tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post6115826442161899826..comments2024-03-18T11:10:18.708-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: Matter, truth, and C. S. LewisVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger156125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-69989504165051741022014-03-11T13:30:06.258-07:002014-03-11T13:30:06.258-07:00planks,
I don't deny what I said. But you do...planks,<br /><br />I don't deny what I said. But you don't understand what I said. Is thought a physical process of the brain? Yes. Does that imply that we don't think? That's stupid. Does it imply that consciousness is an illusion? Not to me. Consciousness is part of our cognitive function. There is no implication that because if its physical nature, it must not exist. I did say that our concept of "self" is an illusion. That doesn't mean we don't have an identity. But the thing we perceive as 'self' is a construction of the mind - it leads to the idea that our 'self' is an entity in its own right - it leads to the idea of a soul. In reality, this sense 'self' exists when the brain is functioning in a normal waking mode, and is absent at times. It also changes over time, although we are not aware that who we are today may be very different from who we were at some time in the past. Our memories link the 'self' of today to the 'self' of yesterday and provide a sense of continuity.im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-39951029674350706632014-03-11T12:38:30.485-07:002014-03-11T12:38:30.485-07:00Are you now denying that you have said time and ti...Are you now denying that you have said time and time and time again that our thoughts are nothing more than physical processes within the brain? Or at the least, you are repudiating your former statements?<br /><br />If so, then you are making major progress, and I congratulate you!planks lengthhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01176715815596833639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-8245269975659600872014-03-11T12:08:36.197-07:002014-03-11T12:08:36.197-07:00planks,
If you don't try to understand what I...planks,<br /><br />If you don't try to understand what I say, how can you take issue with it? Animals don't have the "subsistent" soul that humans have - the one that is the seat of intellect. That's what I said. You also accuse me of commenting "to the effect that our consciousness, and indeed our very identity, is mere illusion", which is not true at all. You should read more carefully and try to get the meaning of my words, rather than dismissing everything without due consideration. You might find that there's a bit more there to chew on than you have given me credit for.im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-38726252350723604902014-03-11T11:43:00.952-07:002014-03-11T11:43:00.952-07:00im-skeptical,
Your quote is correct, and even you...im-skeptical,<br /><br />Your quote is correct, and even your analysis of it is (at a cursory glance) correct. Where you jump off the cliff, however, is where (in your previous comment) you write "<i>[The dualist] must deny that a mere owl can have that human-like kind of cognition, but is instead simply a machine.</i>"<br /><br /><b>Wha-a-a-a-t???</b> Are you not the very same im-skeptical who has commented at wearisome length to the effect that our consciousness, and indeed our very identity, is mere illusion, and that all of our thoughts are nothing more than chemical reactions within a physical brain (a.k.a., "simply a machine")?<br /><br />But even with your mangling of Thomism, you miss his main point, which is that the human soul is <i>subsistent</i> (i.e., eternal, surviving the death of the body), whereas the souls of animals and plants are <i>conditional</i> (i.e., they perish along with the physical body). This has absolutely nothing to do with whether an animal can have consciousness, which was the point of your original posting. <br /><br />And by the way, the quote from Aquinas in your most recent comment directly contradicts your statement that "<i>The dualist is in a conundrum here. He believes that awareness is conferred by an immaterial soul, not the brain. But <b>animals ... don't have this soul</b>.</i>" The very quote you gave references the "<b>souls of brute animals</b>". Do you not even read the stuff you are quoting?planks lengthhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01176715815596833639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-22005918157296357942014-03-11T10:43:06.259-07:002014-03-11T10:43:06.259-07:00"Really, im-skeptical, you need to do your ho..."Really, im-skeptical, you need to do your homework before making such pronouncements!"<br /><br />I get my information straight from the Summa Theologica: "Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations they are not subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its being." He is saying that the soul of the animal (or anything else) is merely the essential form of the body, but that the human soul is very different in nature, for it is the seat of intellect - something that animals lack.<br /><br />im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-45519994142778541062014-03-11T10:25:24.636-07:002014-03-11T10:25:24.636-07:00"But animals (at least those who are not clos..."<i>But animals (at least those who are not close to human) don't have this soul.</i>"<br /><br />Where in the world did you get this idea from? You obviously haven't read your Aquinas (but we all knew that already), or you'd have realized that he speaks of the animal soul, and even of the vegetative soul.<br /><br />Really, im-skeptical, you need to do your homework before making such pronouncements!planks lengthhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01176715815596833639noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-12843458626691494112014-03-11T09:56:00.507-07:002014-03-11T09:56:00.507-07:00The dualist is in a conundrum here. He believes t...The dualist is in a conundrum here. He believes that awareness is conferred by an immaterial soul, not the brain. But animals (at least those who are not close to human) don't have this soul. So he must deny that a mere owl can have that human-like kind of cognition, but is instead simply a machine. This is contrary to any scientific understanding of cognition, that would allow degrees of cognitive capability, according to the functional capabilities of the brain.im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-27404673997777089492014-03-11T00:28:01.424-07:002014-03-11T00:28:01.424-07:00I'd want to make a distinction between the owl...I'd want to make a distinction between the owl possessing intentionality and its internal states possessing intentionality. A thought, something happening in me, seems to be the primary bearer of directedness towards an object. As an entity capable of such states, I possess intentionality in a secondary sense. <br /><br />I don't know about consciousness or qualia in animals. It's just that it seems to me that there is much going on in the owl that is directed towards the vole. I find it hard to distinguish this kind of directness towards from the kind of directedness towards that occurs in me when I think of the vole. But this may just mean that intentionality is too broad and shallow to be a useful concept.<br /><br />Is its possessor's awareness of a state a necessary condition of its directedness?David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-57598677459298099522014-03-10T12:35:05.435-07:002014-03-10T12:35:05.435-07:00David,
You would go on to say, I think, that the ...David,<br /><br /><i>You would go on to say, I think, that the processes in the owl's brain do not possess intrinsic intentionality, but only derived intentionality, again granted by me. But I would say that this gets things wrong. The processes in the owl's brain mean next to nothing to me---I'm barely aware that they are going on. For the owl though, they mean everything. They are its life.</i><br /><br />Why would you think I believe the owl only has derived intentionality? I hope you're not assuming I think only humans are conscious or have qualia or intentions or that sort of thing.<br /><br />For that matter - the processes in the owl's brain mean next to nothing <i>to the owl</i>. Do you think the owl is aware it has brain processes?Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-37737556112249773792014-03-10T03:43:40.396-07:002014-03-10T03:43:40.396-07:00Ah, your 1:01 comment makes more sense now:
You h...Ah, your 1:01 comment makes more sense now:<br /><br /><i>You have picked out, in advance, that X is an owl and Y is a vole and Z is a brain, these things of formal and material and efficient causality that wouldn't be intrinsically differentiated in a wholly mechanistic universe, with processes A B and C being delineated as clearly the beginning and the end of a particular process, etc.</i><br /><br />From your point of view I am making a performative inconsistency. We could discuss this---I think I can see ways around the obstacle---but it would take us away from the topic in hand. As we are the only ones left in the conversation, another time perhaps.<br /><br />This, though may be apropos. You would say, I think, that my little picture of Tilly and Lola has derived intentionality because my intrinsic intentionality allows me to grant it meaning for me. It then acts as a kind of reminder for me of the dogs. You would go on to say, I think, that the processes in the owl's brain do not possess intrinsic intentionality, but only derived intentionality, again granted by me. But I would say that this gets things wrong. The processes in the owl's brain mean next to nothing to me---I'm barely aware that they are going on. For the owl though, they mean everything. They are its life.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-65995365091739092702014-03-09T21:13:56.964-07:002014-03-09T21:13:56.964-07:00David,
It's fine. Really, I think this is a c...David,<br /><br />It's fine. Really, I think this is a civil conversation, which is a pleasant change of pace.<br /><br /><i>But it's hardly a refutation of my proposal merely to say that it denies intrinsic intentionality; that just restates my position. Nor is a recital of the virtues of alternative theories.</i><br /><br />I didn't say it was. At most I'm pointing out what I think follows when intrinsic intentionality is ruled out and all that's left is derived intentionality. And that's not necessarily some anti-naturalist interpretation either - with Rosenberg, etc, you can see other self-described naturalists who pretty well say 'yes, that's what follows.'<br /><br /><i> Example: when an owl swoops on a vole I say there must be neural processes in the owl's brain that derive from the image of the vole on the owl's retinas and contribute to the control of the owl's flight so as to keep the image centred on the foveas and the owl ever closer to snatching the vole. I say these states have intentionality towards the vole.</i><br /><br />The story you give as quoted is something I could embrace - but then I'm going to say you get right back to a kind of built-in intentionality at the end of the day. So what is there for me to object to? The story as-is is just a description of an animal event, that also comes with a good share of mental assumptions built in. (You have picked out, in advance, that X is an owl and Y is a vole and Z is a brain, these things of formal and material and efficient causality that wouldn't be intrinsically differentiated in a wholly mechanistic universe, with processes A B and C being delineated as clearly the beginning and the end of a particular process, etc.)<br /><br />I think one thing that's key here is that you say you can find representational states - but from my understanding this comes automatically with the caveat that these are always derived intentionality, and that that is all there is. I can derive a map of Dallas out the arrangement of pencils and pens and paperclips on my desk right now if I choose - deriving's easy. (At least once we assume, explicitly or not, that we've got intrinsic intentionality. Once that's the only thing around, something funny happens.)Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-66020816261524549802014-03-09T17:59:26.370-07:002014-03-09T17:59:26.370-07:00Fair enough, Crude. I take back my tentative rema...Fair enough, Crude. I take back my tentative remark about the intentionality dilemma. I did say I couldn't follow you.<br /><br />You are of course at liberty to accept intrinsic intentionality. I am trying to get by without it. But it's hardly a refutation of my proposal merely to say that it denies intrinsic intentionality; that just restates my position. Nor is a recital of the virtues of alternative theories.<br /><br />I think I can find representational states in artefacts. That's where I entered the discussion at 2:36. And also in animals. I say a state in an organism is representational of something when it is causally dependent on that something and causally contributory to the organism's behaviour with respect to that something. Example: when an owl swoops on a vole I say there must be neural processes in the owl's brain that derive from the image of the vole on the owl's retinas and contribute to the control of the owl's flight so as to keep the image centred on the foveas and the owl ever closer to snatching the vole. I say these states have intentionality towards the vole.<br /><br />Now, am I misusing the words 'representational' or 'intentional' in this context? Is it all too woolly to be of any value? Does it miss something out? What <i>are</i> the objections?David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-78291565869076105002014-03-09T16:10:16.407-07:002014-03-09T16:10:16.407-07:00C S Lewis: "But to talk of one bit of matter ...C S Lewis: <i>"But to talk of one bit of matter as being true about another bit of matter seems to me to be nonsense.{"</i><br /><br />I can understand Lewis expressing this sentiment given the period in history that he lived. The amazing thing is not his incredulity of the relationship between the matter of stars and the brain as a lump of matter but the fact that the matter of stars is indeed the same matter that is found in brains, including electrical impulses, and energy transfer and mass/energy transpositions pretty much as physics describes it. Research into thoughts and how they are generated and promulgated conform to the laws of physics. The idea of a dualistic nature of thoughts seems less and less likely and thoughts are material in nature. A thought is not generated in the first instance in the brain followed by physical electrical impulses, rather, a thought is the firing up of electrical impulses, a physical function. Storage within the brain is also a physical function by which brain matter is permanently altered to accommodate that thought. While still much neuroscience research is needed to fully flesh out the detail, there seems little doubt thoughts are not floating independent pieces of immateriality but are material in both essence and reality. <br /><br />Ask yourself the question, If you have a thought, don't write it down, and forget about it, is it still a thought? <br />When one writes a thought down they are representations of what somebody was thinking. Not only what they were thinking, but what they decided to filter out and put on paper.<br /><br />A useful guide [not mine but I am very partial to it] to remember:<br /><br />1. The words on the paper are not thoughts. They are words [marks] written on a piece of paper. Nothing more or less, just words on paper.<br /><br />2. The thought to write it down exists in one's brain and only in one's brain.<br /><br />3. The paper with words is not a thought, it is a physical representation of a thought. It is paper with marks inscribed on it. All your previous posts do still exist. They are now posts, but they are not your thoughts per se.<br /><br />4. They are representations of thoughts in your brain. Representation are the words on the paper, not your thoughts. One's thoughts only exist in one's brain.<br /><br />5. When somebody else reads those representations, they have thoughts about what you might have been thinking. They assume what you were thinking based on what they think those words represent. Hopefully, they and you have both learned the same form of represenation, English. If it was written in French, one would have no clue what to think about your thinking.<br /><br />6. [I add to this list] If after a period of time you pick up a piece of paper on which you previously wrote down a thought, and for the life of you cannot recall or remember that thought, or the context, even though you are now reading it, is it still a thought or just marks on a piece of paper that you have no memory of?<br /><br /><a href="http://www.uam.es/otros/persuasion/papers/2013PsychSciBrinolGascoPettyHorcajo.pdf" rel="nofollow">THIS PAPER</a> among many others is now mapping an insight into the materiality of thoughts and their compliance with physics.<br /><br />The Cartesian notion of mind/brain dualism seems far less likely today than during C S Lewis's time. 'The mind is what the brain does' now more than ever seems to be a confirming proposition. Papalintonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03818630173726146048noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-57259013453429508092014-03-09T15:43:06.158-07:002014-03-09T15:43:06.158-07:00David,
I don't follow you at 1:01 at all. It ...David,<br /><br /><i>I don't follow you at 1:01 at all. It looks as if you have impaled yourself on both horns of the intrinsic/derived intentionality dilemma. </i><br /><br />Not at all. I think trying to get 'mind' without 'intrinsic intentionality' is a complete non-starter - if intrinsic intentionality is denied, then Lewis is right. None of the parts of the brain are 'about' anything, there's no 'true' or 'false' to speak of, eliminative materialism obtains, which is absurd, etc, etc.<br /><br />The problem I'm having here is that you seem to regard 'having to accept intrinsic intentionality' as 'being impaled upon a horn', and thus something to be avoided at all costs. I have another perspective: it may well be true. <br /><br />But if the game is 'Well, let's find a solution to this... ah, but it has to be a naturalistic solution, nothing else will count or be regarded as possible', okay.<br /><br /><i>I'm saying that meaning and decision appear with representational states and behaviour-affecting processes that are causally dependent on them. I can't find anything like this in the plant world.</i><br /><br />Can you find 'representational states' even with non-plants? That's part of the problem you're having to begin with. When does this or that wholly mechanistic process or state 'represent' something? And that's right on back to the intrinsic and derived, which ultimately aren't avoidable questions.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-53874052263593093022014-03-09T15:22:30.456-07:002014-03-09T15:22:30.456-07:00Hi Crude,
I don't follow you at 1:01 at all. ...Hi Crude,<br /><br />I don't follow you at 1:01 at all. It looks as if you have impaled yourself on both horns of the intrinsic/derived intentionality dilemma. That's why we have to reject it :-)David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-35391085631793286732014-03-09T15:03:57.606-07:002014-03-09T15:03:57.606-07:00Hi William,
I certainly don't call any old ...Hi William, <br /><br />I certainly don't call any old patterned behaviour 'making a decision'. Else I'd have to regard a ripe apple falling from the tree as some sort of decision. I'm saying that meaning and decision appear with representational states and behaviour-affecting processes that are causally dependent on them. I can't find anything like this in the plant world.<br /><br />Regarding Brentano, I agree. But I'm not addressing Brentano. I have to crawl before I walk. I'm trying to show that it may not be as absurd as Lewis suggests to think that matter could be true of matter. As I said at 9:27 this behoves us to think about what we mean by 'truth'. If Victor posts about Brentano I may comment then. I reject panpsychism at 1:16.<br /><br />I offer no evidence that animal behaviour is determined by physics and chemistry. This is one of my naturalistic assumptions. But perhaps I should have said <i>explained by</i>. The change doesn't affect the gist of my remark at 5:14 and removes the apparent commitment to determinism. I think the Harvard animal psychologists are humorously lamenting that lab animals have internal state that isn't under experimental control.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-32970143372006780252014-03-09T14:05:26.563-07:002014-03-09T14:05:26.563-07:00William,
I'm not sure how related it is, but ...William,<br /><br />I'm not sure how related it is, but I recall that it's an open question whether even chemistry can be reduced to physics.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-11333710835246524142014-03-09T13:38:17.260-07:002014-03-09T13:38:17.260-07:00"Also, what evidence can you give that animal..."Also, what evidence can you give that animal behavior is determined by physics and chemistry?"<br /><br />Oh good grief.BeingItselfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13196126096999779200noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-9851909118985704902014-03-09T13:07:22.896-07:002014-03-09T13:07:22.896-07:00David: as long as you call pattered behavior &quo...David: as long as you call pattered behavior "making a decision" I think plants can do that. Look up tropism and taxis.<br /><br />A flaw in identifying patterns in nature with a kind of primitive intentionality is that inditity that completely fails to account for the subjective aspect that was Brentano's main point about the mental. Brentano might say the patterning and maps were beside the point. Unless you are claiming panpsychism here? <br /><br />Also, what evidence can you give that animal behavior is determined by physics and chemistry? I think you are assuming determinism here, and even the actual quantum physics denies determinism. Consider the Harvard Law of animal behavior: "under carefully controlled experimental circumstances, an animal will behave as it damned well pleases."<br />Williamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09292602256213936359noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-27923412574259415552014-03-09T13:01:19.951-07:002014-03-09T13:01:19.951-07:00The animal is just following a series of events de...<i>The animal is just following a series of events determined by physics and chemistry. But there is a pattern to these events that we recognise and call 'making a decision'. Plants lack the architecture for events of this pattern to occur within them.</i><br /><br />I know you said you don't find the derived/intrinsic division helpful, but I actually think it's supremely helpful here - look at how much it applies.<br /><br />What is an animal? Well, it's going to be derived - 'what a mind decides this or that collection of material counts as an animal'. Why do we call it 'making a decision' when we're talking about the thing-we-derive-as-animal but not thing-we-derive-as-plant? More derivations.<br /><br />Sure, that may sound totally unsatisfactory. I agree, which is why I reject it.<br /><br /><i>OK, we can figure out that the particle velocities follow Maxwell's distribution, but can we get a sense organ out of this capable of finding pattern?</i><br /><br />Apparently, so long as you derive it as doing such, it really is, because meaning and intentionality doesn't get any more real than that. Unless some things just plain MEAN something, objectively, derivations be damned. But then...<br /><br />Even when you talk about 'a star is spherical', you seem to be forgetting that you're filtering out a whole lot of "stuff" in the universe, near and around the star, that you could include with the 'star' if you wanted to. I have a hand on my keyboard right now. What's my hand? The four fingers and a thumb? The four fingers and a thumb plus the keyboard? Half the keyboard? The bones?Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-31959018186087545672014-03-09T05:14:42.828-07:002014-03-09T05:14:42.828-07:00The animal is just following a series of events de...The animal <i>is</i> just following a series of events determined by physics and chemistry. But there is a pattern to these events that we recognise and call 'making a decision'. Plants lack the architecture for events of this pattern to occur within them.<br /><br />I don't buy the intrinsic/derived meaning distinction. On the view I'm groping towards here meaning is neither intrinsic to a lump of matter per se, nor is it imposed by some external mind such as our own or God's, say. Decisions and meanings arise together and are defined in terms of one another: for organisms of a certain structure, the meaning of an internal state arises from its role in the organism's decision making, that is, the causal processes it undergoes that determine its actions. In a slogan: meaning is use. <br /><br />Regarding error-free meanings, we might say this. States representing the external world have to be transduced via sense organs from information arriving at the organism's surface. This is where mistakes can be made. The sense organs aren't perfect and the incident information may be ambiguous (camouflage), noisy (poor light), or downright deceitful (eyespots). On the other hand, internal states like damage signals need no transducing. They are available to contribute to decision-making directly without the intervention of sense organs. Hence they are (almost) error-free. The neurologist Antonio Damasio has a fascinating story about a patient with trigeminal neuralgia, which causes excruciating pain. It can be fixed with surgery. After the op Damasio asks about the pain. It's still there, he's told, but it no longer hurts (!)<br /><br />Sure, we can see that a star is spherical and the pressure increases towards the centre. But take a cubic metre of plasma. Is there any pattern to be found here? OK, we can figure out that the particle velocities follow Maxwell's distribution, but can we get a sense organ out of this capable of finding pattern? That would seem to need a Maxwell's demon.<br /><br />I have to assume the patterning is real. There is more stuff in some places than others, independently of minds.<br /><br />I think the intrinsic/derived distinction is a big intellectual obstacle in this subject. It's a block on progress. We have to find ways of thinking ouselves around it.<br /><br />Once again, thanks for forcing me to think!David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-16138998698587073822014-03-08T20:41:13.584-07:002014-03-08T20:41:13.584-07:00http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/intentionality.htmlhttp://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/intentionality.htmlWilliamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12533263841520213358noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-72224445239175100642014-03-08T17:59:22.691-07:002014-03-08T17:59:22.691-07:00But humans find meaning in things that are not rel...<i>But humans find meaning in things that are not related to our immediate decision-making process... and many of them simply relate to things we "know", without inducing any particular action. </i><br /><br />Yes, that's true. I have to complicate my initial story a bit. I can say that the patterning is conditionally contributory to decision making, perhaps inhibited from producing causal effects until such time when a decision involving it is required. We know that neural networks contain such inhibitory elements.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-60875083875058417082014-03-08T17:34:53.135-07:002014-03-08T17:34:53.135-07:00It seems to me like you're saying that plants,...<i> It seems to me like you're saying that plants, despite being 'alive', have to make decisions at this or that point.</i><br /><br />Typo. I meant more along the lines that plants don't have to make decisions, despite being 'alive'.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-6800747103481407862014-03-08T17:29:04.078-07:002014-03-08T17:29:04.078-07:00David,
I guess I'd want to restrict things fu...David,<br /><br /><i>I guess I'd want to restrict things further to animals with nervous systems that, unlike plants, have to solve the problem of 'deciding what to do next'.</i><br /><br />Well, why does 'decision' have to come into it at all? It seems to me like you're saying that plants, despite being 'alive', have to make decisions at this or that point. But why even go that far? Especially on a mechanistic view, it sure looks as if the animal is just following some blind, decisionless series of events.<br /><br /><i>If such decisions are to benefit the creature they must be based on internal states most likely representing aspects of the environment. Hence these states have meaning (for the creature). The resources devoted to representation will always be limited and hence subject to error. This opens the door to truth and falsity. </i><br /><br />But I don't see where 'decisions' or even 'representations' get off the ground to begin with. Especially when you're dealing with a world where all meaning is derived - and that would include what does and doesn't count as a mind. Now, putting the mechanistic aside for a moment, it seems to me that some experiences aren't subject to error - 'I am experiencing pain.' No error there. 'I am having an experience.' Likewise.<br /><br /><i>I would say that all things, in so far as they are not arranged randomly, manifest patterns. One would be hard-pressed to find patterns in the interiors of stars, or, apart from sound waves, in gases.</i><br /><br />Does that seem right? I think if we're talking about a person finding patterns in the interiors of stars, etc, then it's trivial to do so - but that's a case of a human mind seeking out or even deriving a pattern on their own. <br /><br />I'm tempted to say that insofar as we think there are patterns, we're really talking about a kind of intrinsic intentionality without realizing it. We're heading in that direction the moment we treat this or that lump of matter as having a beginning and end, etc, as opposed to letting it all be some undifferentiated mass in total.<br /><br /><i>I say there is no intrinsic meaning in matter since no matter has meaning of itself alone. To have meaning the patterning in the matter has to be used, has to contribute causally to the deciding what to do next. It has to be interpreted in some way. But this can be a mechanistic business.</i><br /><br />That doesn't seem to be the case. If the only meaning that exists is derived meaning, then it really seems as if meaning never gets off the ground to begin with - since whatever's doing the deriving is also going to involve meaning, which will itself have to be derived, and so on and so on. It's one thing to say meaning X is derived and interpreted, but once the thing doing the interpreting also has to be derived and interpreted (by something else that has to be derived and interpreted, etc..)Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.com