tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post7279844623517493498..comments2024-03-27T15:34:14.749-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: A refutation of the AFRVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger42125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-42388485100724686462009-08-27T16:16:38.227-07:002009-08-27T16:16:38.227-07:00http://www.youtube.com/user/mazierephilippe#play/a...http://www.youtube.com/user/mazierephilippe#play/all/uploads-all/1/mojV17Y0iu4<br /><br />Is this really the maverick philosopher?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-60043843545664138632009-08-27T09:21:44.613-07:002009-08-27T09:21:44.613-07:00NJ: I only have an amateur's interest in this ...NJ: I only have an amateur's interest in this topic, but I recall thinking this was cool:<br /><br />Mansy SS, Schrum JP, Krishnamurthy M, Tobé S, Treco DA, Szostak JW. Template-directed synthesis of a genetic polymer in a model protocell. Nature. 4 June 2008.<br /><br />(Summary and implications discussed <a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v454/n7200/full/454037a.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>).<br /><br />It won't be long before we have arguments about whether these things created in labs are alive. Then the fights will be about whether the conditions in which such life is created are enough like those of prebiotic Earth. Then the fights will be over and another gap will be closed. :)Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-61120447637584597892009-08-26T17:47:01.700-07:002009-08-26T17:47:01.700-07:00BDK, off-topic sorry. Is there any news on abioge...BDK, off-topic sorry. Is there any news on abiogenesis you're aware of?normajeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06612628618334389249noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-65304373392459777572009-08-25T09:39:39.080-07:002009-08-25T09:39:39.080-07:00I said:
" I think ultimately, after giving th...I said:<br />" I think ultimately, after giving the general reasons for thinking that mental states are brain states"<br /><br />This is nontrivial, because there are so many data to discuss, and so many reasons to believe the mind is neural. Unlike the antinaturalists, who tend to be one-hit wonders (basically repeating versions of Leibniz's windmill), the naturalists are sticklers for detail and evidence, and have lots of experiments they like to chew on (the antinaturalists should be chewing over the same experiments, but for some reason they like to stay in Leibniz's mill staring about in awe, feeding on their intuitions about what neuroscience will be like in 300 years). <br /><br />I'm writing this up now but it is quickly expanding into a book unfortunately.<br /><br />(for his mill example see Section 17 of the <a href="http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/leibniz/monad.htm" rel="nofollow">Monadology</a>:<br /><br />"Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.").Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-57637373237326522602009-08-25T08:55:11.189-07:002009-08-25T08:55:11.189-07:00DL: I agree to some degree but think you overstate...DL: I agree to some degree but think you overstate things a bit. I said at another blog (the rest is pure quote):<br /><br />[N]aturalists need a positive story, a biological mechanism to point toward and say 'See, that's how cognition works.' In arguments about phenotypes whose phylogeny is unclear, at least we can point to natural selection as a plausible mechanism. There is, as yet, no 'standard theory' of the biology of cognition, no default consensus mechanism we can point toward.<br /><br />Because of this, even naturalists are presently forced to be speculative when it comes to specific mechanisms of cognition. Hence, many dualists believe they are on equal footing with the naturalists. "Hey, if the naturalists have no consensus, not even a plausible story, about how consciousness emerges from brain matter, then why should we take their word for it? Indeed, here are some arguments that cognition/consciousness <i>cannot</i> emerge from brain matter. Much less than leaving us on an equal footing, that puts me one up on these silly naturalists that can't even keep their stories straight!" <br /><br />Such lines of thought are not easy [for the naturalist] to rebut. I think ultimately, after giving the general reasons for thinking that mental states are brain states, we have to say something like: 'In the absence of compelling data a good scientist is less confident, not more confident, in her conclusions. In that spirit, I'll only say that time will tell which general approach is more plausible.'Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-82229078433783756212009-08-25T06:57:11.711-07:002009-08-25T06:57:11.711-07:00BDK,
I agree. It may not be obvious how to get t...BDK,<br /><br />I agree. It may not be obvious how to get to consciousness, but there's nothing to suggest we can't. All the evidence points to the likelihood that we can. We know humans are machines, and we know humans can do it.<br /><br />Now, if dualists could prove we weren't machines, they would have a case, but they can't prove it. I mean, it's not like there's astral projection or telepathy which would provide a compelling case for dualism.<br /><br />This is why dualism is such a total sham. Dualists now admit that in every scientifically detectable way we're machines, yet they still insist that machines can't possibly think like we do. That's like saying that in every scientifically detectable way, the Apollo moon landings will appear to have occurred, but actually they were faked. (Oh, and, furthermore, we can never land on the moon!) Dualism is a ridiculous conspiracy theory.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-21798333936939520062009-08-25T06:06:23.653-07:002009-08-25T06:06:23.653-07:00There are different senses of 'recognize.'...There are different senses of 'recognize.' One sense DL is using, and another which requires <i>conscious</i> recognition. E.g., you see a friend's face but he is wearing a hat, so it takes two seconds before you have the 'click' of recognition. In AI, pattern recognition is simply the ability to reliably discriminate different patterns. For instance, the 'facial recognition' software can match a novel picture of Jill to a stored image template of Jill, and give a 'Jill' response (and can also do the same for lots of other face pictures). This involves a stored memory of Jill's face, and a comparison of this template with present data. (Of course there are other face recognition algorithms, this is just one type).<br /><br />Clearly, such facial recognition software isn't conscious of faces, doesn't have that 'Aha there's Jill' experience that we would have. <br /><br />The interesting question is how far such gizmos (implemented in brains) can get you toward full intentional contents and also toward consciousness (as I argue in the sites linked to above, I think they get you pretty close to the former, but it is less obvious how far they bring you to the latter. That is, it isn't obvious how to bridge the gap between recognition widgets and conscious states).Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-5393612091072572182009-08-24T21:22:47.436-07:002009-08-24T21:22:47.436-07:00normajean,
I can see a causal relation but not th...normajean,<br /><br /><i>I can see a causal relation but not that it literally recognizes.</i><br /><br />Tell me what you think is missing. <br /><br />Isn't recognition a causal relation?Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-85970926158081330942009-08-24T18:49:41.103-07:002009-08-24T18:49:41.103-07:00I can see a causal relation but not that it litera...I can see a causal relation but not that it literally recognizes.normajeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06612628618334389249noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-3314093398068350862009-08-24T06:52:04.527-07:002009-08-24T06:52:04.527-07:00normajean,
If a mechanism responds only to a part...normajean,<br /><br />If a mechanism responds only to a particular pattern in its input, then it recognizes that pattern, by definition. By this definition, hemoglobin recognizes oxygen.<br /><br />I've also explained that when humans recognize something there's generally more than just recognition taking place. Humans have recognition, abstraction, and recognition of our own recognition. This is something that the simplest mechanisms (like hemoglobin) lack, but which more sophisticated mechanisms possess.<br /><br />Hemoglobin does not learn to abstract, and does not recognize that it recognizes (because it cannot abstract). <br /><br />HTMs can and do learn to abstract.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-67922007403420069632009-08-24T06:44:46.035-07:002009-08-24T06:44:46.035-07:00Anonymous,
But does the machine know what it'...Anonymous,<br /><br /><i>But does the machine know what it's doing? Does it grasp it even if it has been trained to output "The cat is on the mat" when it's presented with a picture of a cat on a mat, and "The cat is not on the mat" when presented with a picture of same?</i><br /><br />Yes. As I've explained, the machine does not simply contain what is necessary to recognize "cats on mats." It has what is necessary to recognize its own recognizing of cats on mats, as well as the ability to abstract to "X on mats".<br /><br /><i>You provide "meaning" as a given for the machine to have (it's just in terms of 'lower level' ones), but the problem is getting any meaning at all (back to the Chinese room.)</i><br /><br />The Chinese Room argument proves that individual neurons don't understand Chinese. It doesn't have anything at all to say about what brains do or do not understand. The Chinese Room argument is a simulation of a brain as it operates one neuron (or one subnetwork) at a time (as if the simulation were running on a single processor computer). The fact that an individual neuron doesn't understand Chinese is pretty irrelevant to cognitive science.<br /><br />Again we're back at personal incredulity as an argument against AI/materialism.<br /><br /><i>But if it's objective and real, then there is more to the universe than "colorless, odorless, featureless, totally homogeneous particles advancing in perfectly predicable lines with all the rigid and absolute predictability of the premises of a syllogism".. and therefore you reject materialism.</i><br /><br />You suggest that for something to be objective and real, it has to be irreducible. Well, that's a very peculiar definition of objective and real. I quite expect that in almost any philosophy there are things that are composite and real. Even in mereological nihiism (which is a very silly idea) arrangements of simples are real and objective.<br /><br /><i>Utterly incorrect even on Cartesian dualism. On hylomorphic dualism you could not be more wrong, since proponents explicitly argue for the presence and role of bodily systems for sensory operation (no sight without eyes, etc).</i><br /><br />Oh, I'm sure dualists reject the idea *now*. But 500 years ago, if you theorized that mental faculties were non-material, there are lots of mental faculties that could be implemented non-materially with no support from the physical brain. Now that we know the brain is capable of doing everything by its onesy, the non-material part is more elusive than ever. Your situation is analogous to that of the conspiracy theorist. No matter how much hard evidence piles up in favor of materialism (or physicalism, because they're both equally deadly to your superstitious religious attachments), you keep pointing to gaps to support your case. You want it both ways. You want to interpret all the latest evidence against the defendant as merely expected evidence for an invisible conspirator who framed the defendant.<br /><br /><i>I mean, to hear you put it, there's actually no such thing as a philosopher (much less a materialist philosopher) who explicitly argues for eliminative materialism, or for mereological nihilism, etc.</i><br /><br />Yes, I've heard of such things, but these are fringe ideas to say the least. They are far from mainstream. If that's what you're arguing against, save your breath/keystrokes.<br /><br /><i>"I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they’ve been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear on their list. But aboutness surely won’t; intentionality simply doesn’t go that deep."<br /><br />That's Jerry Fodor.<br /><br />So do you agree or disagree with Fodor? </i><br /><br />Sure I agree. I never said aboutness was irreducible. Why should it be? It is the dualist's view that aboutness is irreducible, not the materialist/physicalist's view.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-62837931379630505102009-08-22T14:00:06.995-07:002009-08-22T14:00:06.995-07:00DL,
"I suppose that sooner or later the phys...DL,<br /><br />"I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they’ve been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear on their list. But aboutness surely won’t; intentionality simply doesn’t go that deep."<br /><br />That's Jerry Fodor.<br /><br />So do you agree or disagree with Fodor? <br /><br />Is "forms a triangle" for your three uranium atoms an ultimate and irreducible property?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-49635755672190765652009-08-22T13:33:00.119-07:002009-08-22T13:33:00.119-07:00Dr-
I too am confused about this statement > Y...Dr-<br /><br />I too am confused about this statement > You wrote: If I have a simple machine that generates 5 volts output in the presence of cyanide, and 0 volts otherwise, then this machine "recognizes" cyanide. The simple machine will have neither abstraction nor consciousness, but that's not important. It still recognizes.<br /><br />It doesn't appear to follow =/normajeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06612628618334389249noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-56388768295219173072009-08-22T13:22:31.218-07:002009-08-22T13:22:31.218-07:00Doctor Logic,
You're taking a childish descri...Doctor Logic,<br /><br /><i>You're taking a childish description of physicalism to an utterly absurd extreme.</i><br /><br />No, DL, I'm pointing out the utterly absurd extremes to which a consistent materialism leads. Have you ever thought that maybe - just maybe - materialism is absurd? And that maybe, just maybe, if your chosen way to demonstrate that materialism isn't absurd is to take advantage of slippery definitions to define materialism to include what amounts to hylomorphic dualism.. that maybe you're helping to demonstrate its absurdity?<br /><br />You know that materialism and physicalism are not strictly the same things ("Slippery" as they may be), so shame on you for trying to substitute one for the other so casually. Double shame on you for purposefully obfuscating and switching in "naturalism", "materialism" and "physicalism" so interchangeably.<br /><br />Anyway, let's pull out a representative sample of your materialism "defenses" here.<br /><br /><i>Consider mathematics. By your definition, mathematics does not exist under materialism.</i><br /><br />Do you want to know what your biggest problem here is, DL? You seem to think that if materialism ever leads to utterly inane conclusions, that somehow the definition of materialism being used must therefore be wrong and dishonest. Because it can't possibly be that materialism is utter bunk and ridiculous, can it? So instead you try some bizarre debating tae kwon do where if a reductio ad absurdum demonstrates materialism to be absurd, what it actually demonstrates is that materialism is actually something else. Convenient!<br /><br />I mean, to hear you put it, there's actually no such thing as a philosopher (much less a materialist philosopher) who explicitly argues for eliminative materialism, or for mereological nihilism, etc. And further, there's no possible way for someone's metaphysics to, when taken to its logical conclusions, reduce to positions like these. No, absurdity is only possible for philosophies attached to intellectual positions you disagree with, right?<br /><br /><i>The meaning of a higher-level abstraction is in terms of lower level ones.</i><br /><br />I ask how someone grasps an abstract concept in their mind, you give a reply that explains how a machine can cycle through processes and give reactions to events that could, from our interpretation, make reference to what we take to be an abstract concept. But does the machine know what it's doing? Does it grasp it even if it has been trained to output "The cat is on the mat" when it's presented with a picture of a cat on a mat, and "The cat is not on the mat" when presented with a picture of same? You provide "meaning" as a given for the machine to have (it's just in terms of 'lower level' ones), but the problem is getting any meaning at all (back to the Chinese room.) And again, even for the machine - if you are really and truly a realist about information - adios materialism anyway.<br /><br /><i>Getting back to your idea of information... Of course information exists under materialism.</i><br /><br />You can argue that information really exists - that it is an objective and real constituent of the universe, not just part of some nominal story made up for the purposes of pragmatic explanation. But if it's objective and real, then there is more to the universe than "colorless, odorless, featureless, totally homogeneous particles advancing in perfectly predicable lines with all the rigid and absolute predictability of the premises of a syllogism".. and therefore you reject materialism. <br /><br /><i>(If dualism were correct, there would be no need for brains with memory or abstracting ability, nor need for a central nervous system at all.)</i><br /><br />Utterly incorrect even on Cartesian dualism. On hylomorphic dualism you could not be more wrong, since proponents explicitly argue for the presence and role of bodily systems for sensory operation (no sight without eyes, etc). Wait, let me guess: Hylomorphic dualism is just physicalism now, right? L-O-L.<br /><br /><i>I wonder, could you possibly be more arrogant in your responses?</i><br /><br />Pot, kettle, black.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-24107572262805659232009-08-22T08:14:04.385-07:002009-08-22T08:14:04.385-07:00Anonymous,
I'm assuming that information is n...Anonymous,<br /><br /><i>I'm assuming that information is non-material - and it is, even if substrates are involved. The AfR is aimed squarely at materialism;</i><br /><br />You're taking a childish description of physicalism to an utterly absurd extreme.<br /><br />Suppose that the universe is described by particle physics, and I have three Uranium atoms positioned such that they are equidistant from each other. This forms a triangle. Is the triangle real? By your definition, the triangle is non-material and not real to the materialist. This is nonsense. To a materialist, there is a triangle there. A triangle is a description of a configuration. It does no good to claim that, in descriptions of physics, there are no configurations, no abstract behaviors, etc.<br /><br />Even if you were to say that descriptions of physical reality are not real, our own descriptions of physical reality would become real if we are physical beings.<br /><br />Indeed, by your reasoning, there's no such thing as a planet in materialism. You practice some form of ultra-greedy reductionism in which a planet no longer exists because the planet is made up of quarks and leptons. But there's a difference between 10^30 quarks and a planet. A particular planet is a particular arrangement of those quarks. The behaviors of the planet depend on those arrangements. The planet is the word for that particular arrangement.<br /><br />Indeed, by your definition, there aren't even laws. Consider Galileo's discovery that two different masses fall to Earth at the same rate (neglecting air resistance). Is this a law? Well, we would have to be talking about abstractions of mass, and abstractions of their initial position. We could be dropping the masses from the Tower of Pisa or from the Eiffel Tower, or dropping them from a tower we have yet to design and build. Furthermore, we would have to abstract the planet or gravitational field in which the masses are dropped. So are laws not allowed under physicalism? That would be a pretty peculiar physicalism, would it not?<br /><br />Consider mathematics. By your definition, mathematics does not exist under materialism. Yet mathematics is a abstraction about computation. Mathematical systems are abstractions of systems. They're like physical laws of computing.<br /><br />The idea that a mind is a physical system is the idea that a mechanism can create abstractions and think the way we humans are observed to think. If you could prove that machines could not create abstractions, then you would have a case against naturalism, but you don't have that proof. Indeed, the evidence is that not only can machines abstract, but that our brains are instances of such machines. (If dualism were correct, there would be no need for brains with memory or abstracting ability, nor need for a central nervous system at all.)<br /><br />You have an argument from ignorance, i.e., "I can't imagine how a machine could think."<br /><br />Getting back to your idea of information... Of course information exists under materialism. Suppose I have a configuration of atoms in a lattice, and their spins are either up or down. There is information in the configuration, i.e., it takes a certain number of bits to represent this. <br /><br />There are two kinds of information. There's information in the sense of "how many bits does it take to record a configuration?", and also in the sense of "how much of this information has utility to me?" It takes a lot of bits to record the configuration of pixels in a black and white photo containing nothing but randomly black or white pixels. However, that photo has no utility to us, so it contains no information in the second sense. Even if you take information to be defined in the latter sense, there is still meaning to information in a physical world.<br /><br /><i>But don't dig your heels in the ground and refuse to give credit where credit is due (assuming you're admitting these things are real, of course) just because a *gasp* christian or *GASP* apologist came up with a good argument.</i><br /><br />I wonder, could you possibly be more arrogant in your responses?Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-59824270986241373062009-08-22T07:43:44.882-07:002009-08-22T07:43:44.882-07:00Anonymous,
Fantastic: The pattern IS an abstracti...Anonymous,<br /><br /><i>Fantastic: The pattern IS an abstraction. Great. So is a sentence containing an abstract proposition. As I asked, by what in the brain is this recognized?</i><br /><br />If I have a simple machine that generates 5 volts output in the presence of cyanide, and 0 volts otherwise, then this machine "recognizes" cyanide. The simple machine will have neither abstraction nor consciousness, but that's not important. It still recognizes. <br /><br />If I create a simple HTM that recognizes cats, that HTM will not just recognize, but also *be* an abstraction for cats. It recognizes all cats, including the ones with eye patches and peg legs. Because HTM's learn, the simple HTM is abstracting (verb) from its sample training cat to the class of all cats (or most of them). A simple HTM will lack consciousness of its recognition, and lack consciousness of its abstraction. However, it both recognizes and abstracts. Humans would differ because they not only recognize and abstract from examples, but they are conscious and aware that they are doing this.<br /><br />So, the primary difference between simple HTMs and humans is that humans also recognize and abstract their recognition and abstraction abilities. How could a machine make that work? <br /><br />Well, we can imagine that an HTM that finds patterns in its own internal processes of recognition and abstraction, and which will learn to recognize when recognition and abstraction are taking place. Moreover, it will be possible for this meta-HTM to recognize when a cat is being recognized versus when a dog is being recognized.<br /><br /><i>The question is how this becomes an interpretation, a conceptualization in the/a mind - how is it grasped?</i><br /><br />How do you grasp ideas for yourself? Consider soft velvet. When you think about this term, you think of it in terms of past experiences. If you had no sense of touch, you would not really know what soft velvet was. You would know it only by its appearance to your other senses. If you lacked both sight and touch, the term loses meaning even further. Soft velvet is defined in terms of the inputs to your recognition and abstraction processes. When you think of soft velvet, you can feel soft velvet with your fingertips, albeit less vividly than if you were actually touching velvet. Thinking the concept of soft velvet causes your mind to react as if you were actually touching velvet.<br /><br />This is precisely what you would expect if you brain was full of HTM's. An HTM is a memory and a recognizer. It contains feedback loops, so that retrieving a memory is similar to an abstract rehash of all prior training experiences.<br /><br />Meaning is in terms of past experiences.<br /><br />The same applies to mental abstractions. An HTM that has other HTMs as inputs can find patterns in patterns, abstractions in abstractions. The meaning of a higher-level abstraction is in terms of lower level ones.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-80379790156857273262009-08-20T16:50:56.530-07:002009-08-20T16:50:56.530-07:00Well the reason rationality cannot arise out of no...Well the reason rationality cannot arise out of non-rationality is that rational effects cannot be produced by non-rational causes, and if whatever one designates as rational arises out of non-rational causes, then it is the effect of a non-rational cause and therefore non-rational as well.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-62801311682640121862009-08-19T14:21:29.640-07:002009-08-19T14:21:29.640-07:00Anon: hmmm, perhaps you missed the links. For inst...Anon: hmmm, perhaps you missed the links. For instance, <a href="http://philosophyofbrains.com/2008/08/06/biorepresentations-necessary-but-not-sufficient.aspx" rel="nofollow">this post</a> entitled 'biorepresentations.' <br /><br />Doctor Logic, that Numenta stuff is interesting theoretical engineering, but not particularly cutting edge or accepted as brain theory. I was not impressed by Hawkins talk on it at Society for Neuroscience. That said, it provides an interesting possibility argument.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-85048317160247947342009-08-19T13:47:43.906-07:002009-08-19T13:47:43.906-07:00BDK,
Anon, it should be relevant to:
Yep, and I ...BDK,<br /><br /><i>Anon, it should be relevant to:</i><br /><br />Yep, and I didn't see that explained in your links. By all means, if you care to explain that, go for it!<br /><br />DL,<br /><br /><i>My bad. It doesn't represent an abstraction. It IS an abstraction.</i><br /><br />Fantastic: The pattern IS an abstraction. Great. So is a sentence containing an abstract proposition. As I asked, by what in the brain is this recognized? How is this accomplished? That a material medium can embody an abstraction (The words "The cat is on the mat" on a piece of paper) is not itself a mystery to me. The question is how this becomes an interpretation, a conceptualization in the/a mind - how is it grasped? A TXT file on a computer with the words "The cat is on the mat" in ASCII means diddly here.<br /><br /><i>No, the physical configuration in the brain isn't objectively about the cat in the sense that it lacks subjectivity. It objectively represents cats, is an abstraction of cat, to the subject that owns the brain. It is a structure that was formed by interaction with a cat, and a structure which will be triggered into similar activity when supplied with inputs resembling the cat.</i><br /><br />Who said 'lacks subjectivity'? You're saying it "objectively represents cats" - which I can only take to mean is you declaring that information is a real constituent of the universe, not some useful fiction. Wonderful, I agree with you! You just sank materialism, and you're buying in to the AfR.<br /><br />Unless you're saying that information doesn't "really" exist, and all you're describing here is some mechanical process that you're certain will explain the *appearance of* abstract thought, etc in a machine (in which case you're not talking about anything relevant) and eventually humans (in which case, pal, this ain't reason you're talking about. Ain't properly intention either.)<br /><br /><i>This is question-begging. You're making an assumption about information. You're assuming that information is non-natural. Information is defined based on our own subjective perspective. It's not defined to be non-natural, so such an assumption is unwarranted.</i><br /><br />No, I'm assuming that information is non-material - and it is, even if substrates are involved. The AfR is aimed squarely at materialism; I could really care less if you suddenly want to define non-material existences, or even full-blown dualism(s), as natural. Go right ahead! Personally, I'd love to define hylemorphic dualism as natural. I'd love to define God as natural! Look at me, I'm an orthodox Catholic naturalist.<br /><br />Now, I know from the thread over at New Empiricism that you think non-material/non-physical things can be filed under "naturalism". That's great, I don't even feel like fighting you on that. But if you're walking down that road here - if you're admitting that information/non-physical/non-material things is/are a real and actual constituent of our universe - then DL, you've left materialism behind. And that's central to the AfR's aim.<br /><br />Don't worry, DL. You don't have say that God exists just because the AfR worked in that capacity. Victor has flatly said more than once that it mostly moves you to various other options in metaphysics and philosophy. But don't dig your heels in the ground and refuse to give credit where credit is due (assuming you're admitting these things are real, of course) just because a *gasp* christian or *GASP* apologist came up with a good argument. There are atheists out there who reject materialism. I'm sure they'll welcome you among their number. (Bring pizza. And wear a Discworld T-shirt.)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-20683989033440885202009-08-19T12:47:48.161-07:002009-08-19T12:47:48.161-07:00Eric,
Check out http://www.numenta.com.
HTM tech...Eric,<br /><br />Check out http://www.numenta.com.<br /><br />HTM technology is based on Jeff Hawkins theory which is explained in the book "On Intelligence".Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-72402368514827764782009-08-19T12:46:37.515-07:002009-08-19T12:46:37.515-07:00Anonymous,
What does it mean for there being a &q...Anonymous,<br /><br /><i>What does it mean for there being a "circuit in the brain that represents the abstraction for cat"?</i><br /><br />My bad. It doesn't represent an abstraction. It IS an abstraction.<br /><br /><i>What's more, if you're saying that 'aboutness' is real - that pattern X in the brain is objectively and certainly "about 'the cat is on the mat'" and that information is a real and certain part of the universe rather than a useful, if fictional model.. well done, citizen.</i><br /><br />No, the physical configuration in the brain isn't objectively about the cat in the sense that it lacks subjectivity. It objectively represents cats, is an abstraction of cat, to the subject that owns the brain. It is a structure that was formed by interaction with a cat, and a structure which will be triggered into similar activity when supplied with inputs resembling the cat.<br /><br /><i>To make "information" a real constituent of the universe is to indirectly support the AfR, not fight it.</i><br /><br />This is question-begging. You're making an assumption about information. You're assuming that information is non-natural. Information is defined based on our own subjective perspective. It's not defined to be non-natural, so such an assumption is unwarranted.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-36370302728235194732009-08-19T07:31:40.094-07:002009-08-19T07:31:40.094-07:00Anon, it should be relevant to:
>>What does ...Anon, it should be relevant to:<br />>>What does it mean for there being a "circuit in the brain that represents the abstraction for cat"? Represents to who or what - another part of the brain? How is this representation accomplished?"<<Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-67828646538511551412009-08-19T07:31:08.725-07:002009-08-19T07:31:08.725-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-82767622895664341082009-08-18T22:07:58.903-07:002009-08-18T22:07:58.903-07:00BDK,
Thanks. Interesting. Not really what I'm...BDK,<br /><br />Thanks. Interesting. Not really what I'm going after here (what's related to my response to DL doesn't offer anything new), but yet another fun resource to read up on for different topics.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-30485675551326147482009-08-18T21:35:31.318-07:002009-08-18T21:35:31.318-07:00IT took me a half hour to find that @#$# link. I t...IT took me a half hour to find that @#$# link. I think I need to make a post at my own blog with all the relevant links, so I never have to look for it again. How annoying. Grrrr... Waking up in 6 hours to go running. :OBlue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.com