tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post6196182359340483192..comments2024-03-18T11:10:18.708-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: The Waning of MaterialismVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger206125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-52953039074908387172011-02-16T21:23:41.110-07:002011-02-16T21:23:41.110-07:00An interesting suggestion, Loon. Then the structur...An interesting suggestion, Loon. Then the structure of the Mary argument would be changed into a modal argument that is actually more interesting than Jakcson's original argument. A really good idea.<br /><br />The main thrust, though, of the Mary argument, is that :<br />1) It is not possible for her to gain this knowledge without having the experience.<br /><br />Which is logically equivalent to:<br />2) It is necessary that she cannot gain this knowledge without having the experience.<br />(or at least that's true in lots of modal logics, and seems primae facie plausible).<br /><br />Number 1 expresses the idea that she is epistemically screened off from having knowledge of experience until she has it. That's pretty much the whole point of the Mary argument (and note I dislike the argument precisely because of its focus on knowledge rather than properties, but I'm playing along for now).<br /><br />If you give up on number 1, then you are making a major concession for Materialist Mary. So if Lightning Mary makes you reject 1, that is a pretty important turn of the dialectical wheel.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-10031102411226745722011-02-16T09:38:04.056-07:002011-02-16T09:38:04.056-07:00"then the materialist says great: if she has ..."then the materialist says great: if she has the same knowledge before she leaves, the argument against physicalism fails."<br /><br />But that would only hold in the altered Lightning Mary case. It doesn't hold in the vanilla case.<br /><br />All the Knowledge arguer needs is surely this:<br /><br />1) Possibly, one can acquire an exhaustive physical knowledge of some aspect of reality without knowing 'what it is like' to experience it.<br /><br />Not<br /><br />2) Necessarily, one acquires an exhaustive physical knowledge of some aspect of reality without knowing 'what it is like' to experience it.<br /><br />Lightning Mary undermines 2) but not 1).Gibbering Loonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-82123445279423727552011-02-15T17:05:08.962-07:002011-02-15T17:05:08.962-07:00GibberingLoon: then the materialist says great: if...GibberingLoon: then the materialist says great: if she has the same knowledge before she leaves, the argument against physicalism fails. The whole point is that by having the experience you learn something new. This would undercut that.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-45721885458932681382011-02-15T11:37:09.218-07:002011-02-15T11:37:09.218-07:00Perhaps I'm dense, but I'm not really seei...Perhaps I'm dense, but I'm not really seeing this at all.<br /><br />Suppose Chalmersian prop-dualism is true. Then if Mary2 is functionally equivalent to Mary1, then of course the experiences/concepts will be the same. But why is this an objection?<br /><br />You claim that it harms the anti-materialist use of Mary, presumably by showing that Mary can acquire a knowledge of colors via other means than actually experiencing colors, right? But the knowledge arguer isn't committed to the claim that knowledge must always come through this avenue, only that we intuitively recognize that this avenue CAN provide us with such knowledge.Gibbering Loonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-3374972643049279332011-02-15T08:53:02.307-07:002011-02-15T08:53:02.307-07:00In sum, Lightning Mary undermines the antimaterial...In sum, Lightning Mary undermines the antimaterialist use of Mary (as I said fifteen posts ago). It isn't meant to harm antimaterialism, but the antimaterialists use of Mary to help their cause. It cuts Mary's legs off as an antiphysicalist argument (though some materialists wouldn't think Mary2 has the same thoughts because they are not internalists about phenomenal content or concepts).Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-37139113103005036842011-02-14T17:08:10.932-07:002011-02-14T17:08:10.932-07:00Panpsychists and property dualists have a lot of t...Panpsychists and property dualists have a lot of trouble with this scenario (e.g., Chalmers). Indeed, most antimaterialists fall into one of these camps. <br /><br />A subset of substance dualists can get out of it, but at the cost of saying identical brain states don't imply same ability to think about experiences. I know some substance dualists will be fine with that...<br /><br />But the problem is the materialist can use this thought experiment to take Mary to the woodshed. Mary2 has the same concepts as Mary1, and who's to say that lightning is needed to reconfigure her this way?Could she restructure her visual system with microstimulation, or even just via her experience in the black and white lab ? Not clear at all.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-73810494550745122452011-02-14T15:57:59.936-07:002011-02-14T15:57:59.936-07:00"She will, at the very least, be able to pick..."She will, at the very least, be able to pick out the correct color chip. She should be behaviorally indistinguishable from Mary1"<br /><br />But the dualist can deny that this is possible to do via lightning strikes or anything else - you can't, by zapping the brain, give her full-blooded color concepts (unless the lightning places the brain in the same state as it is in when it is actually seeing a color, but why would a dualist deny that that would prompt a genuine experience of red?).<br /><br />I think the only other way do this is by adding new psychophysical laws to the effect that when the brain is in this lighting-state then full-blooded color concepts follow. Or alternatively, you change the brain such that it forces actions from the subject in a way behaviorally indistinguishable from someone who has the whole hog color-wise. (A color zombie.) But then it is no surprise that this is odd - you have radically changed the way the brain works!Gibbering Loonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-88481462252986594432011-02-14T12:52:25.581-07:002011-02-14T12:52:25.581-07:00Loon the point is Mary2 has never seen red, but ha...Loon the point is Mary2 has never seen red, but has the same concepts as Mary1, she knows what it is like to see red. She will, at the very least, be able to pick out the correct color chip. She should be behaviorally indistinguishable from Mary1 (though the argument wouldn't work for versions of dualism in which that is not the case: certain strong versions of substance dualism, though the view defended in such a case would end up looking very strange--some versions would have to say that Mary2 is a color zombie).Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-3377447238566994592011-02-14T10:15:52.863-07:002011-02-14T10:15:52.863-07:00"Does Mary1 know what it is like to see red, ...<i>"Does Mary1 know what it is like to see red, but Mary2 does not? When shown a red color chip, will Mary1 know what color it is? Will Mary2?"</i><br /><br />I don't see the force of this argument.<br /><br />The dualist can surely consistently defend either<br /><br />yes, yes, no<br /><br />or like you<br /><br />no, yes, yes.<br /><br />The former if change in a brain state isn't sufficient for a change in soul state, and the latter if it is.Gibbering Loonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-53460093478874362802011-02-14T00:50:02.868-07:002011-02-14T00:50:02.868-07:00Well, despite my "pot shot", it is hones...Well, despite my "pot shot", it is honestly amazing that you have as good of a grasp of the philosphical material as you do, though that is not your profession. And, being a neuroscientist, you're in such a great position to discuss the mind-body stuff. So I hope you continue to think about these things and eventually publish on it. Obviously your debate partners should be more along the lines of some of the guest appearances on this thread.<br /><br />I hear you on the tediousness. I was taking an external course for my B.A. in philosophy several years back. Having a daughter and then going through a divorce ultimately caused me to cave, but even prior to that I was having second thoughts. I personally had to come to the realization that I wasn't *really* bright enough to make any major/original contributions to the field, and to be honest, I had a very hard time even grasping some of the concepts in my course on Philosophic Logic.<br /><br />I read when I can though, I guess just for fun as well.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-38217524955028385282011-02-13T21:53:31.368-07:002011-02-13T21:53:31.368-07:00Anon no worries.
I like to get digs in at philoso...Anon no worries.<br /><br />I like to get digs in at philosophy every now and then but obviously I find it entertaining.<br /><br />I think philosophers should keep doing what they do. Philosophy can't move all that quickly. It's too hard to do well, and too hard to creatively push human thinking in directions it has never been before. <br /><br />But every fifty years or so it seems to happen: Russell, Sellars, ...unfortunately I'm not sure if we'll have another Kant or Hume type in this age of incredible overspecialization. <br /><br />The most impressed I've been by a philosopher recently (other than Dretske) is Peter Koellner at Harvard. That guy is in a league of his own with mathematical logic, and he gave a great talk about Godel, mind, and Penrose here last Friday. But he's a great example of the type of genius hyperspecialization you have to have to really push forward. He was able to integrate Godel, Tarski (that's old news, been done) and 'epistemic arithmetic' (basically a logical system with a 'knows that' operator) into a really interesting charitable reconstruction of Penrose's argument (Penrose's argument fails in this charitable logical reconstruction but it was a ridiculous tour de force)...wait for the paper it will be a nice crank of the dialectic. The guy is just a genius.<br /><br />Tempted to put Putnam up there as great modern thinker, for Twin Earth alone, but he has never created a more synoptic vision that holds together in a nice way (not to mention he constantly is revising his views so you never know what version of Putnam you will get).<br /><br />There are plenty of greats out there with more narrow foci. By my lights, Dretske rises way up there. <br /><br />Anyway, I did find philosophy extremely tedious personally when it was my only focus in life in grad school, but as a hobby it is great. I enjoy reading, and contributing, to philosophyofbrains.com. That may be my main source (aside from this site) of philosophical contact with the world outside of lab.<br /><br />Lightning Mary is <a href="http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2011/01/waning-of-materialism.html#c863846513841802928" rel="nofollow">here</a>. She is an ingenious crank of the Mary dialectic, inspired from Dennett.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-34732012336423834152011-02-13T20:25:12.707-07:002011-02-13T20:25:12.707-07:00BDK: Anon that comment about Jackson and my commen...BDK: Anon that comment about Jackson and my comment about Bonjour were both jokes. <br /><br />Anon: I apologize for not picking up on that and I really did not intend to take a pot shot; I was perhaps being too blunt and insensitive. Perhaps I am just the one who cannot grasp your rebuttal to the Knowledge Argument then. <br /><br />Regarding the slow progress of philosophy, what do you think is needed to remedy that situation? Do we just need more intelligent philosophers? Or should we just give up philosophy altogether and all do neuroscience in order to answer the deep questions about consciousness. It seems if we took the latter route, you wouldn't have had much to say on the matter in this thread. <br /><br />On Lightning Mary, when I get over this flu in a couple dys, I'll need to take a few hours and sift through this book of a thread to find her, and then see if I understand your rebuttal adequaetely enough to respond. <br /><br />Anyway, again, I apologize for offending you. I've learned *alot* on this thread and have you to thank for that.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-62488010481982512702011-02-13T19:33:15.504-07:002011-02-13T19:33:15.504-07:00Anon that comment about Jackson and my comment abo...Anon that comment about Jackson and my comment about Bonjour were both jokes. <br /><br />I understand the argument perfectly well, that's pretty much lame for you to end with such a pot shot. I get it, it's not particularly complicated or hard to get. I just don't buy it because I think it is a weak argument (Jackson rejects it for similar reasons, and I presume he <i>understands</i> the argument).<br /><br />My initial counter defeats a certain type of antimaterialist reading of Mary (the most common I run into in practice with people that throw Mary out there, people who have simply not thought it through). But you are right there are additional wrinkles the dualist or materialist can add that need a different response (phenomenal concepts).<br /><br />Incidentally, I am indeed a bit out of the loop in the latest philosophy of consciousness. I don't know who has said what. I do try to keep up with the latest trends in thought, though. Luckily the progress in philosophy is so slow that it isn't that difficult to stay apprised of the latest "developments" coming from the armchair pilots.<br /><br />Oh I almost forgot: nobody replied about Lightning Mary, so I win. Physicalism is true. If you disagree, you just don't get it.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-91038884197942024412011-02-13T11:34:25.746-07:002011-02-13T11:34:25.746-07:00Mr. Veale - not that I can think of, without revea...Mr. Veale - not that I can think of, without revealing my identity (which I would rather not do). I can give you my word (whatever an anonymous word is worth).<br /><br />You could always email BonJour and ask him, though I'd prefer it if you kept my identity out of it.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-14248215648924247182011-02-13T11:20:56.857-07:002011-02-13T11:20:56.857-07:00Thanks for the article anonymous. My complaints we...Thanks for the article anonymous. My complaints were aimed at several of the other anonymous's (!) and not you. <br /><br />(Is there any way to confirm that you really were relaying BonJour's comments?)Mr Vealehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12931446615905211560noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-48759231410274726272011-02-13T10:59:57.950-07:002011-02-13T10:59:57.950-07:00BDK - I'm a bit shocked that you didn't al...BDK - I'm a bit shocked that you didn't already know that Jackson rejects his argument. This is very old news and not sufficient grounds for a "Bam!". It shows that you're more than a little bit out of the loop. Here's an article by Torin Alter from _Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge_, that seeks to demonstrate that Jackson has not answered the Knowledge Argument adequately:<br /><br />http://faculty.unlv.edu/beiseckd/Courses/PHIL-352/Dave%20-%20Consciousness%20PDFs/Alter%20-%20Does%20representationalism%20undermine%20the%20knowledge%20argument.pdf<br /><br />The "horrible" knowledge argument is, nonetheless, still accepted by many prominent philosophers of mind who are *not* substance dualists. <br /><br />I considered responding to your latest response to me in detail, but in looking over the thread, there is really no point. We are saying the same thing over and over again. <br /><br />All this confusion about how we get from epistemic considerations to ontological ones. Well, that is really always the case in general, but putting that aside, since Mary is omniscient with regards to all the physical facts, her newly gained experience is of an aspect of reality - namely, the most relevant and essential condition for understanding consciousness - she was not formerly acquainted with by knowing all of the neural correlates of consciousness. <br /><br />You concede that she gains something new, we just obviously disagree about what that something is, and its relevance. No surprise there.<br /><br />For the record, I am not even a big fan of the Knowledge Argument, and were I in need of further convincing in order to accept substance dualism, I doubt it would do much for me. With me, that goes for any philosophical thought experiment like this though. Intuitively, I just find it hard to believe that such matters can be settled in these ways. Regardless, I still don't think you're properly understanding the argument, and I think your rebuttal fails - *particulary* your very first post in this thread. <br /><br />But, I think its good that we got some interaction going between yourself, BonJour, Chalmers, etc. Good luck with your writing and I look forward to reading it when it is ready.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-68223608381041199182011-02-13T08:16:28.118-07:002011-02-13T08:16:28.118-07:00BDK
I appreciate that...and I know its frustratin...BDK<br /><br />I appreciate that...and I know its frustrating to have to repeat yourself. But there is a lot of detritus on this thread, and it's been a bit difficult to keep up with the flow of discussion. <br /><br />GrahamMr Vealehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12931446615905211560noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-72162804060722892562011-02-12T19:48:23.834-07:002011-02-12T19:48:23.834-07:00Mr veals I already did summarize my main points......Mr veals I already did summarize my main points...like two times now. Not equivocation but intensional fallacy. Yes I added to my original point...a lot. See resp 2 to bonjour and subsequent for main pts...it will not work unless I add the phenomenal concept wrinkle, didn't have originally bc don't take it too seriously...should have mentioned it. See resp 2 Chalmers 2 4 another overview of main pts..on cellphone...Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-66206773402832914642011-02-12T17:43:47.463-07:002011-02-12T17:43:47.463-07:00I just note that the objection that you began with...I just note that the objection that you began with in #3 didn't work as stated; you seemed to nuance and supplement that argument rather than abandoning it. Which is cool. There's no problem with that. I just want to make sure that I've read you correctly. <br /><br />GrahamMr Vealehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12931446615905211560noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-25981922025935854982011-02-12T17:39:45.186-07:002011-02-12T17:39:45.186-07:00BDK
I was following this thread - until the vario...BDK<br /><br />I was following this thread - until the various anonymous posters arrived. I couldn't keep track of which you were responding to, when and why.<br /><br />Is there any chance that you could summarise why you feel Jackson's argument failed? A quick click, copy paste of the highlights would suffice...(but if you've grown tired of the whole thing I'll understand). <br />You seem to be arguing that the argument commits the fallacy of equivocation. Have I read you correctly?<br /><br />GrahamMr Vealehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12931446615905211560noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-71880096959204415452011-02-12T17:28:30.898-07:002011-02-12T17:28:30.898-07:00Incidentally, ask Bonjour what would make him give...Incidentally, ask Bonjour what would make him give up his antimaterialism about consciousness. If nothing, then it isn't clear there is anything of substance in anything he has ever written.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-62451402213505518122011-02-12T17:27:20.401-07:002011-02-12T17:27:20.401-07:00Indidentally, it seems Jackson rejects his argumen...Indidentally, it seems Jackson rejects his argument now, <a href="http://consciousness.anu.edu.au/jackson/mindillusion.pdf" rel="nofollow">paper here</a>, largely for reasons like those I said.<br /><br />Bam!<br /><br />But you shouldn't reject his argument because he does, but because it is a crappy argument for the many reasons I already mentioned in this thread.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-55885517658567267782011-02-10T13:39:12.413-07:002011-02-10T13:39:12.413-07:00Deprive a brain-mind of sensory input like in a se...<i>Deprive a brain-mind of sensory input like in a sensory deprivation chamber, and it can even go mad. Simply deprive it of REM sleep and it can die.</i><br /><br />No.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-4913532698846099482011-02-10T13:34:27.730-07:002011-02-10T13:34:27.730-07:00Williams wrote, "what is a belief, not a pure...Williams wrote, "what is a belief, not a purely physical thing surely."<br /><br />ED'S RESPONSE: Williams, you miss the point about split brain patients. Two brain-minds each answer different questions simultaneously.<br /><br />Moreover, what is a "belief?" How do we arrive at consciousness itself prior to a brain and sensory input?<br /><br />If you reduce your argument to "beliefs are not physical," then what are they if not dependent in some way on sensory input, and the acquisition of language via culture which also helps us focus on "what we believe."<br /><br />I don't have to have a complete theory of how the brain-mind functions to note very broadly how it does appear to function.<br /><br />Deprive a brain-mind of sensory input like in a sensory deprivation chamber, and it can even go mad. Simply deprive it of REM sleep and it can die.<br /><br />We spend a third or so of our lives unconscious, and most of the rest of our lives and thoughts running on automatic, even when arguing, we are mostly reacting based on past ideas and opinions, in a relatively automatic fashion. The brain-mind is a conservative instrument once it has some "mental" grooves worn in it, it doesn't change that easily.<br /><br />So what are "beliefs?" And why do you think they are beyond physics? Physics is strange enough all by itself, so physicalism must include some rather weird stuff itself.<br /><br />Not that any of us have the cosmos figured out. I'm agnostic. But the idea that "Christian" beliefs are the only true ones and everyone else is damned eternally, makes even less sense to me than brain-mind substance dualism.<br /><br />And metaphysical and religious "beliefs" run a tremendous theological and cultural gamut.Edwardtbabinskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13036816926421936940noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-86637747957047687612011-02-10T11:53:49.776-07:002011-02-10T11:53:49.776-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Edwardtbabinskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13036816926421936940noreply@blogger.com