to be approximations (Einstein replacing Newtonian laws for instance), they simply moved the target further down the line, now arguing that there are constants that cannot be explained, more laws that must truly be laws, etc... Still, we have no reason to think that these laws which we created are nothing more than descriptions.
Hugo:
"
But I don't see how this is 'easier' for Theists. It goes against many things we know of, from a scientific perspective. We know there were no humans at some point in the past, yet the universe existed without humans. So the definition of what minds are necessarily imply some sort of non-human minds...
"
God would be at least one of those nonhuman minds. So that is why things are easier for the theist, who is allowed to assume that conditions are right for consciousness as a consequence of assuming God's consciousness prior to the universe as a whole.
Right, in that sense I suppose it's easier, as in it's consistent with a creator god. I guess I was thinking about the fact that it does not help the task of proving that some god exists... but that's a different question.
I used to argue this a lot on CARM WITH with several atheists the most notable was a mathematician from Austria calling himself HRG (Hans Grume). He and his atheist coheart would alleged that they would conceive of a world with no God not created by God and that beat Plantinga's argument that God is necessary in all possible worlds.
I got then to admitted that they were only asserting the conception of a Godless world based upon doubting God's existence in this world. Since they cant prove God doesn't exist they are only begging the question.
People will say they are conceiving of something when in reality they have an idea of it but they don't really fully understand what that idea entails. I can think of the notion of a square circle but I cant picture one because it's a contradiction in shapes.
@Joe,
I can think of the notion of a square circle but I cant picture one because it's a contradiction in shapes.
I think you've put your finger on the difference between what one can imagine (form a mental picture of) and what is conceivable (what is logically possible).
I don't get that, what's the difference between imagine and conceive here? We can put the labels together, 'square circle', but we cannot literally think about it. We can think of either a square or a circle...
But that's exactly what I mean, I can't conceive it nor imagine it. Square and circle are 2 labels put together; two words, two different shapes. Together they mean nothing and cannot even be imagined/conceived. In other words, I take 'imagine' and 'conceive' to be literal synonyms. We tend to use them in slightly different context but, besides that, what's the difference?
Hal said...
"Maybe my imagination is better than yours.:-)"
Haha, who knows... but seriously, my point depends on the fact that your imagination and mine work in the same way. So perhaps you do have a better one and that makes you understand things differently!
But...
"I agree that we can't conceive of a square circle for the reason you mentioned."
Ok, and you explain why:
"Perhaps you think that for one to imagine something they have to form an image in their mind, an image that they could represent with a drawing or painting."
Yes and no. So let's see:
"We can imagine myriads of things that we can't form mental images of."
What does imagine mean here then? It's like conceiving but without the mental image?
You could also say that you can conceive myriads of things that we can't form mental images of, or not? Why?
Now to the example:
" God is an atheist. Would you agree with me that it is logically impossible for God to be an atheist? Since God knows all things how can he know that he doesn't exist?"
Logically impossible, of course. So how can you think about that? By using something you can conceive/imagine, a god, and say what the other 'atheist' god is not: logical.
So here's what point; if you want to make a distinction between 'to conceive' and 'to imagine', base on the mental image possibility, then I argue that the only way you can 'imagine' more things than you can 'conceive' is by allowing imagined things to be based on the negation of conceived things.
You, I, and anyone else, can do nothing else but that. Unless you do have a better 'imagination' and are somehow able to literally think about illogical, impossible, perhaps even indescribable, things.
@Hal and Hugo,
I got it wrong on a previous post while I think Joe got it right.
Imagination usually refers to being able to picture something in your mind (the root word is image). Conceivability usually refers to something you can hold in your mind that doesn't violate the laws of logic.
A typical example is a many many sided polygon. One can conceive of a 1000 sided polygon as well as one with 1001 sides, but one can't really form a picture of the 2 different things in one's mind.
Imagine:
to form a mental image of (something not present)
From SEP:Imagination:
It is also sometimes distinguished from mental states such as conceiving and supposing, on the grounds that imagining S requires some sort of quasi-sensory or positive representation of S, whereas the contrasting states do not.
Of course there is a lot of controversy regarding what is actually conceivable.
Well that fits well with what I just said I believe.
If we really want a difference between 'to imagine' and 'to conceive', we can simply state that 'to conceive' is imagination plus extrapolation or reduction, where imagination is restricted by our senses and our ability to get an abstract representation of that physical reality our senses experience.
I forgot the most important point here... controversy or not, I don't see any support for the idea that we can conceive of things that are illogical. But I will try to read more of that article you linked to bmiller; interesting stuff.
Hugo Pelland said...
I forgot the most important point here... controversy or not, I don't see any support for the idea that we can conceive of things that are illogical. But I will try to read more of that article you linked to bmiller; interesting stuff.
I agree that was my point. we can think of the idea of it such as square circle but we cam't imagine an actual square circle.
bmiller,
Are you saying that one can conceive of something that they cannot imagine?
I would think the opposite is the case.
We can imagine all sorts of impossibilities (logical or not). What is logically impossible cannot be conceived.
September 12, 2017 12:51 PM
another example, i can understand the notion of married bleacher I can point to a man and say "He is a married bleacher" but I don't understand what married bleacher would be
You can think of square circle as much as not-a-circle. You can't positively, just by negation.
I agree with Ron back at the beginning. Only I would put it more strongly. Rather than say that it's contradictory for me to be you I'd say it was meaningless. I can't attach any sense to this. So I'd like to invite Victor to explain what he means.
Victor also says, There is nothing about the physical world that guarantees that I will be me and you will be you. I agree. It's a linguistic fact about how the pronouns 'I', 'me', and 'you' work.
Heres a brief post by Bill Vallicella on imaginable, conceivable and possible.
Since we are waiting for Victor to respond, perhaps he is referring to the fact that we have a personal experience of the world that can not be scientifically determined.
How do we explain consciousness? What isfirst-person experience?
I don't mean video gaming btw :-)
on metacrock' blot evolution of the God Concept part 2
Hal, I think you are clear, but we either disagree are not talking exactly about the same things.
When you say that 'mental images are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for imagining something', I disagree. Because we do need 'some' mental image to be able to imagine these things that are not just some mental image.
I would also disagree with the notion that 'The relationship between what is imaginable and what is conceivable is a complex one.' I think it's actually pretty simple. We can create mental images of certain things and use these mental images to create other mental images, or even things that we cannot create mental images of by either extrapolation, or negation, of these mental images.
But I said all of this already, no? So are we talking past each other or you disagree? It seems to me that it's the latter and I don't understand why.
Hal,
Thanks. I scanned the article.
I liked the ending:
"So I herewith issue aformal challenge to the consciousness studies community: either show that these arguments areflawed, or retire from the field, admitting that consciousness studies as the members of this community represent them are sheer nonsense."
I'm curious. Did you hear of any retirements? ☺
The entire paper linked above seems to me to be an argument from personal incredulity.
Hal said...
"If it were that simple we wouldn't have to spend so much time discussing it.:-)"
Haha, well, you got a point. But what I mean is not that our disagreement is simple, nor that the discussion about imaginable and conceivable is simple. What I mean is that, after careful evaluation, I do find the relationship between what is imaginable and what is conceivable to be simple.
- Conceivable, we agreed to define, is what we can form a mental image of
- Imaginable is broader, it includes what we can conceive and extrapolation/negation of what we can conceive.
I argue that this is simple, and complete. We cannot think/conceive/imagine anything else.
Examples:
"When I imagine if Jack were wiser that Jill would be pleased I don't have any mental image in my mind when I imagine that. What would an image of "wiser" look like?"
Wiser is a relationship between 2 people. So you have 2 conceivable people, with conceivable wise-ness levels, and one has a level higher than the other: Jack is wiser.
Without the mental images of people, and of what it means to be wise, you could not imagine that. It does not matter how good someone is at doing that. My point is that the 'imagining' part depends entirely on the 'conceiving' part, to stick with our definitions.
"We do agree that we can't conceive of logical impossibilities and I think that is more important."
Yes, but I think the realization that we cannot think of things we have never experienced physically is extremely important too. At least for my defense of existence being based on the physical world. Because that position would be falsified if one could show that we can in fact think of things that are not based on 'conceived' things.
OP "My argument is an attempt to show, not assume, that minds exist first, on the grounds that if they don't exist first, they cannot emerge."
--Minds do not exist and they do not emerge.
" Mental states have to be a complexity-fact about the physical world if physicalism is true. "
--What we call a mind is a brain process. There is no mindstuff, or object that is a mind. The mind is not an existent thing, rather, it is an abstraction to model a very complicated physical process, the brain process.
"But let's take the claim that "I am Victor Reppert" and the claim "I am Hugo Pelland." It seems perfectly conceivable that there is a world physically identical to this one in which you are me and I am you."
--That sounds like perfect woo to me.
" If you say that such a world is impossible, you need to prove it, since it is conceivable."
--You are repeating the error of Anselm is concluding that a logical possibility necessitates a physical possibility. If you assert a physical system that is not in evidence the burden of proof is on you.
" There is nothing about the physical world that guarantees that I will be me and you will be you. "
--On determinism you must be you. On an omniscient god determinism must be the case. Therefore on an omniscient god you must be you.
Even absent an omniscient god, on a deterministic universe by any mechanism, you must be you.
Even absent a deterministic universe on the observation that you exist the posterior probability of you being you is 1.
The universe does not care if you are you. A physical object in another galaxy is a physical object in another galaxy irrespective of you being you or you never having been born. It's physical reality is independent of your personal sense of identity.
Your brain process is your brain process. If it had turned out to be some other brain process then that physical process would self identify differently than you do.
You are roughly like a computer that boots up at your birth, reads your ID number stored in ROM, and reports via text to speech that "I am Victor 10DF83B9". The mere fact that you detect yourself in some particular way is sufficient.
"So physicalism cannot be true."
--Non-sequitur.
So Dusty says the mind does not exist, but of course is wanting us to pay attention to his written words as if they had meaning.
Left as an exercise for the reader: show how Dusty's post is self-defeating if taken from from the stance that the mind does not exist :)
It seems perfectly conceivable that there is a world physically identical to this one in which you are me and I am you
This seems to me like asking about a world in which the number three is actually the number two, and vice-versa. To the extent that the question has any meaning, such a world would be identical to ours. Perhaps I misunderstand. :)
It also seems to me that a consciousness is generated out of purely material causes every time a human child is born. True, there could be an immaterial soul added at some stage. But we have no scientific evidence or means (maybe even in principle) of testing for this. The fact that full awareness develops so slowly and gradually strongly suggests to me that there are only physical causes at work.
William said.. September 15, 2017 10:43 AM .
" So Dusty says the mind does not exist, but of course is wanting us to pay attention to his written words as if they had meaning.
Left as an exercise for the reader: show how Dusty's post is self-defeating if taken from from the stance that the mind does not exist :)"
--Of course you leave it somebody else to argue what you are apparently incapable of arguing.
Performative contradiction:
1. If a mind does not exist, the ideas of that mind do not exist to that mind.
2. If there are no such ideas, the words that otherwise would express those ideas do not express such ideas to that mind.
3. If those words do not express such ideas, they do not have the meaning that would otherwise be intended to that mind.
4. Thus such a post above is meaningless from the standpoint of the mind which takes that stance, if taken from the stance that the mind does not exist.
@William,
I believe you are literally arguing with a self-identifying mindless troll ☺
bmiller, I am no fan of SP's style, but calling him a mindless troll is completely unwarranted imho...
Blogger William said.. September 15, 2017 12:31 PM.
" 1. If a mind does not exist, the ideas of that mind do not exist to that mind."
--You contradicted yourself already. To refer to "that mind" it must exist, yet your antecedent is "mind does not exist". Make up your mind :-)
" 2. If there are no such ideas, the words that otherwise would express those ideas do not express such ideas to that mind."
--Ditto.
" 3. If those words do not express such ideas, they do not have the meaning that would otherwise be intended to that mind."
--Ditto again, but I don't mind :-)
" 4. Thus such a post above is meaningless"
--At last we agree wrt 1,2,3.
@Hugo,
That was my attempt at humor as indicated by the smiley face.
I found it ironic that William is arguing for the existence of a mind with someone who insists they don't have one.
I see, fair enough!
Dusty:
1. If a mind does not exist, the ideas of that mind do not exist to that mind."
--You contradicted yourself already. To refer to "that mind" it must exist, yet your antecedent is "mind does not exist".
---------------------------------------------
But: 'If a mind does not exist, the ideas of that mind do not exist to /the square circle/' is also true, I think, just irrelevant.
I was covering for the case that some but not all minds were real, BTW. In that case a nonexistent mind can fail to have thoughts that do actually exist in another mind, you see.
Blogger William said..
September 15, 2017 7:52 PM.
" But: 'If a mind does not exist, the ideas of that mind do not exist"
--You seem to be having some difficulty with language here. There is no "that mind" if "a mind does not exist".
" I was covering for the case that some but not all minds were real, BTW. In that case a nonexistent mind can fail to have thoughts that do actually exist in another mind, you see."
--In simpler terms, a "mind" is a model, a colloquial term, or folk science. There is no such thing as mindstuff. A mind is what we call a brain process. When the brain dies the brain process stops so there is nothing existent such as a mind or a soul to somehow float off the body as released ectoplasm.
As the fetus develops the brain begins to function. No new ectoplasm mind or soul object came floating into the fetus like a parasitic space alien from a grade B movie. The brain simply develops by cell division and begins to function in utero. Eventually the brain process will stop. At no point in the human life is there ever a mind as a real existent thing.
"There is no "that mind" if "a mind does not exist"."
But we all talk about God here, even if there is no such thing, so what's the problem? ;)
------
Hal, I think what you wrote makes sense, but at the same time, there is in fact an illusion here, which most people never think about. That may be what SP refers to. We are not thinkers inhabiting bodies, we are the bodies.
Ever heard of that?
William said...
The entire paper linked above seems to me to be an argument from personal incredulity.
Hinman"Oops i never got back over to link up part 2
why incredulity: you think that paper is about doubting God? the point of it is that caning notions of God are not proof we made up God but discoveries of truth through progressive revelation.
Hal said...
The fact that a brain is necessary for humans to think and act for reasons has nothing to do with whether or not there is an afterlife.
Only creatures that have a mind are capable of thinking and expressing their thoughts with words. That is a grammatical truth. Anyone who denies that minds exist doesn't understand the meaning of the word "mind". The result is nonsense.
right Brain is hardware and mind is software
Hal, I think what you wrote makes sense, but at the same time, there is in fact an illusion here, which most people never think about. That may be what SP refers to. We are not thinkers inhabiting bodies, we are the bodies.
Ever heard of that?
It's a unity, Mind is emergent property that emerges from complexity of Brain,in biological organism doesn't mean there can;t be mind independent of body.
I like how Joe's article is called The Evolution of the God Concept. It's the perfect title.
It explains how different humans share the same kind of spiritual experiences, and how they often attribute them to something they call God. Out of ignorance and awe.
I understand the awe...
Joe,
I was referring to P M S hacker's paper not your chapter, sorry if I confused you.
Stardusty,
If as you claim the mind is brain function and the mind does not exist, do you mean that brain function does not exist? If not, then the mind must exist, right? Just a question of semantics then.
William said.. September 16, 2017 2:34 AM.
" If as you claim the mind is brain function and the mind does not exist, do you mean that brain function does not exist? "
--Does running exist? Can you bottle some running stuff? Does running have mass? What is the rest state of running? Does running pop into existence and out of existence depending on my speed of locomotion?
Running is a body process. Running is not an existent thing unto itself. Running is a word we attach to a characteristic set of bodily processes. That set of processes are real processes of a real body. Our simplification of that complexity by attaching the label of "running" is an abstraction.
What we attach the label of "mind" to is just the brain running, as it were.
Joe Hinman said.. September 16, 2017 12:20 AM.
" It's a unity,"
--Idle speculation of no more value than Russel's teapot.
" Mind is emergent property"
--emergent properties, like phenomena, are abstractions. The whole is not greater than the "sum" of the parts.
" that emerges from complexity of Brain,in biological organism doesn't mean there can;t be mind independent of body."
--Just because there is a teapot in my kitchen does not mean there can't be a teapot in orbit. So what?
Hal said.. September 16, 2017 10:54 AM.
Does running exist?
" Yes."
Can you bottle some running stuff? Does running have mass? What is the rest state of running? Does running pop into existence and out of existence depending on my speed of locomotion?
Hal,
Do you think assuming the physical exist is a valid assumption though?
Because then we can argue that minds exist because of the physical existence of the brain. Minds are indeed the label we put on that physical process.
Not sure why one would say minds, or running, does not exist though. That's just mixing things up imho...
Hal said.. September 16, 2017 12:47 PM .
" Your questions assume that the only things that can exist are material substances. I see no reason for accepting that assumption."
--So you cannot affirmatively answer my questions.
Where does running exist? In what sense does running exist?
If a thing exists but it is not made of anything at all, no material known or unknown then it is absolutely nothing at all. In what sense do you say absolutely nothing at all exists?
You don't seem to have thought this through very carefully.
Blogger Hugo Pelland said.. September 16, 2017 8:48 PM.
" Minds are indeed the label we put on that physical process."
--Right. We put labels on processes. A label is an abstraction, a model, a brain process. There is no outside realization for the label, although we consider a model to be valid if it converges on reality or closely approximates reality.
" Not sure why one would say minds, or running, does not exist though. That's just mixing things up imho..."
--Actually it is unmixing things. You were correct in saying that things like mind and running are labels we put on real processes. Many people, such as apparently Hal, mix up the label with a real existent thing. This is particularly true with "mind".
Many people have some fuzzy notion of an intelligent ectoplasm that resides inside the skull along with the brain and is somehow connected to it.
By insisting the mind does not exist I clarify that the mind is not an existent thing, only a label we attach to a process.
Photons.
The sun does not exist, only a label we attach to a process (of solar evolution).
Flames.
William 2:12 AM
"The sun does not exist, only a label we attach to a process (of solar evolution)."
--Ok, that brings up an interesting point. What does exist? Do large scale objects exist? Do phenomena exist?
What exists is the fundamental. Right now our best available description of the fundamental is the standard model.
All our macro scale models, labels of phenomena, and labels of macro scale objects are approximations. They are considered valid approximations when they converge accurately on reality.
Fortunately, most people realize that when we say "the sun" we mean a collection of subatomic particles that are in a very complicated and vast process.
In the case of the brain process called "mind" that is unfortunately not the case. Most people still have the idea that there is some sort of ghostly intelligent thing inside the human body that somehow connects to the human body and survives the human body. That is, of course, just an ancient and ignorant superstition, yet it persists.
That ghost, the ectoplasm, does not exist.
Hal said.. September 17, 2017 6:13 AM.
" We put labels on processes."
" "Poecesses" is a label. Does that mean processes don't exist?"
--A process does not exist as an object, a thing, an independent entity that itself has properties.
Real objects really change. A process is a valid description of how existent things change.
Hal said.. September 17, 2017 9:25 AM.
" you are simply assuming that the only things that exist are material objects. You still have not provided a good reason for making that assumption."
--I did, but you simply did not read or understand it.
What else could there be but something? If it is not something then it is nothing. In what sense does "nothing" exist or have properties, much less intelligence?
Something.
Some thing.
else
Nothing.
No Thing.
The very notion of an immaterial existent thing is an incoherent contradiction in terms.
If a thing is not made of something then in what sense does it exist? How does a thing made of nothing have structure? Without structure how does a thing that is made of nothing have properties at all, much less intelligence?
Material existence is the only coherent notion of a thing. All talk of immaterial real things is incoherent babble.
The evidence for material existence is vast. If you wish to speculate about some other sort of existence the burden is on you. So far nobody has even begun to meet that burden, only spewing meaningless incoherent babble about the immaterial.
Hal said.. September 17, 2017 9:53 AM.
" Running is something. "
--Running is not a thing. Running has no independent existence. Running is not an object. Running does not have properties.
Running is a process of material objects.
The notion that something immaterial exists is incoherent babble.
Hal said...
" Running is an activity. Activities can have properties."
--What properties does running have? Where do they reside?
Are these properties of running or are they properties of the materials that together we describe as running?
@Strawdusty,
Material existence is the only coherent notion of a thing.
What do you define as a materially existing thing then? Do you only mean an object that has mass, extension in space and location in space?
I agree with SP on that part so let me try to answer bmiller's question.
Materially existing is what our sense-perception detects, experiences or feel, and everything else we can indirectly detect using other material things. It's basically anything we can ascribe SI units to.
Now, here's why I asked Hal: is it fair to assume material existence exists?
Hal replied yes of course, material things exist, but that was not really answering my question. I am asking whether you, or anyone else here, accepts that as a first assumption regarding existence.
I think we should, and it yields a consistent framework of what 'to exist' means, from the purely material, all the way to the most complex so-called 'non-material' things.
Now here's the problem. On the one hand, SP is correct imho to say that non-material things do not exist in reality, as objects in the physical world. But I think we can say that they do exist nonetheless, as dependants of the material world. The label 'running' that we put on a fast moving physical human being exists only in that narrow sense: it wouldn't exist without a physical runner in the first place. Saying that 'running' literally does not exist is thus more confusing, for conversation purposes, even if it is indeed correct to say that running doesn't have an existence of its own.
Moreover, none of this assumes only the material exists; that's a common misconception. We only assumes the material exists on its own, as base reality.
Hal,
We have to have a clear definition of what 'to exist' mean before we can even talk about whether something like 'running' or 'minds' or 'photons' exist. This is where I begin with the assumption that the material world, the physical, exists as a base reality.
To your point, that this "amounts to saying that a non-material thing cannot be a material thing. That does not entail that non-material things do not exist." I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of what I, or SP, is saying. It's obvious that a non-material thing cannot be a material thing, by definition, but the point is that these things we call "non-material" are contingent on material existence. But that is probably still not enough to answer your point asking to clarify what you mean by "exists on its own"."
So the point is that, under what I assume to be a base reality, material things exist and in turn cause other material things to exist. The resulting things are themselves material things that do exist. They are dependent on other physical things to exist, just like our bodies need oxygen to exist, but they are, in fact, material things that 'exist' in reality. This is different from labels, adjectives, concepts, that 'relate to' these physical things, without existing in the real world on their own.
Therefore, something like 'running' exists only because a material thing, 'the runner', exists. The runner exists in reality, as a material thing, so I call that to have an 'existence of its own', given that it falls under the assumed material reality. Labels or any concepts, on the other hand, are attached to something within that reality but do not exist. To use the examples of 'runners' and 'oxygen' again, it could be the case that a 'runner' exists without 'oxygen' (some ET) and vice versa, but it means nothing to talk about 'running' without a 'runner', so the label 'running' is entirely dependent on some physical thing doing the running in the first place, within that assumed material reality.
Hal,
"Labels or any concepts, on the other hand, are attached to something within that reality but do not exist." was indeed incomplete... it was supposed to be a repetition of the same idea: they do not exist on their own.
You are correct in stating that it's my opinion that immaterial things are somehow less real than the material. This is actually what I thought we all agree on! Or at least most of us... I mean, isn't it obvious that the concepts in our heads are less real than the real things they may or may not refer to?
But that does not mean that they are not influential. I do agree that "our existence as human beings "depends" as much on the non-material as the material. Laws, tales, concepts, thoughts, etc. are not material. We could not exist as humans without those things." However, the word depends does not mean the same thing at all here. Our 'existence' does not depend on these non-material thing. It's not because 'love' is non-material yet incredibly influential that 'love' somehow exists on its own. Without material beings existing, there would be no such thing as 'love'. The concept is defined in material terms.
My favorite example on that topic is usually colors. Do colors exist independently of the physical? Are colors concepts that exist regardless of our experience of light hitting our eyes? You know what my answers would be... what would be yours?
Hal said...
" it is not at all obvious to me that the concepts we employ in representing the world are any less real than the chair I am sitting on."
Interesting; not sure what to reply to that honestly... I would say the exact opposite: the concepts we employ are not in any way as real as the chair I am sitting on. The concepts are things we 'think' about, or objective labels that describe material things. My point is that without the material world, we cannot have any of these concepts. And the word 'we' is important here, as this is a human-centric definition, given that we are humans having a conversation about these concepts.
" Why are you putting existence in quotes? "
I use single quotes for emphasis purposes, and double quotes when either quoting someone or pointing out that the word I am putting in quote is not obvious. Just my style :)
" Without those concepts I could not survive [...]
Neither of us would exist as humans without those non-material things."
I don't understand that; what do you mean?
Hal,
Regarding the second post (I had not even read it as I was writing mine), I don't think we disagree that much actually. It reminds me of a conversation I had on some forum, years ago. I was on the other side, being confused as to why someone would say that something non-material literaly does not exist. It just seems obviously wrong, as we have things like 'the color red', or 'love', or 'running', which are not material in the strict sense. But the point is not that these things do not exist, the point is that they are in fact material, because they are labels we attach to real material things. Something purely non-material, on the other hand, has literally no defined existence for us.
And you did get the wrong idea regarding my views on God, or gods in general. There is nothing in what I present as my theory of existence that excludes gods from the start. The one thing that it rejects is the notion that minds exist, regardless of the material. Minds are physical processes, something humans exhibit. My position is an opposition to the primacy of consciousness, which is arguable the default position for most people.
FYI, it was surprisingly easy (even 6 years later!) to find the thread I mentioned:
http://www.wearesmrt.com/bb/viewtopic.php?f=35&t=7474
I will read it again too; it will be interesting to see whether I agree with myself from that time, and the other people who wrote... Vagon is the one that changed my mind here. It seems small but in insight it was a big deal actually. I would say that's when I started to understand why I am a materialist, something that made no sense to me before that exchange.
I would be curious to know what you get from it Hal!
Hal,
" "Material" is a concept. We could not understand this world we live in without such concepts."
We could not 'understand' anything without concept, fair enough. But that has nothing to do with whether we could 'exist'.
"I don't understand why you think the existence of material objects somehow makes concepts less real."
I don't understand what your definition of 'real' is here. If I think of something, it's not 'real' automatically, obviously... so I have to turn the question around. Why do you think the existence of concepts somehow makes them as real as the material objects they may, or may not, point to?
"If you don't have a mind, if you are unable to form concepts and express them with language, to have reasons and act on those reasons, then you would not be a human being.
And I doubt any of us would exist in any form because we would have been wiped out by another hominoid that did have a mind. "
But that has nothing to do with the existence of the physical human being, or another hominoid. The action you refer to, 'to act on those reasons', is what material beings do, it's a process of their brain. It helped them, sure, but it does not explain how they got their material bodies, and brain, in the first place.
Hal,
What is this word 'thing'? I do not think it means only what you think it means.
thing1
[thing]
See more synonyms on Thesaurus.com
noun
1.
a material object without life or consciousness; an inanimate object.
2.
some entity, object, or creature that is not or cannot be specifically designated or precisely described:
The stick had a brass thing on it.
3.
anything that is or may become an object of thought:
things of the spirit.
4.
things, matters; affairs:
Things are going well now.
5.
a fact, circumstance, or state of affairs:
It is a curious thing.
6.
an action, deed, event, or performance:
to do great things; His death was a horrible thing.
7.
a particular, respect, or detail:
perfect in all things.
8.
an aim; objective:
The thing is to reach this line with the ball.
9.
an article of clothing:
I don't have a thing to wear.
10.
things.
implements, utensils, or other articles for service:
I'll wash the breakfast things.
personal possessions or belongings:
Pack your things and go!
11.
a task; chore:
I've got a lot of things to do today.
12.
a living being or creature:
His baby's a cute little thing.
13.
a thought or statement:
I have just one thing to say to you.
14.
Informal. a particular interest or talent:
Sports is not my thing.
15.
Informal. a peculiar attitude or feeling, either positive or negative, toward something; mental quirk:
She has a thing about cats.
16.
something signified or represented, as distinguished from a word, symbol, or idea representing it.
17.
a topic, behavior, or activity involving or limited to a specified group:
It’s a girl thing, so you wouldn’t understand.
18.
Informal. something that people do (often used in expressions of mild disapproval or mockery):
Since when did clapping at the end of a movie become a thing?
19.
Law. anything that may be the subject of a property right.
20.
new thing, Jazz. free jazz.
21.
the thing.
something that is correct or fashionable:
That café is the thing now.
that which is expedient or necessary:
The thing to do is to tell them the truth.
Idioms
22.
do / find one's own thing, Informal. to pursue a lifestyle that expresses one's self.
Also, do/find one's thing.
23.
make a good thing of, Informal. to turn (a situation, experience, etc.) to one's own profit; benefit by:
She made a good thing of her spare-time hobbies.
24.
not to get a thing out of,
to be unable to obtain information or news from:
The police couldn't get a thing out of him.
to fail to appreciate, understand, or derive aesthetic pleasure from:
My wife likes opera, but I don't get a thing out of it.
25.
see / hear things, Informal. to have hallucinations.
Hal said...
"Minds are not things at all. There are physical processes that take place in the brain."
Maybe the word 'exhibit' was not correct here because what you wrote is exactly what I meant as well.
" We would not exist as human beings without the capacity to reason and form concepts."
Yes, but that's not what I am talking about. I will let you complete; the capacity to reason and form concepts exists because...
Well, you thought the 'materialism' I presented here entails that there is no god, which is not the case, so... you don't get it I am afraid. To be clear, I am not saying you are wrong; I am just running out of ways to correct your interpretation of my arguments. So let's not ignore that please: the capacity to reason and form concepts exists because...?
By the way, one thing I agree with: I am also not very impressed with that tread as I was back then. Perhaps it was more important to me because it changed my mind on something. But it does not make it impressive...
Hal said...
"The possibility for the capacity to reason and form concepts exists because we have bodies with well developed brains. But the brain in a body is just the vehicle for the power."
Exactly.
"You appear to me to be confusing the power with its vehicle. That is why I disagreed with your claim that the mind is a physical process. The mind is no such thing."
That's amusing frankly because I think you are the one confusing things... because you say:
"Running cannot exist unless there is a runner. But neither can a runner exist unless there is running."
That's an equivocation fallacy. Of course a runner cannot exist unless there is running, but that 'running' is the actual running, someone actually moving fast in reality, regardless of what we call it. But it does not mean that the runner can only exist if there is some concept of running. Yet, that's what you are arguing for here; you are claiming that the non-material concept of running is what allows the material running to exist. If not, you agree with me! So which one is it?
~~ Had written these paragraphs below too, but that's long and unnecessary. Posting just as some extra thoughts, or clarifications ~~
Another way to put it is that it does not matter how we call that thing we observe as 'running'; the point is that it exists as a material thing, first. We then we put some label on it so that we can identify what it means for a runner to be running. But the material existence of the runner, the material muscles & fibers & energy that make the runner run, are all material objects that are part of the real world, and they all actually exist on their own. The label 'running', or whatever description someone running we use, is what cannot exist without a physical runner in the first place.
"In the same way we know that we can reason and use words and concepts to represent and interact with the world. In other word we have minds. Because we have that capacity we have the vehicle for that capacity. It is not like one can exist without the other."
But it is possible that one exists without the other. That's what Theists believe. They think minds exist without the vehicle, they think their minds will survive that physical body, they think God does not need any material vehicle to reason. Or at least some of them think all of that, and it's a possibility we cannot deny.
So the question really is: which one do you assume exist first? Are you able to talk about what it means 'to exist' without assuming either?
On the primacy of consciousness, one says that they assume that this thinking exists, on its own, no matter what.
On the primacy of material existence, one says that they assume that the material world exists, on its own, no matter what.
The latter is more complicated, as it must lead to the existence of the thinker, otherwise we run into a contradiction. But I also think it's not that difficult to reach that conclusion and it is better at explaining our human experience.
Hal said...
" We can represent the concepts we think of with words or with drawings.
It is irrelevant whether or not what we conceptualize actually exists. I can share with you the concept I have of material things. Or I can share with you the concept I have of a unicorn, but that doesn't make the concept imaginary. You can pass those concepts on to others.
The concept of a house I have could be represented in a set of blueprints that are used to enable the construction of that house.
I don't understand why you wouldn't think concepts are real if we can represent them and and share them with others and even use them to make new and different material objects."
That's just more of the same. You are talking about concepts as things that exist. Well, Santa Clauss exists then... How useful is that?
How do you differentiate between real material things, concepts that point to real material things, concepts that do not point to real material things, representation with real material things of things we do not know exist as real material things, etc... Let me know what words you prefer so we're talking about the same things.
Hal,
You cannot have one without the other because 'runner' and 'running' are in fact related to the exact same material stuff, the person and its environment.
Could you conceptualize a 'runner' and 'running' without some physical thing 'running'? Yes, of course, but then would a 'runner' be real? It depends. Are we talking about a 'runner' as in a person that may or may not run, or are we talking strictly about a 'runner' as something that is running as we are talking about it?
"Do you think the only kind of thing that can be said to be real or to exist is a physical (or material) object?"
Does Santa Clauss exist? Is Santa Clauss real?
And I already explained that there are things that can be said to exist but not be physical or material. Not sure about real though, that's not exactly the same. That's why I am asking you.
" If not I don't see why you should have difficulty with the claim that an immaterial object like a concept could exist"
I never said that they don't exist. I said that immaterial objects like a concept exist if, and only if, the material world exists.
"You are never going to be able to talk about or describe or explain anything in the world without using concepts. "
That's just stating the obvious. We need to add a bit more to that statement:
You are never going to be able to talk about or describe or explain anything in the world without using concepts that point to real material physical things you have yourself experienced because of your body and brain.
Do you agree?
Hal said:
- Don't know where you got the idea that I thought such activities could not take place without the concepts.
- If we have no concept or word for running then it follows that we cannot say that a runner exists.
Exactly, so the concept of 'runner' you have in your head may or may not point to an actual runner in reality, to an existing runner. So the point is that this runner, the real one, is a runner regardless of how we call it, regardless of whether there is someone to call the runner anything. It's the fact that there is, or was, a physical thing moving that makes a runner a runner. The existence of the concept is irrelevant when it comes to the existence of the runner. It's irrelevant whether we can talk about it. It is what it is. And because it is something we can say that it exists, and attribute it more appropriate labels.
Hal,
What does 'applying the concepts' have to do with whether something exists?
Hal,
Not sure I understand your question; I don't see a difference between 'applying' concepts and 'using' concepts to talk about things. What do you mean?
Also, 'and attribute it more appropriate labels' just meant 'and attribute it labels.' not sure why I added the extra words here. But I add something else:
"The existence of the concept is irrelevant when it comes to the existence of the runner. It's irrelevant whether we can talk about it. It is what it is. And because it is something we can say that it exists, and attribute it labels if we want to talk about it with each other."
Does that make more sense?
Sounds equivalent, yes.
So, gentlemen, after all that, Are there runnings? I'm happy to say there are, but we have to accept that we have now admitted more than mere bodies to the existents. Having chopped the world up into persisting bodies we accommodate its flux by saying that bodies undergo change and we have words denoting various kinds of change. To say that change exists is really to say that changes occur. But what about thinkings, feelings, fearings, believings, etc? If these are also kinds of change the obvious question is to ask, Change in what? However, it's not obvious to the senses what is undergoing change and so it's not unreasonable to postulate some insensible thing called 'mind' for the substrate of this change. Compare with the so-called 'luminiferous aether', perhaps.
One way of stopping the slide towards the ghost in the machine is to accept just the flux and no more. This appears to be SP's strategy. Physics tells us that there are quarks and leptons and their interactions. But these things are not at all like ordinary bodies writ very small and what their existence amounts to isn't clear. It's as if the ghost has crept back in at the other end of the scale.
David Brightly said...
"So, gentlemen, after all that, Are there runnings? I'm happy to say there are, but we have to accept that we have now admitted more than mere bodies to the existents."
Yes I think there are more than mere bodies in existence.
"But what about thinkings, feelings, fearings, believings, etc?"
Change in brain states.
"Change in what?"
Why 'in' ? The question is 'what' changed and the answer is always the brain, for feelings, beliefs, etc...
" it's not obvious to the senses what is undergoing change"
In what way is it not obvious? It's not obvious to myself right here, right now, that my mind is changing because of my brain reacting to physical/chemical reactions. But I think it's pretty obvious that this is what is happening. We know that is what is happening. There could be something else, should our Theists/Dualist/Supernaturalists friends be right. But I don't know what they refer to nor why they believe such 'other' or 'extra' thing exist.
"One way of stopping the slide towards the ghost in the machine is to accept just the flux and no more."
Not sure I understand that point right but I don't believe there is a 'ghost' in the machine. We are the machine and 'think' that we are somehow the controller of that machine; that intuition is wrong.
Hal said...
"You are never going to be able to talk about or describe or explain anything in the world without using concepts."
Obviously.
"I think I'll stick with the obvious. "
But you are not addressing the point then: why do you think concepts exist in the first place?
You did say:
"Just as we have the capacity to conceptualize "real material physical things" we also have imaginative powers that enable us to think of things we've never experienced."
But that is still beside the point. These things you have never experienced: how can you think of them? What do you think of so that you can think of things you have never experienced?
Hi Hal,
"Was that the point?"
Yes, from the original post:
"My argument is an attempt to show, not assume, that minds exist first, on the grounds that if they don't exist first, they cannot emerge. "
And my partial answer was:
I have said exactly the same before, in the opposite direction. On the primacy of physical existence, by assuming the material as basic existence first, minds don't exist from the start and emerge from physical processes. The assumption can indeed be proven wrong if it can be shown that minds do not exist in such a world. i.e. it's falsifiable.
So the question is 'can minds emerge from the physical?'
Yes, their existence is completely explained by the physical existence we are part of. The only things our minds can think of are physical things. To think of non-physical things, we need to first conceptualize physical things and play around with the concepts and labels we get from these objects.
"You do realize, I hope, that reality is mind-dependent and language-dependent? Sure reality can exist without us [...]"
This is about what it means 'to exist', it's about 'existence'. That's what physicalism or materialism is about. In that context, no, reality is not mind-dependent and certainly not language-dependent. The physical, the material, does exist without us and the question is whether there is more to it.
"[...] but it is incoherent to think that we can know and understand things-in-themselves without being mediated through our mind and language."
Right, but that's about understanding. Not existence.
"I know that the physical world is temporally prior, but the mind is logically prior when it comes to experiencing and understanding the physical world."
When you say 'temporally prior', that's what it means to exist. Minds exist because the physical exist.
"To try and explain what we are doing when we think or when we run or when we eat by saying that it is due to brain processes is a vacuous explanation."
It is not the entire explanation; it's just the reason why it exists. It does not explain how it happens. But is there anything else needed for 'thinking' or 'running' to exist? I don't think so. Theists say you need a god. What do you think we need?
Hello Hal. Not seen the film but just read the synopsis on Wikipedia. An uncompromising ending then, despite pressure from the studio. Was put in mind of Haldane's On being the Right Size.
Hello Hugo. I guess I am speculating about how we arrived at the concept 'mind'. Our ancestors could see with their eyes that an instance of running involved a body and regular changes to the disposition of its limbs. But no such body could be seen or otherwise sensed as changing when thinkings and feelings occurred. They didn't have the concept of brain-state. Aristotle, apparently, thought that the brain was a kind of radiator for cooling the blood. Why not postulate an unseen body in which the thinkings occurred? Nineteenth century physicists, knowing that light was a vibration, postulated an insensible medium in which those vibrations took place. Same idea.
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