tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post3377005119217487003..comments2024-03-28T12:34:14.649-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: Against objective probability Victor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-41823583364033764422015-01-14T18:05:55.185-07:002015-01-14T18:05:55.185-07:00I don't have a definition of "faith"...I don't have a definition of "faith" to offer (or of most words that we use, beyond dictionary approximations, for that matter), and also, I do not intend to get into a comprehensive defense of my take on some aspects the psychology of religious and generally ideological beliefs (a matter closely tied to Loftus's definition) in this context. But that said, my impression is that and Loftus's definition gives an approximate though not entirely accurate description of a psychological phenomenon that is usually called "faith", in one of the senses of the word (there are several). <br /><br />That sort of attitude is, in my view, widespread among religious believers - as well as believers in other ideologies not usually called "religion" -, but not universal: for example, some people would stop believing pretty quickly if they were to actually think about whether their religion is true (some do), often because they lacked the attitude in question - they are just mistaken, probably from childhood indoctrination, and they haven't actually looked at the matter yet. <br /><br />By the way, I don't think the definition implies fideism, in the sense that a person may have faith without being a fideist - but again, I haven't read Loftus's book, so I may be misinterpreting -, for the following reason: <br /><br />Fideism (going by Plantinga's definition; if you prefer another one, please let me know which one) requires that a person consciously, and deliberately, promote or choose faith.<br /><br />On the other hand, the attitude involved in Loftus's definition (if I'm getting it right) does not require that a person even know that she has it. <br /><br />For example, I think political ideologies like communism, or the belief that a person is a hero, a great leader, etc. (e.g., Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Mao Zedong, etc.) are usually held on faith in the sense of the word in question (at least in the West; I don't know how it is in, say, China), even though most of the people who have such beliefs do not know that, and would strongly disagree with someone who said that they hold their beliefs on faith, or who (to avoid misunderstandings) tells them that they have that sort of attitude.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-42373293503129446072015-01-14T17:21:42.081-07:002015-01-14T17:21:42.081-07:00Possibly not. But, do you think that it's plau...Possibly not. But, do you think that it's plausible to define faith the way he does, making it out to imply fideism.Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-34203142985001935232015-01-12T17:05:12.567-07:002015-01-12T17:05:12.567-07:00Do you think Loftus's quote above requires an ...Do you think Loftus's quote above requires an algorithm for correct priors? <br /><br />Maybe he requires that somewhere else (I don't know), but going just by that quote, there are plausible interpretations that do not require anything like that (e.g., see my first post on that). Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-47848732787821538782015-01-12T16:30:02.240-07:002015-01-12T16:30:02.240-07:00You can have irrationality, surely, and drawing of...You can have irrationality, surely, and drawing of wrong conclusions. However, there is no probabilistic algorithm for correct priors. Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-77081326895170659232015-01-12T15:15:00.555-07:002015-01-12T15:15:00.555-07:00Okay, noted. We disagree about it, but we don'...Okay, noted. We disagree about it, but we don't need to debate that in this context, since the point I was trying to make wasn't about the resurrection of Jesus (we might consider the claim that archangel Gabriel gave the Quran to Muhammad, or some claim about Joseph Smith, etc., instead.), but about a potential interpretation of "what the evidence calls for". Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-35835340070712588042015-01-12T12:35:19.197-07:002015-01-12T12:35:19.197-07:00When it comes to the Resurrection, I think the rel...When it comes to the Resurrection, I think the relevant issues are so complex, and involve so many factors, that I am very disinclined to issue irrationality charges either way on that issue. <br /><br />Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-76255276464226304982015-01-12T11:15:18.842-07:002015-01-12T11:15:18.842-07:00Victor,
Even though the probability a person oug...Victor, <br /><br />Even though the probability a person ought to assign to a hypothesis depends in part on the information available to that person (or the observations, if you like), that doesn't preclude objectivity in a colloquial sense - namely, that there is an objective fact of the matter as to what probability a specific person should assign, or shouldn't assign; this does not require specific precise numbers - as it does not preclude it in the case of morality (i.e., moral obligations depend in part on the information available to the person too). That does not entail objectivity in some other, technical senses, but seems to be enough for claim in the quote. <br /><br />So, with regard to the quote, I've not read Loftus's book, so I don't know whether he requires that interpretation of probability elsewhere, but going by your quote, there are at least some ways in which one may say a person is assigning greater probability to a hypothesis than what the evidence calls for (or perhaps, what observations and arguments call for?; there are interpretations of evidence that wouldn't work here.): <br /><br />a. Based on the prior probabilities and the observations, she ought to assign a lower probability. <br />b. She has wrong priors. <br />c. a. plus b. <br /><br />In category a., the person is just making the wrong assessment given all of the observations available to them (even those prior to their exposure to the religion in question). <br /><br />Category b. may be more controversial, since one may wonder whether there is such thing as the wrong priors. I think there is for humans, but in any case, it seems a. can [usually] do the work required here. <br />Take, for example, a hypothetical extreme presuppositionalist who claims he assigns the resurrection of Jesus a probability P=1, as a prior. <br />That seems to fall into category a, because even if he claims it's a prior, there was a time when he wasn't like that, and given his priors and all of the observations, he ought not to have given the resurrection a high probability, let alone one (of course, I don't expect Christians to agree that he ought not to have given the resurrection a high probability, but you may pick a hypothetical Mormon or Muslim or Hindu presuppositionalist if you like; the point about probability is the same). <br />Then again, it may be that after their commitment to their ideology (religion or not) affects the way their mind works, changing the priors into wrong ones, so b. applies too. <br /><br />But now let's consider someone who isn't a presuppositionalist. One may claim that if they assign more than 1/2 (or, for that matter, more than 1/1000000, so put a number) to Jesus's resurrection - at least, in the context of today's world, after reading the Bible, having access to the internet and/or books, etc. -, they're assigning probability they ought not to assign; the observations do not call for that, given their priors - or else, they have the wrong priors. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.com