tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post516508810770864292..comments2024-03-28T12:34:14.649-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: The positive existence claim has the burden of proof, or does it?Victor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger59125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-52450755998601388692015-02-15T19:38:44.433-07:002015-02-15T19:38:44.433-07:00Do I believe that someone could have a properly ba...Do I believe that someone could have a properly basic belief in God? It is within the realm of possibility.<br /><br />Do I believe that every theist has a properly basic belief in God? No. Given the prevalence of deconversions and rational non-belief, God-belief could not be properly basic for everyone.<br /><br />Do I believe that even a small plurality of theists have properly basic beliefs in God? No. Properly basic beliefs about God are much too special, IMO. How many theists sincerely claim to have it? Seems to me to be more an apologist tool and the last bulwark (and a strong one at that) of theistic belief - not that people sincerely attest to it.<br /><br />Aragornhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17161621090445639028noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-92225363930954387982015-02-14T14:27:05.930-07:002015-02-14T14:27:05.930-07:00Keith Rozumalski,
I'm still not sure what to ...Keith Rozumalski,<br /><br /><i>I'm still not sure what to make of your result and method, but an initial observation is that all of these systems that purport to output something like objective truth have a flaw in that we're putting subjective inputs and expecting objective outputs which doesn't really work. </i><br /><br />If objective is defined as the coherent resolution of all subjective inputs, I don't see a flaw. Basically one can think of human knowledge as the distillation of the subjective experiences of countless human beings over historical time periods. The subjective experience which can be characterized predictably and consistently forms the basis for communication, language, and written record.<br /><br /><i>I'm not sure that an external world is necessarily the simplest explanation. For instance, how did this external world come to be? </i><br /><br />You don't have to hypothesize that far in this case. Which is a simpler explanation: (1) you are a brain in a vat or (2) the external world you perceive is real. If you are a brain in a vat, the brain and vat must additionally exist in a real external world. Therefore, both hypotheses propose an external world, but one proposes additionally that you are a brain in a vat. Therefore, (1) is trivially more complex than (2) and should be downgraded accordingly.DougJChttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15361876063686431335noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-68595561776772018702015-02-14T14:15:08.862-07:002015-02-14T14:15:08.862-07:00"The evidence you see is of trees, houses and..."The evidence you see is of trees, houses and people. What you have no evidence of is whether these observations correspond to an external world or just a mental/digital world."<br /><br />You still conflate evidence and proof. My observation of things is evidence of their existence, and I believe they exist. I do not claim to have proof of this. But I believe the existence of an external world is the best, most likely explanation for what I observe.<br /><br />" I think we can say that your compulsion to believe in the external world and the God believer's compulsion to believe in God are rational. "<br /><br />They are not the same at all. One is based on direct observation. The other is based on your <a href="http://theskepticzone.blogspot.com/2015/02/the-epistemology-of-religious.html" rel="nofollow">interpretation of an emotional experience</a>.<br /><br />"Speaking of having less than absolute proof, why do you have this double standard when it comes to requiring it?"<br /><br />I believe what I believe and you do, too. I believe that empirical evidence is a valid basis for belief about what exists, but I don't believe that emotions are a valid basis for belief. No double standard at all.<br />im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-64717380287344313192015-02-14T14:03:43.062-07:002015-02-14T14:03:43.062-07:00"And you know this how, exactly? On what grou..."And you know this how, exactly? On what grounds do you claim to know what other people have experienced better than the people who have actually experienced it?"<br /><br /><a href="http://theskepticzone.blogspot.com/2015/02/the-epistemology-of-religious.html" rel="nofollow">Good question.</a>im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-62333506533738566802015-02-14T13:37:01.408-07:002015-02-14T13:37:01.408-07:00DJC, thanks for the further explanation. I'm s...DJC, thanks for the further explanation. I'm still not sure what to make of your result and method, but an initial observation is that all of these systems that purport to output something like objective truth have a flaw in that we're putting subjective inputs and expecting objective outputs which doesn't really work. <br /><br />I'm not sure that an external world is necessarily the simplest explanation. For instance, how did this external world come to be? Keith Rozumalskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075074084646770559noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-25964497410687675782015-02-14T13:18:30.983-07:002015-02-14T13:18:30.983-07:00im-skeptial wrote: "My belief is influenced b...im-skeptial wrote: "My belief is influenced by the evidence I see."<br /><br />The evidence you see is of trees, houses and people. What you have no evidence of is whether these observations correspond to an external world or just a mental/digital world.<br /><br />im-skeptial wrote: "You don't see any God. You experience an emotional feeling, and you go through some kind of reasoning process that tells you it was caused by God. That's not a properly basic belief."<br /><br />Msgrx is right, you're now in the very strange position of denying someone's private, subjective experience of, say, hearing God speak to them. How in the world can you know that someone didn't experience something? Even under the strict model of classical foundationslism an observational statement such as "I heard God speak to me," would count as a properly basic belief.<br /><br />Now the tricky part is that just as you can't be certain that your observation of a tree corresponds to a physical, external world, the God believer can't be certain that their observation corresponds to God or to something else. If both your cognitive faculties are properly working i.e. you're not insane, on hallucinatory drugs or etc. then I think we can say that your compulsion to believe in the external world and the God believer's compulsion to believe in God are rational. <br /><br />im-skeptical wrote: "Again you need to understand that seeing something IS evidence. It is not absolute proof."<br /><br />Your seeing a tree is undeniable, but what you don't know is whether this tree corresponds to the external world or to something else. Your tree observation could go either way.<br /><br />Speaking of having less than absolute proof, why do you have this double standard when it comes to requiring it? It's OK for you to believe in something with less than absolute proof, but the person who has a properly basic belief in God is "believing in bullshit" and is irrational. I could give you some of your own psychoanalytic medicine by saying that this is a result of your anti-God cognitive bias, but I'll spare you. Keith Rozumalskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075074084646770559noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-89381917441197673142015-02-14T09:50:00.606-07:002015-02-14T09:50:00.606-07:00IS:
"- You don't see any God. You exper...IS:<br /><br /><i> "- You don't see any God. You experience an emotional feeling, and you go through some kind of reasoning process that tells you it was caused by God. That's not a properly basic belief. I experience the same emotional feelings that you do, except that I don't attribute them to God."</i><br /><br />And you know this how, exactly? On what grounds do you claim to know what other people have experienced better than the people who have actually experienced it?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-36425724815440459002015-02-13T17:37:18.756-07:002015-02-13T17:37:18.756-07:00Keith Rozumalski,
Where do we get the evidence a...Keith Rozumalski,<br /><br /><i> Where do we get the evidence about the nature of existence that you allude to? Your second to last paragraph seems like magic; you wave a wand and poof out comes reject it. How do we go from considering various possibilities to rejecting everything, but the existence of the external world? </i><br /><br />A key issue of SI is that the more complex possibility (faked external world in this case) is not outright rejected, but rather treated as less likely to be true (avoiding the usual objection to parsimony that we have no way of guaranteeing that the simplest explanation is the correct explanation). But the reason it is treated as less likely to be true is an important matter of strategy. If we go with the simplest explanation as true for now (which means it will be continually used and therefore heavily tested with all other models thought to be true) and it is later found to be inadequate, we have potentially ruled out a larger space of conceptual possibility. Disproving a simple explanation is likely to eliminate a larger search space of possibilities than disproving a more complicated one.<br /><br />Complexity can be more formally defined with Kolmogorov complexity which can be thought of as measuring the lengths of hypothetical computer programs (say for a hypothetical computer simulating the laws of physical reality) that match observed evidence.DougJChttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15361876063686431335noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-33198673601445309562015-02-13T15:34:24.790-07:002015-02-13T15:34:24.790-07:00Keith Rozumalski,
You seem to make no distinction...Keith Rozumalski,<br /><br />You seem to make no distinction between evidence and proof: "you're making a logical leap from "I see a tree before me" to therefore the external world exists". I'm not making any logical leap. Evidence is reason to believe something. But it is different from absolute proof, which I never claimed.<br /><br />"You have sensory observations of objects and then assume that these observations correspond to an external world. To put it another way, your cognitive faculties compel you to believe that the external world exists."<br />- My belief is influenced by the evidence I see.<br /><br />"Well, the Christian who, has a properly basic belief in God, has experiences with God and has a sense of God's working in the wold. Their cognitive faculties compel them to believe in the existence of God."<br />- You don't see any God. You experience an emotional feeling, and you go through some kind of reasoning process that tells you it was caused by God. That's not a properly basic belief. I experience the same emotional feelings that you do, except that I don't attribute them to God. The evidence that these emotions are natural is too strong to ignore. You can call me mentally defective if you choose, but that's a retreat from logic and reason.<br /><br />"What evidence? Seeing people, cars and trees does not prove that these things physically exists or that there is an external world. There is no way to conclusively prove that there is an external world."<br />- Again you need to understand that seeing something IS evidence. It is not absolute proof.<br /><br /><br />im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-9079018506531567862015-02-13T15:14:58.260-07:002015-02-13T15:14:58.260-07:00DJC, kudos for coming up with a novel solution. I&...DJC, kudos for coming up with a novel solution. I'm not sure that I agree at this point, but you have my interest. I haven't had the chance to read up on Solomonoff induction, so I'm not sure exactly how it works.<br /><br />Where do we get the evidence about the nature of existence that you allude to? Your second to last paragraph seems like magic; you wave a wand and poof out comes reject it. How do we go from considering various possibilities to rejecting everything, but the existence of the external world? Keith Rozumalskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075074084646770559noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-84272316833970722092015-02-13T14:39:37.117-07:002015-02-13T14:39:37.117-07:00im-skeptical wrote: "Observational statements...im-skeptical wrote: "Observational statements, such as "I see a tree before me", and logical truths are examples of basic beliefs." If that doesn't mean we can believe the evidence of our senses, then I have no idea what it means. Yet belief in the existence of the external world is absolutely no different. I believe it because I see it."<br /><br />The problem is that you're making a logical leap from "I see a tree before me" to therefore the external world exists--this simply doesn't follow. What you can't know with certainty is that this sensory observation corresponds to a physical world or even that there is such as thing as the physical world. The tree might be just a digital object in a simulation you exist in. The image might be just piped into your mind by an evil demon who is fooling you into believing that an external world exists. <br /><br />im-skeptical wrote: "I believe the world exists because I see it. I don't believe God exists because I don't see it."<br /><br />You have sensory observations of objects and then assume that these observations correspond to an external world. To put it another way, your cognitive faculties compel you to believe that the external world exists. Well, the Christian who, has a properly basic belief in God, has experiences with God and has a sense of God's working in the wold. Their cognitive faculties compel them to believe in the existence of God. Since neither you nor the Christian has any solid direct evidence for your beliefs I don't see the difference between the two of you. <br /><br />im-skeptical wrote: The difference between me and the external world skeptic is that my belief is based on evidence..."<br /><br />What evidence? Seeing people, cars and trees does not prove that these things physically exists or that there is an external world. There is no way to conclusively prove that there is an external world. Keith Rozumalskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075074084646770559noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-48369414843249088982015-02-13T13:58:38.537-07:002015-02-13T13:58:38.537-07:00Keith Rozumalski:
Remember, classical foundation...Keith Rozumalski:<br /><br /><i><br />Remember, classical foundationalism says that it's irrational to believe in the external world and other minds because these beliefs are not self-evident, incorrigible or evident to the senses<br /></i><br /><br />It seems to me the best way to approach the external worlds and other minds problem is to enumerate all conceptual possibilities that could be fully consistent with all the evidence and then accept the common features of the largest space of possibility as tentatively true.<br /><br />If new conceptual possibilities are discovered or if old ones are found to be incoherent or impossible, update.<br /><br />Thus, we would accept the external world and other minds as provisionally true because the larger space of conceivable possibilities permits it. Only a few possibilities with fairly extensive additional variables -- brains in vats, mad scientists, simulated universes by highly advanced future civilizations, etc. -- reject it.<br /><br />This is a parsimony approach guided by complexity measure (Solomonoff induction) which seems superior to either classical foundationalism or reformed epistemology.DougJChttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15361876063686431335noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-91765464438772239122015-02-13T11:59:13.678-07:002015-02-13T11:59:13.678-07:00"You're still conflating classical founda..."You're still conflating classical foundationlism with Reformed Epistemology."<br /><br />I'm going by what you said: "Observational statements, such as "I see a tree before me", and logical truths are examples of basic beliefs." If that doesn't mean we can believe the evidence of our senses, then I have no idea what it means. Yet belief in the existence of the external world is absolutely no different. I believe it because I see it. I believe it because interacting with the external world is the only means I have of learning anything. Plantinga's assertion that we have other means of learning what exists is pure special pleading.<br /><br />" you take the existence of the external world to be a properly basic belief, even though there is no conclusive arguments or evidence for this belief. But, when it comes to belief in God, you demand that the belief be supported by conclusive arguments and evidence. This is special pleading."<br /><br />Bullshit. I believe the world exists because I see it. I don't believe God exists because I don't see it. It's that simple. No special pleading. To say that mu cognitive facilities will tell me that God exists if they are working properly is blatant, obvious special pleading.<br /><br />"a more radical skeptic could say the exact same thing to [God skeptics] about one of their beliefs"<br /><br />The difference between me and the external world skeptic is that my belief is based on evidence (whether you think so or not - seeing it is in fact evidence). Like the theist, the EW skeptic doesn't base his belief on what the evidence tells him.<br /><br />"I'll ask it again, do you support classical foundationalism? "<br /><br />If I was knowledgeable in all the types of epistemology and their variants, I could tell you precisely what I favor (probably some kind of empiricism). As it is, I can say that there are certain epistemologies that strike me as nothing more than justification for believing bullshit. im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-41717802193410435692015-02-13T11:08:58.582-07:002015-02-13T11:08:58.582-07:00im-skeptical wrote: "His assertion that you c...im-skeptical wrote: "His assertion that you can believe that a tree exists based on the evidence of your senses, but you can't believe that the external world exists on the same basis is incoherent."<br /><br />You're still conflating classical foundationlism with Reformed Epistemology. Remember, classical foundationalism says that it's irrational to believe in the external world and other minds because these beliefs are not self-evident, incorrigible or evident to the senses . Plantinga is the one who say that if one's cognitive faculties are properly functioning and these faculties compel you to believe in the external world then it is rational to do so.<br /><br />im-skptical wrote: "I think he's engaging in special pleading, and his epistemology is goal-directed."<br /><br />Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. As far as I can tell, whether you realize it or, you take the existence of the external world to be a properly basic belief, even though there is no conclusive arguments or evidence for this belief. But, when it comes to belief in God, you demand that the belief be supported by conclusive arguments and evidence. This is special pleading. <br /><br />im-skeptical wrote: "As for what kind of epistemology I endorse, let's just say I don't accept any epistemology that is designed to justify belief in non-existent entities."<br /><br />It always amazes me that it never dawns on God skeptics that when they say things like this that a more radical skeptic could say the exact same thing to them about one of their beliefs. An external world skeptic could say the exact same thing to you if you take the external world to be a properly basic belief!<br /><br />God skeptics often also seem to have difficulty seeing things from a theistic perspective. For a Christian with a strong properly basic belief in God, God is not a "non-existent entit[y]" (you're begging the question with that statement, by the way), his existence is as obvious to them as the existence of the external world is to you. <br /><br />Finally, I noticed that you failed to answer the question I posed in my last response. I'll ask it again, do you support classical foundationalism? Keith Rozumalskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075074084646770559noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-8589006763526044402015-02-13T08:36:09.121-07:002015-02-13T08:36:09.121-07:00"That doesn't seem like a very charitable..."That doesn't seem like a very charitable view of reformed epistemology, particularly since it enables us to rationally hold beliefs that include the existence of the external world, other minds as well as the belief that the world is older than five minutes."<br /><br />I don't have a particularly charitable view of Plantinga's philosophy. His assertion that you can believe that a tree exists based on the evidence of your senses, but you can't believe that the external world exists on the same basis is incoherent. I think he's engaging in special pleading, and his epistemology is goal-directed.<br /><br />As for what kind of epistemology I endorse, let's just say I don't accept any epistemology that is designed to justify belief in non-existent entities.<br />im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-91639114118906988442015-02-13T00:01:41.089-07:002015-02-13T00:01:41.089-07:00im-skeptical wrote: "From what I understand o...im-skeptical wrote: "From what I understand of this kind of epistemology, it seems to have been invented for the purpose of justifying your religious belief in the absence of evidence or any other rational basis."<br /><br />That doesn't seem like a very charitable view of reformed epistemology, particularly since it enables us to rationally hold beliefs that include the existence of the external world, other minds as well as the belief that the world is older than five minutes. So, you're obviously not keen on reformed epistemology, but does this mean that you're endorsing classical foundationalism? Are properly basic beliefs only self-evident, incorrigible or evident to the senses? Keith Rozumalskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075074084646770559noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-15886506532929986542015-02-12T22:15:54.489-07:002015-02-12T22:15:54.489-07:00Keith Rozumalski,
So now that I understand you re...Keith Rozumalski,<br /><br />So now that I understand you reject classic foundationalism in favor of Plantinga's reformed epistemology, your comments don't seem quite so confusing. From what I understand of this kind of epistemology, it seems to have been invented for the purpose of justifying your religious belief in the absence of evidence or any other rational basis. The idea that you are justified in believing just because you <i>feel</i> that it must be true seems rather facile to me. In fact, the same epistemology can be used to justify most any belief at all. That includes the metaphysics of materialism, which Plantinga rejects as self-refuting.<br /><br />Plantinga's assertion that my lack of <i>sensus divinitatus</i> is due to a cognitive malfunction is actually quite amusing to me. It amounts to "If you don't believe what I do, you're mentally defective." This is the product of the greatest philosophical mind that Christianity has to offer today? I'm not impressed.<br /><br />Here are some thoughts from people who have examined this more carefully:<br /><br /><a href="http://formerfundy.blogspot.com/2010/05/essence-of-reformed-epistemology.html" rel="nofollow">Ken Pulliam</a><br /><br /><a href="http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=10551" rel="nofollow">Tyler Wunder</a><br /><br /><a href="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2009/12/jaco-gericke-fundamentalism-on-stilts.html" rel="nofollow">Jaco Gericke</a><br />im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-57078033647702613902015-02-12T22:13:37.105-07:002015-02-12T22:13:37.105-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-1099727888760794062015-02-12T19:45:53.458-07:002015-02-12T19:45:53.458-07:00Keith Rozumalski,
Now that you have responded to ...Keith Rozumalski,<br /><br />Now that you have responded to my comment, I begin to see what you were trying to say, but I could have never guessed that until I heard your clarification. I will re-assess and reply soon.<br />im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-46945273866587946562015-02-12T18:54:36.166-07:002015-02-12T18:54:36.166-07:00Plantinga proposes a negative and a positive way o...Plantinga proposes a negative and a positive way of addressing this problem. The negative way seeks to demonstrate that the evidentionlist project will not hold up. The positive way seeks to offer a rationale for Reformed Epistmeology. <br />The Negative (analytical) Argument<br /><br />Plantings grants those propositions which are self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible are properly basic. Plantinga's objection is with the evidentialist who claims that only these propositions are properly basic. Plantinga wants to include other beliefs (such as belief in the past, belief in other minds, etc.)<br /><br />The foundationalist contention is presented as (19):<br /><br />(19) "A is properly basic for me only if A is self-evident or incorrigible or evident to the senses."<br /><br />Plantinga argues that one is rational in accepting (19) only if either (19) is properly basic or (19) relates to propositions which are properly basic. Now, Plantinga thinks that its obvious that (19) is neither self-evident, evident to the sense, nor incorrigible. Therefore , Plantinga makes the following claims:<br />N1 - (19) is not properly basic.<br />N2 - since no one has demonstrated that (19) relates to propositions which are properly basic, then, Plantinga asserts, not only is there no compelling reason to accept (19) but also to do so would be epistemologically irresponsible (on Clifford's criterion - there is not sufficient evidence).<br />This is the negative critique of evidentialism. It's Plantingas strongest argument.Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-81660650571840762252015-02-12T18:14:35.269-07:002015-02-12T18:14:35.269-07:00Harpia Empírica wrote: "Because 'belief&q...Harpia Empírica wrote: "Because 'belief", 'existence', 'proof', 'rational' or 'irrational have sense inside the external world."<br /><br />These things could exactly make as much sense in a simulation. The external world has no monopoly on these things.<br /><br />Harpia Empírica wrote: "A person would be rational to believe in everything. Every belief without proof would be still rational. Fairies, trolls, soul eaters, banshees, a person could say an irrational universe exists (one that does not necessarily follows logic assertions) and still be rational on believing it. A weapon that can kill God, also (that would be cool, metaphysical god-killing-spear)"<br /><br />First of all, if a defeater is successfully presented against a belief then the belief is not warranted and can't be rationally held. This will strike down anything logically impossible such as married bachelors or universes that exist and yet are non-existent. Also, belief that are proven to be wrong have no warrant. <br /><br />It's also important to note that if one's cognitive environment is proper and one's cognitive faculties are properly functioning then one should not come to believe in faeries. One aught to conclude that there is no good reason to believe in faeries. <br /><br />Harpia Empírica wrote: "But anyway, even if you're right that we are all being irrational by assuming the external world exists"<br /><br />I didn't say that it's irrational to believe in the external world (EW)--I take it to be a properly basic belief that has warrant. The classical model of foundationalism says that belief in the EW is irrational because there is no conclusive proof or evidence that it exists. <br />Keith Rozumalskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075074084646770559noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-40395696128781046032015-02-12T17:27:45.422-07:002015-02-12T17:27:45.422-07:00im-skeptial wrote: "So this time, you seem to...im-skeptial wrote: "So this time, you seem to be saying that a properly basic belief is "self-evident, evident to the senses or incorrigible", and a belief is rational if it is properly basic or inferred from propositions that are properly basic. Did I understand this correctly? Note that the concept of incorrigibility is somewhat unclear."<br /><br />No, that's not right all. First of all, an incorrigible belief is one that can't be mistaken. This of course is a very small list which includes the belief about your own existence and beliefs about logical truths such as the non-existence of married bachelors. Basically, if it's logically possible for that belief to be false then that belief is not incorrigible, and the EW certainly fits in the not incorrigible category.<br /><br />I think where I lost you was when I was contrasting the idea of a basic belief in classical foundationalism with more moderate forms of foundationalism which includes reformed epistemology. The classical model is much more strict and leads us to conclude that it is irrational to believe in the EW, God, other minds; and that the world is older than five minutes.<br /><br />Properly basic beliefs aren't based on other beliefs, arguments or evidence--in fact there can be no conclusive arguments or evidence for these beliefs. It's as simple as your properly functioning faculties compelling you to believe that the EW exists. <br /><br />im-skeptial wrote: "I'm sorry, but this still leaves me confused. Basic beliefs are rational. Existence of the EW is a basic belief, but it is irrational ... What you say doesn't make sense to me."<br /><br />The existence of the EW is a properly basic belief and is rational under the moderate/reformed foundationalism, but irrational under the classical model since there are no conclusive arguments or evidence for it. <br /><br />im-skeptical wrote: "And what about this "sense" you have that are compelled by your cognitive faculties? I'm not compelled to believe any such thing. What compels you is something called cognitive bias. But cognitive bias is certainly not a source of properly basic beliefs. In other words, what you believe is unwarranted."<br /><br />Well, you're not going to like this answer, but under reformed epistemology you don't have this sense because, when it comes to the sense of the divine, your cognitive faculties are not properly functioning. If one's cognitive functions are working properly then beliefs formed from those functions are warranted. Keith Rozumalskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11075074084646770559noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-83693511898937153692015-02-12T17:03:20.918-07:002015-02-12T17:03:20.918-07:00" Why is someone who believes in the existenc..." Why is someone who believes in the existence of the external world, despite having no real proof for this belief, rational while someone who believes in God is irrational?" <br /><br />Because "belief", "existence", "proof", "rational" or "irrational" have sense inside the external world. It makes no sense to use it on the the external world, for all those things might be just made-up. Just the way "material causality" is valid to our observable universe, it might not be valid to it. <br /><br />I don't think I'm right about where this is going, and this might be ignorant from my part, but if you're trying to shift the burden of the proof for claims about existence here, there are some nasty things that would follow. A person would be rational to believe in everything. Every belief without proof would be still rational. Fairies, trolls, soul eaters, banshees, a person could say an irrational universe exists (one that does not necessarily follows logic assertions) and still be rational on believing it. A weapon that can kill God, also (that would be cool, metaphysical god-killing-spear)<br /><br />But anyway, even if you're right that we are all being irrational by assuming the external world exists, I'd say if you fall off your chair all way to the ground your ass would still hurt. Even if your ass doesn't exist at all. Even if you (or we) are false, we still have to live as if it was true. I still stand by my original point, though, while "logic" and "reason" can be applied to things inside the external world, it might not be applied to it.Narcisohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08017770745142918762noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-49655008064553167352015-02-12T16:49:32.722-07:002015-02-12T16:49:32.722-07:00Hello Victor, interesting post.
I still think the...Hello Victor, interesting post.<br /><br />I still think the ones making the positive claim bear the burden. I don't think how "the external world" would be different.<br /><br />I also don't think that what John Moore said is correct. <br />"you have a burden of proof whenever you make any sort of claim" <br /><br />But what about this great debate? How do we know which came first? "God exists" or "God doesn't"? <br /><br />What I think of this is that everything we argue assume that the external world exists. We sort of beg the question everytime.<br /> I think proving that it doesn't is impossible, it would not even make sense because it's pretty much unfalsifiable. And I don't think it is intellectual defeatism at all.<br /><br />The same, when you, say, "pluck" some things to the concept of God, such as omnipotence, omniscience and moral goodness, then we can observe the world, assuming that it exists, and see if it fits.<br />But how do we "pluck" things to the concept of the external world? It is all we see! We have no external background to analyze this, we don't know the real scenario behind it so we can test if it exists or not.<br /><br />I'm thinking out loud here, but it might be the case that logic itself is a false thing. Who knows? <br /><br />I'd simply bite the bullet and say "Well, there is no way we can deal about that". As for there is no way we can deal with "there is an invisible and by no possible means detectable unicorn behind you now". It's just simply sadder.<br /><br />So I think the idea of burden of proof to the positive claim is valid to the external world but not to it since "burden of proof" might be a thing of the external world which might be completely made-up?Narcisohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08017770745142918762noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-50546555204925752032015-02-12T15:36:21.137-07:002015-02-12T15:36:21.137-07:00Lets see if i can sort this out.
So this time, yo...Lets see if i can sort this out.<br /><br />So this time, you seem to be saying that a properly basic belief is "self-evident, evident to the senses or incorrigible", and a belief is rational if it is properly basic or inferred from propositions that are properly basic. Did I understand this correctly? Note that the concept of incorrigibility is somewhat unclear. It seems to be something that we believe that is based on something other than empirical evidence or logical self-evidence, and yet it is necessarily true.<br /><br />Now, you claim that belief in existence the EW if properly basic. But you also claim that it is NOT logically necessary (and therefore, not self-evident), NOT based on empirical evidence, NOT an incorrigible belief, but "because our cognitive faculties compel us to believe that the EW exists." How does this fit with the definition you provided? <br /><br />I'm sorry, but this still leaves me confused. Basic beliefs are rational. Existence of the EW is a basic belief, but it is irrational ... What you say doesn't make sense to me.<br /><br />OK. Whatever. About God: "If someone has a sense that God has created the world this is because someone's cognitive faculties compels that person to this belief, just as one is compelled to believe in the EW." So this belief is irrational for the same reasons that belief in the EW is irrational? And what about this "sense" you have that are compelled by your cognitive faculties? I'm not compelled to believe any such thing. What compels you is something called cognitive bias. But cognitive bias is certainly not a source of properly basic beliefs. In other words, what you believe is unwarranted.<br />im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.com