tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post6220640723929861319..comments2024-03-18T11:10:18.708-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: The external world and the burden of proofVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger340125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-6009306558762196322017-05-26T05:43:22.844-07:002017-05-26T05:43:22.844-07:00I can only imagine the constant concern of going a...I can only imagine the constant concern of going about your business during the IRA bombings. But you Brits have a reputation for carrying on...the Blitz for instance.<br /><br />What do you think finally ended the IRA bombings? Is there more power sharing now in Northern Ireland between the 2 parties?bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-68142788527835554482017-05-26T03:24:45.755-07:002017-05-26T03:24:45.755-07:00Thank you for your thoughts. We live in relative ...Thank you for your thoughts. We live in relative safety on the edge of rural north-east Hampshire. But I was living just south of Warrington town centre at the time of the IRA bomb in 1993 that killed two children. Also the massive 1996 IRA bomb in Corporation street, Manchester, which killed no-one. The IRA weren't so much interested in killing mainland Brits as showing that they could cause havoc if they wanted, so they would issue warnings. But I well remember the distinct unease one felt travelling on the London tube when bomb alerts were frequent and one eyed people's bags with suspicion. <br /><br />I invested in the Kindle version of Scholastic Metaphysics a while back (half the price of the paperback in the UK) and have been peppering it with Notes. It's not so simple to cut and paste bits out of the online Kindle reader but I'll see what I can do. We may yet get this thread to 400 comments.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-7677701543344867682017-05-24T16:27:33.724-07:002017-05-24T16:27:33.724-07:00David,
I'm glad to see that you're writin...David,<br /><br />I'm glad to see that you're writing which means you're safe. I hope that none of your family or acquaintances were harmed from the Manchester event.<br /><br /><b>It's not difficult to find criticisms of the arguments for priority in his Scholastic Metaphysics, for example, which he doesn't counter in the text.</b><br /><br />I haven't read the book so I have no context for the assertions or criticisms. Do you have specific criticisms in mind or can you point me to something to read? <br /><br />I agree that new developments or discoveries in the practice of science raise questions of how they fit into the philosophy of science. But it seems you think present day Thomism has not just failed to address those questions adequately, but has not even attempted to address those questions. While it's true that Feser paints the early moderns as the villains in his narrative, I have seen him address General Relativity, Quantum Mechanics, and classical objections, so I don't think its true that Thomists are locked into defending the 4 elements. <br /><br />Thanks for mentioning Popper's growth of knowledge theory. I'll read up on it.<br /><br />I've always had an interest in why people think the way they do and why they thought the way they did. It's also interesting to see how I came to be taught what I was taught. I found it interesting that the history of scientific thought was not an orderly evolution from one logical thought to another as you would assume merely taking physics courses. Seems there was plenty of loud disagreements, name calling and politics. Surprise :-)bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-60348581072157262382017-05-23T03:44:57.614-07:002017-05-23T03:44:57.614-07:00Yes, this is a theme in Ed's writings. He see...Yes, this is a theme in Ed's writings. He seeks to isolate his metaphysics and philosophy of nature from the findings of science. The former are in some sense 'prior' and the latter are their detailed working out, as it were. Nothing in science can possibly cast doubt on this division. You won't be surprised when I say I think this position is doomed, though I can see why Ed would want to defend it. It's not difficult to find criticisms of the arguments for priority in his <i>Scholastic Metaphysics</i>, for example, which he doesn't counter in the text. He seems to think it's enough to rebut Ockham and Buridan and the arch-enemy Hume to which, in his view, the former inevitably lead. But more significantly he doesn't acknowledge the extent to which developments in science and mathematics, which have occurred as natural growths within their disciplines, have thrown up <i>new</i> philosophical puzzles. That's why we have phil of science and phil of maths. His project doesn't recognise the Popperian unpredictability of the growth of knowledge. He'd say it was all down to the mistakes of the early moderns of course!David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-11289999773947044862017-05-17T20:53:44.391-07:002017-05-17T20:53:44.391-07:00Thanks. I think that's an excellent summary o...Thanks. I think that's an excellent summary of the different perspectives, top down or bottom up but unfortunately using the same word. I can see how its confusing from your perspective.....Its worse than Brits and Yanks talking about the car's boot, or more correctly trunk :-)<br /><br /><br /><br />Here is how I read the quote:<br />If there is causality, then what has to be true and what has to be false? Maybe there really isn't such a thing.<br />But the claim is more of what type of questions the philosophy of nature asks as opposed to those of a scientist who just assumes causality. bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-6910348015652609862017-05-17T05:49:24.580-07:002017-05-17T05:49:24.580-07:00From the mid 19th century much basic chemical know...From the mid 19th century much basic chemical knowledge of what elements formed compounds with others and in what proportions was summarised by a whole number property of each element called its valence. Hydrogen had valence 1, oxygen 2, and carbon 4, so compounds like H20, CO2, and CH4 were possible. School chemistry still goes like this. In the mid 20th century the quantum mechanical understanding of the electron distribution in discrete 'shells' inside atoms showed how valence was connected with the number of electrons in the outermost shell, which became known as the valence shell. It also explained where the valence theory broke down and why 'multi-valency' had sometimes to be introduced. Since the electron shell theory accounts for the valence theory we say it's more fundamental. It gets closer to 'the bottom of things', as it were.<br /><br />I think it's clear Ed doesn't mean anything like this. Rather, I suspect he is emphasising the a priori aspect of the Aristotelian analysis. Even when we know next to nothing about opium we can argue from very general considerations that its properties derive from some intrinsic principle. Perhaps this is why he says, <i>The philosophy of nature is concerned with <b>deeper</b> questions -- for example, with what has to be true if there is to be any causality at all, or any material substances at all</i>. Unfortunately, my intuitions regarding spatial metaphors for degrees of knowledge or understanding go the opposite way! I see Ed's as a 'top-down' approach which yields very general, but shallow results---they do not tell us much about the world in detail. The chemist, on the other hand, gives us an empirical, bottom-up, as it were, account, which goes more <b>deeply</b> into things. Do you see how we use 'deep' in opposite senses? Though we both think deeper is better! So I'm inclined to put this disagreement down to a clash of metaphors. <br /><br />Incidentally, I'm not really sure how to read that quoted claim above. The position of the 'if' suggests he's after necessary conditions---if there is causality etc then there must be such-and-such. On the other hand the 'to be' suggests sufficient conditions---if such-and-such holds there will be causality etc. The latter, I think, would be a much bigger claim. <br /><br />Interesting that little nuances of language can be so misleading.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-22943537715440729172017-05-16T05:53:59.048-07:002017-05-16T05:53:59.048-07:00Can you please help me understand what you do cons...Can you please help me understand what you do consider the proper ordering of 'more/less fundamental' then? Perhaps you consider there is no way to order things in this way.<br /><br />I think you get the form/matter distinction right? But something can be part of the form of a thing but not essential to it. For instance the car in your garage may be red. If your car was blue, it would still be a car. So in this case the color of the car would be considered an accident and not part of the car's essence or substantial form.<br /><br />Regarding your analogy. I think in general a philosopher would ask different types of questions like: What is a vehicle? What is a car? How are they the same/different? What do they do? What are their causes and effects? etc. For instance Aristotle used the analogy of a statue to illustrate his concept of the 4 causes. It was incidental and less relevant to what he was trying to convey whether the statue was one of Apollo or Aphrodite. I take Ed to have this in mind with the quote you refer to.<br /><br />I realize that you reject final cause. I was just discussing where it came from.<br />How do you account for the apparent regularity of how things work? Does it even need an explanation?bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-8897634738137353112017-05-15T14:09:26.579-07:002017-05-15T14:09:26.579-07:00Not quite. I wouldn’t say that an instance of a ...Not quite. I wouldn’t say that an instance of a generalisation was more fundamental than the generalisation itself. Or vice versa. In my view, instances and generalisations don’t fall under the kind of ordering implied by ‘more/less fundamental’. That’s my beef with Ed F: He claims that the properties and operations of opium stem from its ‘substantial form’. I don’t quite know what he means by this term, but he seems to admit that chemical investigation can reveal more about it, and yet talk of the substantial form is more fundamental than the chemical findings. So here is an analogy: I get around quickly because I possess a vehicle. Inspection of my garage reveals the vehicle to be a car. But Ed would say it’s a more fundamental account of my speedy movement to say I have a vehicle than to say I have a car. <br /> <br />I agree MW definition 2a gets closest. But Ed is using ‘fundamental’ in a comparative sense, whereas MW uses the absolute term ‘essential’ and it’s difficult to make sense of ‘more or less essential’. <br /> <br />I think you have put your finger on it. Final causation was indeed the best hypothesis in the fourth century BC.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-60937504940770797492017-05-15T05:54:53.623-07:002017-05-15T05:54:53.623-07:00Thus explanation A is more fundamental then explan...<b>Thus explanation A is more fundamental then explanation B if A can account for B but not vice versa.</b><br /><br />So you consider that the specific fact that Na and Cl combine to make salt a more basic explanation of how chemistry works than the explanation that 2 substances are needed along with a catalyst to produce a 3rd substance. Yes, I think we do disagree on the definition. <br /><br />To my mind, Na and Cl can account for how salt is made, but not how H2O is made. But the fact that 2 substances and a catalyst are needed to produce a 3rd substance accounts for both. So I would consider the later more fundamental, while you would say that since there are no specifics, then the later is less fundamental in both cases. Merriam Webster has <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fundamental" rel="nofollow">this series of definitions </a>of fundamental. Can you point to one of these or another that you feel phrases your idea the way you conceive it? I'm thinking of 2a as my concept.<br /><br />Thanks for the link. It's a very good summary. Here is more of the quote:<br /><br /><i>Aristotle does not seem to be able to specify what material processes are involved in the growth of the teeth, but he is willing to recognize that certain material processes have to take place for the teeth to grow in the particular way they do. <b>In other words, there is more to the formation of the teeth than these material processes,</b> but this formation does not occur unless the relevant material processes take place. </i><br /> <br />I take this to mean that regardless of what a material process turn to be in detail if it is regular the fact of regularity still needs an explanation. Likewise there is no regularity without a material process. <br /><br />The article also mentions correctly that he offers the final cause as the best explanation for the observation of regularity, not something that can be deductively proven.bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-6650290215618874032017-05-14T13:14:13.530-07:002017-05-14T13:14:13.530-07:00We may have a terminological disagreement here. I...We may have a terminological disagreement here. I can see that a realist regarding universals might regard a universal, redness, say, as more fundamental in some ontological sense than its instances, particular red things. But I tend to think of 'fundamental' as denoting an ordering on explanations or theories and the entities they involve. Thus explanation A is more fundamental then explanation B if A can account for B but not vice versa. This seems to be the sense in which the term is used in the sciences. Ed F seems to accept something like this when he says, <i>Naturally we still have to do chemical analysis in order to discover the specific means by which opium brings about its characteristic effects.</i> The specific explanation accounts for and justifies the more general claim that there is some unspecified principle at work. <br /><br />I looked up Andrea Falcon's SEP article <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/" rel="nofollow"><i>Aristotle on Causality</i></a>. She points out that, understandably enough, <i>Aristotle does not seem to be able to specify what material processes are involved in the growth of the teeth</i>. Hence he looks for an explanation of the regularity of animal jaw arrangements elsewhere. I think he would be impressed by what we can now offer by way of material and efficient explanations of animal physiology.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-64577756371241911192017-05-13T14:45:17.501-07:002017-05-13T14:45:17.501-07:00Really? Why not? Is there another principle operat...<b>Really? Why not? Is there another principle operative besides the substantial form? </b><br /><br />Yes, I see what you mean. If you knew everything there was to know about a thing, then what is left to know?<br />But form is only 1 of the 4 AT 'causes'. We also need to know the material, efficient and final causes to know everything about a thing. A thing is not *just* a substantial form as we need the others too.<br /><br /><b>The analysis isn't more fundamental, it's just more general/less specific. </b><br /><br />I think this may be where you can help me understand nominalism better. I see science as attempting to uncover ever fewer general principles to explain how the material universe changes. To my mind basic general principles are more fundamental than particular instances that exhibit the principles.<br /><br />The scientific revolution did indeed give us more information about how material things work in greater detail. Today's Western science follows some basic assumptions as Aristotle's such as: material things really exist, material things really change, the universe is intelligble, we can cause changes etc. Those assumptions are not debated by chemists since that's not in their job description. It is in Ed's job description to debate those assumptions. He is trying to make a point that it is a category mistake to conflate the 2 jobs.<br /><br /><b>Regarding regularity, the chemist would say that a very basic process like the reaction between sodium and chlorine is time independent and always gives the same result. There is insufficient structure in their atoms to allow internal states that reflect or 'record' the time or their history.</b><br /><br />My point regarding regularity is not that it exists but why does it exist? (even if you move it down through material levels from salt to atoms to quantum fields). From an AT perspective regularity demands an explanation that is not answered by the material cause, the efficient cause nor the formal cause. Your answer assigns it to the formal cause. Aristotle was challenged that his formal cause did not account for regularity, so he accounted for it by the final cause. Things naturally and regularly tend to behave the same.bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-71204693245456980732017-05-13T12:52:44.221-07:002017-05-13T12:52:44.221-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-67575098883471271182017-05-13T10:10:53.404-07:002017-05-13T10:10:53.404-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-76520369500318433612017-05-13T01:49:54.551-07:002017-05-13T01:49:54.551-07:00Here is something else I noticed. Ed also says (i...Here is something else I noticed. Ed also says (in the first excerpt),<br /> <br />He [the Aristotelian] is not claiming that we can say everything we need to know about opium by noting that whatever it does it does by virtue of its substantial form , …<br /> <br />Really? Why not? Is there another principle operative besides the substantial form? Oddly enough, isn’t what Ed says the Aristotelian denies exactly what the chemist <i>would</i> say, if his interpretation of ‘substantial form’ as parts and structure is the right one? <br /> <br />My tentative conclusion on this is that Ed's talk of 'a different and more fundamental level of analysis' and 'asking a different sort of question' is somewhat misleading. The analysis isn't more fundamental, it's just more general/less specific. This is understandable given the state of physicochemical knowledge in ancient times. Indeed, to attribute powers to unseen internal 'principles' is in retrospect decidedly insightful given that there would have been no idea as to how these principles brought about their effects. The scientific revolution of the 17th century marks the start of their elucidation.<br /><br />I can't at the moment make sense of what Ed says in any other way.<br /><br />Regarding regularity, the chemist would say that a very basic process like the reaction between sodium and chlorine is time independent and always gives the same result. There is insufficient structure in their atoms to allow internal states that reflect or 'record' the time or their history. Contrast this with macroscopic bodies, such as plants, which do have enough structure to get into time-dependent states----more growth hormone in spring than in winter, say, and tree growth rings accumulating year by year.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-89760933073611090512017-05-12T22:10:20.287-07:002017-05-12T22:10:20.287-07:00The only further questions he might want to ask wo...<b>The only further questions he might want to ask would be directed to a physicist, not a philosopher.</b><br /><br />I agree with you that a chemist, operating as a chemist, has no interest in philosophy nor does a physicist. They are no longer trained in philosophy and make a muddle of it when they make philosophical pronouncements. That doesn't mean philosophers cannot examine the question using tools that chemists are not trained in using for a purpose they are not trained in.<br /><br />Also, strictly speaking, an orthodox modern or post modern philosopher would deny the formal cause although a chemist would agree that the whole has an intrinsic principle different than the parts. This is where I see that a disconnect occurs between the modern's philosophy of science and science as it it practiced. <br /><br /><b>He could agree with this too. But he would also say the there is a sense in which the whole just is the parts (material cause) put together (efficient cause) in the right arrangement (formal cause). There is nothing in addition to this.</b><br /><br />So I would put this question to the chemist. I see that you've combined (efficient cause) sodium and chlorine (material cause) and produced a substance you call salt that tastes good (formal cause). Can you do it a second time? Why should you expect the same result? Why not a sweet substance next time? There seems to be a need to explain the regularity right?<br /><br />And sorry, I can see in a previous comment that I had attributed regularity to the formal cause whereas regularity is part of the formal cause and structure and behavior is attributed to the formal cause.bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-70817223368179991912017-05-12T09:22:13.323-07:002017-05-12T09:22:13.323-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-61165198467827562442017-05-12T06:32:28.925-07:002017-05-12T06:32:28.925-07:00Here is more from that Ed Feser post, with some co...Here is more from that Ed Feser post, with some comments of mine in bold. <br /><br />Hence, when the Aristotelian says (for example) that natural objects must have substantial forms, he is not trying to give an explanation of the sort that the modern chemist is giving. He is not claiming that we can say everything we need to know about opium simply by noting that whatever it does it does by virtue of its substantial form, and that no further chemical analysis is needed. Rather, he is saying that, whatever the specific chemical details of opium (or water, or lead, or whatever) turn out to be, if these really are natural substances about which we can have scientific knowledge, then there must be some <i>intrinsic principle</i> that grounds the properties that chemistry uncovers and that gives them the regularity that chemistry shows them to have. <br /><br /><b>A chemist could agree with this, for the sake of argument, though he would want to inquire further into what is meant by 'intrinsic principle'. And he'd want to know what sort of explanation the Aristotelian is offering, if it isn't the same kind as his own.</b><br /><br />That is to say, it cannot be that a tendency toward such-and-such effects is to be found only in <i>this or that sample</i> of opium, but must derive from opium as such, from something <i>common</i> to any instance of opium; it cannot be that opium’s typical behavior derives from something <i>extrinsic</i> to it, but must be grounded in an <i>inherent</i> source; if it has <i>causal properties</i> that are irreducible to those of its parts, then there is a sense in which <i>opium itself</i> is irreducible to its parts; and so forth. <br /><br /><b>He could agree with this too. But he would also say the there is a sense in which the whole just is the parts (material cause) put together (efficient cause) in the right arrangement (formal cause). There is nothing in addition to this.</b> <br /><br /> Naturally we still have to do chemical analysis in order to discover the specific means by which opium brings about its characteristic effects. The Aristotelian does not deny this because he is not making a claim that is in competition with chemistry. He is rather approaching the phenomenon from a different and more fundamental level of analysis, and asking a different sort of question about it. (This is one reason Moliere-style “dormitive virtue” objections to substantial forms are puerile. I have discussed that objection in more detail in The Last Superstition and Aquinas.) <br /><br /><b>The chemist has a hard time understanding this. He would want to identify Ed's intrinsic principle with the parts themselves together with their spatial arrangement, just as a table is legs and top correctly assembled. He doesn't see the need for any deeper analysis. The only further questions he might want to ask would be directed to a physicist, not a philosopher.</b>David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-6374890990358803222017-05-11T20:25:59.323-07:002017-05-11T20:25:59.323-07:00Oops. Let me fix the link
Nicomachean Ethics
...Oops. Let me fix the link<br /><br /><a href="http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html" rel="nofollow"> Nicomachean Ethics </a><br /><a href="http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20Nic.%20Eth.%201098a&lang=original" rel="nofollow"> Here is the English for the Wiki Link </a>bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-42170021588428858502017-05-11T05:41:55.447-07:002017-05-11T05:41:55.447-07:00Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics can be found here
I...Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics can be found <a rel="nofollow">here</a><br /><br />I agree with you that rejection of the 'formal cause' by the early moderns doesn't make sense and it seems they went merrily on their way using the concept, while denying it.<br /><br /><b>OK, it's formal in the sense of being expressed in a formula, but it doesn't say anything about the form or structure or plan of gases.</b><br /><br />Form according to AT is the essential nature of a substance that accounts for how it naturally behaves. If a gas naturally behaves in a predictable way or a range of predictable ways to a stimulus, then it is the gas's form that accounts for that behavior. So since Boyle's law describe how gases naturally behave, then yes, it is in line with AT philosophy.<br /><br /><br />bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-20603716752352439642017-05-11T04:40:36.514-07:002017-05-11T04:40:36.514-07:00If the early moderns rejected formal causes what d...If the early moderns rejected formal causes what did they think 'formal cause' meant? After all, what are Hooke's meticuluous drawings of fleas etc other than investigations into formal causes? Or Harvey on the circulation of blood. On the other hand, a piece of knowledge like Boyle's Law doesn't really fit into the Aristotelian picture, does it? OK, it's formal in the sense of being expressed in a formula, but it doesn't say anything about the form or structure or plan of gases. If we know something of the latter we can account for BL---that's the kinetic theory as mentioned earlier. Ditto Hooke's law of springs and Galilean kinematics. Even the much earlier (but post-Aristotle) Archimedean mechanics of levers and pulleys. They seem to be new kinds of knowledge outside the Aristotelian framework. <br /><br />BTW, I looked at the WP 'History of Energy' article. The link to the Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics text regarding 'energeia' was broken. On the article's Talk page another reader had suggested a correction which I edited in. But the section of NE he recommended, though it has the word 'energeia' in it, doesn't seem connected to the modern sense at all. At least in the English translation at Perseus. Afraid I don't read Greek!David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-88587090316953467462017-05-10T09:22:26.990-07:002017-05-10T09:22:26.990-07:00On the other hand, if you are educated in the natu...<b>On the other hand, if you are educated in the natural sciences then you tend to see the claims as concrete and either obviously wrong---no such stuff as prime matter---or explanatorily vacuous----dormitive power, etc.</b><br /><br />It is true that if scientists reject the form/matter distinction then they consider both of them fiction. And indeed the moderns proclaimed that only 2 of Aristotle's 4 causes were proper areas of study for them. They claimed to study only material and efficient causes while ignoring formal and final causes. I'm still trying to figure out why they would reject formal causes. Maybe because it is entertwined so closely with final causes which they considered a distraction from getting on with the business of making technology to improve human conditions. So yes, if science rejects form/matter, then prime matter would be rejected.<br /><br />But it seems science actually does rely on formal causes when they describe things as having certain predictable properties and study how they behave. But regarding your concept of QFT as being the basis for everything isn't that bordering on the very concept of prime matter? Prime matter is supposed to be the basic stuff of all material things just like your concept of QFT. So maybe you believe prime matter exists, but just call it something different :-)<br /><br />Also, if all you read are Enlightenment era criticisms of Scholaticicism then sure one could think a lot of it vacuous. In fact modern AT defenders acknowledge that. However, Enlightenment critics were not interested in criticizing the Aristotlean tradition dialectically, but rather rhetorically. So the "dormative power" meme lives on.<br /><br /><b> But energy isn't stuff. Then what is it? Causal oomph, or a measure of potency!</b><br /><br />Well I'd have to know what your definition of "stuff" is. Leibniz, is considered one who originated the present concept of energy from Aristotle's term <i>energeia</i>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_energy" rel="nofollow"> which Aristotle used as "act" in his act/potency dichotomy.</a><br /><br />Apparently later physicists developed the concept further and borrowed the act/potency concept to theorize kinetic and potential energy that is used in modern science. But this concept is obviously different from Aristotle's more general concept.<br /><br />I think if you asked Professor Tong, he would say everything is stuff so he wouldn't understand the question.bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-15835028471003235002017-05-10T02:01:25.253-07:002017-05-10T02:01:25.253-07:00Too obvious or obviously wrong Both! If you see ...<b>Too obvious or obviously wrong</b> Both! If you see these terms as denoting abstractions then, in the light of what we now know, there is a lot that is obviously right about what is being said. On the other hand, if you are educated in the natural sciences then you tend to see the claims as concrete and either obviously wrong---no such stuff as prime matter---or explanatorily vacuous----dormitive power, etc. Readers like me are confused because writers like Ed F don't make it clear where they stand on this.<br /><br /><b>Energy</b> Oh, when called upon I can talk the 'energy transformation' talk alright! And it appeals to our intuitive understanding of conservation principles like volumes and masses of fluids. But energy isn't stuff. Then what is it? Causal oomph, or a measure of potency!David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-92044199188621040122017-05-10T00:52:06.067-07:002017-05-10T00:52:06.067-07:00The distinction I'm making is between 'unm...The distinction I'm making is between 'unmoving' (='unchanging') and 'unmoved' (='unchanged') where the latter has the passive sense we find in 'moved to tears'. So the unmoved mover could be compared to a play---something that can move but is itself not the kind of thing that can be moved, though it is in time and changes from moment to moment. Turning to QFT, the idea is that the fields 'underlie' or 'sustain' the material. The relation between them isn't causal because the causal operates only <i>within</i> the material. Nor is it exactly like supervenience though it has the asymmetric 'upward dependence' of supervenience. Perhaps more like occasionalism.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-79416842192674659152017-05-09T20:02:40.686-07:002017-05-09T20:02:40.686-07:00Sorry, that should be:
Do you hold that the list y...Sorry, that should be:<br />Do you hold that the list you provided are not merely various forms of the same thing?bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-89047819028514072432017-05-09T05:44:58.408-07:002017-05-09T05:44:58.408-07:00What I don't understand is why there is a hiat...<b> What I don't understand is why there is a hiatus of two millennia before scientific inquiry takes off. </b><br /><br />This is a question of not only of the history of thought but the history of culture and the history of Western civilization.<br />What conditions in the West allowed the 'scientific revolution' to take off while the East and the rest of the world never had one. Something about the confluence of culture, relative peace, wealth and health, establishment of universities all probably contributed. Some have proposed that although both Islam and Greek Christianity both had access to the same base of knowledge, it was the concept based on Aristotle that things repeated in eternal cycles and so the there was an underlying fatalism thus dampening the study of altering nature. I'm not sure, but there must be some explanation.<br /><br /><b>Wow! And you can figure all this out from ordinary experience and pure thought it seems.</b><br /><br />Well as you are aware, whether causality or material substances exist are still live philosophical questions. <br />If you ask a typical scientist about act/potency or matter/form I suspect you would get a blank look. I'm not sure whether your complaint is that they are too obvious or are obviously wrong.<br /><br /><b>Furthermore, there is a danger attached to thinking in generalizations, namely that we reify them. This happens in physics too. We are inclined to think there is energy over and above gravitational energy, kinetic energy, electrical energy, chemical energy, etc. </b><br /><br />Well scientists would say that all of those things you listed are all energy but manifested in various forms. For instance kinetic energy is trans-formed to electrical energy at electrical generation plants at the foot of dams. Do you hold they are not?bmillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05855545675821692382noreply@blogger.com