tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post2547917768303996988..comments2024-03-28T12:34:14.649-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: Steve Hays on some implications of combining the multiverse with ECREEVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger354125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-91824839687350947042013-06-01T09:54:31.379-07:002013-06-01T09:54:31.379-07:00I was just on Loftus's site, and I mentioned t...I was just on Loftus's site, and I mentioned the possibility that the physical constants were originally variables that evolved to their present values. No need for either God or the multiverse.<br /><br />Loftus deleted my comment and banned me. So much for the outsider test!!!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-6897471565122495132012-12-15T19:54:48.636-07:002012-12-15T19:54:48.636-07:00Sorry, I put my comment in the wrong thread, pleas...Sorry, I put my comment in the wrong thread, please disregard the previous comment.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-2025983683657374262012-12-15T19:53:46.501-07:002012-12-15T19:53:46.501-07:00Crude,
“Uh, yeah. In other words - he disagreed.”
...Crude,<br />“Uh, yeah. In other words - he disagreed.”<br /><br />It’s akin to someone posting about depression being a mental illness and how saying “Just snap out of it” is condescending, useless information, and just enrages the person that the comment is pointed towards and then someone in the comments posts “Just snap out of it.” A reply such as “Oh, really, was that my problem, I’ll just think myself out of a mental illness, thanks for the advice, jerk” would be appropriate. Sure, it’s rude, but it will show the person who said the comment how inappropriate it was; tit for tat. Sure, the commenter may disagree that it’s not terrible advice, but they are completely ignorant about the issues involved and have just been told that it’s horrible advice. On the other hand, it’s just what a troll would do. It’s the old age dilemma, is the offender ignorant or malicious. Since they were just told how ignorant it is, malice tends to be the better explanation.<br /><br />Actually, there wasn't that much disagreement in the thread since they later admitted that their comment was condescending, trivial since everyone knew it, intentionally provocative, and didn't accurately describe their position (playing the ol' devil's advocate). In other words, a troll was banned, sad day for him. What’s the big deal?<br /><br />“Oh, better yet, your additional point: 'That's okay, because PZ's in this for the money too.' Not exactly a brilliant defense.”<br /><br />I didn’t ascribe a motive to PZ. That’s what “for whatever reason” means. I was pointing out that blogs may not have the same dynamics when you change their size. Don’t read into more than what I said in my post. There are plenty of reasons to restrict the audience and limit discussion, even for academic reasons. <br /><br />“The example is fine. That you don't agree with it isn't a concern. If anything, your reaction just illustrates my point further.”<br /><br />I disagree with it because I probably would have agreed with him and I wouldn’t have said what he said. He derailed the discussion to make a trivial point, a point that is both condescending and insulting. A lot of blogs have comment policies regarding going off-topic so the fact that he was banned isn’t all too surprising in terms of blogging practices. I’m questioning whether you even have a point since the example doesn’t show someone being banned for mere disagreement. Just look at the thread; there are other people who disagreed who didn’t get banned. Also, picking someone who admitted that they “wanted to stir up the hornet’s nest” by playing devil’s advocate (i.e. trolled) and monopolized the thread (contra comment policy) doesn’t really help your case either.<br /><br />“In fact, CC - multiple people disagree with you right now. Who's cursing you out? Who's screaming 'Victor, ban this troll!' merely because you disagree? Yes, you've been told that you don't understand what you talk about before. Why, people even have mocked your name a bit. It's never even approached what goes on at Myers' crappy little outpost, daily.”<br /><br />Do you think four lettered words make the difference? Just to let you know, atheists don’t typically grant them a special category for offense. Just because the people here use substitutes doesn’t make the verbal barrage any different. <br /><br />Not to mention that your overarching criticism may be obsolete since PZ has since updated his comment policy to include: “TET will become [Lounge]. It is still the same: an open thread, talk about what you want, but I’m going to be specific: it is a safe space. Discussion and polite disagreement are allowed, but you will respect all the commenters, damn you. No personal attacks allowed at all.” If you want earmuffs, he has threads for that, if not, then he has threads for that as well.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-30295266497812735462012-12-07T11:01:41.817-07:002012-12-07T11:01:41.817-07:00350 iterations of the same old program.... sigh.350 iterations of the same old program.... sigh.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-72913162827331245172012-12-03T11:13:14.399-07:002012-12-03T11:13:14.399-07:00Crude: "Already answered, but since you appar...Crude: "Already answered, but since you apparently need to hear it again: yes, it's possible. I'm willing to raise the bar higher and qualify that said beings should be able to have some control over that universe - hence my focus on simulations - but by Hume's standard, that's not necessary."<br />Some questions: <br />a. To be clear, you're talking about control beyond initial conditions, right? <br />b. What is the evidence in support of the claim about Hume's standard? <br />c. Do you think that if someone had proposed the scenario in which humans scientists make a universe, he should have deemed them gods? <br />d. Since you say that the traditional standard (which you think was Hume's) did not require that, and since you defend this allegedly traditional concept of 'god', why would you change the standard? <br /><i>Are you using your own intuitive understanding of 'god' to conclude that they weren't gods, and then try to match that usage, rather than the one you attribute to Hume? </i> If not, please clarify, because it looks like that to me. <br /><br /><br />Crude: "Of course they support my claim. Hume already was willing to entertain that the creators were far from perfect, that they were numerous, that they were no longer around, etc. But he never questioned their being deities. What you're asking is if Hume would change his mind - but alas, those sorts of questions can't be answered. Maybe in the next life."<br />But Hume never considered a scenario in which the creators are nothing but human, so I was asking whether you considered that even in that scenario, under his usage of the word they would be gods (regardless of whether he would actually accept it), and if so, what your evidence for that is. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-10593333199328292122012-12-03T11:12:44.970-07:002012-12-03T11:12:44.970-07:00Crude: "So, yes, I did establish a criterion....Crude: "So, yes, I did establish a criterion. And by Hume's standard and many others, yes, they would be. Now, throughout this conversation I've pointed at having programmer-control over those beings as a major point in my argument. I also pointed out on this question that said beings may have front-loading capability with their universe, which gives them some serious indirect control."<br />You mentioned programmer controlled in some occasions, but that was not your original 'universe-creation' criterion, nor is it compatible with what you said in many posts. <br /><br />Moreover: <br /><br />1. When you offered the standard about creating a universe with planets, etc., you did not qualify it with conditions about programmer-control power within that universe. <br /><br />2. You offered deistic creators as evidence in support of a claim that the level of power an entity had over his own environment was not a requirement for godhood, in the understanding of the word 'god' that you allege is the historical one. It's implicit in your offering deistic beings as evidence that deistic creators were gods by that usage. <br />In fact, it would not have made any sense for you to offer that example unless you believed that deistic creators were god by that usage. <br />But deistic creators need not have power inside their creation. <br /><br />3. In addition to that, now you have said that we're not puny in our environment compared to Zeus in his; I disagree, but that also shows that you believe that having the level of power that we have in our environment does not preclude a being for being a god by your threshold. <br /><br />4. As for indirect control, sure, we may say that the human scientists who in the future create a universe have considerable control over the initial conditions. <br /><br />Given all of the above, it seems clear that it follows from the standard proposed that if human scientists, in the future, manage to create a universe over which they have no control, then they would be gods. <br /><br />That said, the fact that deists did not specify a minimum level power over their surroundings does not mean that any level (like ours, for instance) would have been accepted, by their usage. It simply did not occur to them to entertain the possibility of a human making a universe, but it may well be that they would have rejected entities with as little power as a human, or as a programmer in the scenario described by Bostrom. But that is not what you said, or the standard you proposed. <br /><br />Crude: "But I did say it was a live option that gods could come to exist even in our universe, so that's hardly a surprise."<br />Fair enough, my point is that if human scientists, in about 20 years, were able to make a universe, the vast majority of people would not deem them gods, under their intuitive grasp of the word 'god', and I see no reason to assume that the matter would have been different by Hume's usage of the word. <br /><br />By the way (for another sci-fi example), I recall an episode Piccard convinces the inhabitants of a planet that he's not a god by taking them on board the Enterprise, etc., eventually, it's clear he's humanly weak, and they accept he's not a god. My point is that these usages are common. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-52735086959619430312012-12-03T10:53:53.680-07:002012-12-03T10:53:53.680-07:00Crude: "Not at all, and your mistake is '...<br />Crude: "Not at all, and your mistake is 'putting someone on a holodeck', which implies taking someone and purposefully fooling them. But creating beings in a simulation who are 'natives', and who develop theories and ideas about their world? That'd be like saying the world was intentionally deceiving geocentrists. No, there was no deception involved in such a case - just people who made a mistake."<br />1. That's not the point. If you create people in a holodeck, and make it a point to deceive them into believing that they're not in a holodeck, that's a deception. <br /><br />2. No, the world was not deceiving geogentrists. There was no deception, since deception requires a deceiver, someone who deliberately is trying to get them to have false beliefs. <br /><br /><br />Crude: "Even your own example requires intention on the part of the simulators to trick the simulated inhabitants - 'Heh heh, they think they're in reality, but they're not!' But that's not required at any point. The simulation, in principle, just *is*."<br />But of course there is intent. <br />They want their simulated ancestors not to believe that they're in a simulation. They want them to believe that there are (say) viruses that cause disease, and which are not just images that disappear the moment they're not looking through a microscope, etc. <br /><br />It's an obvious deception. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-34126203802570658882012-12-03T10:47:46.836-07:002012-12-03T10:47:46.836-07:00Crude: "Because judging an event to be very u...<br />Crude: "Because judging an event to be very unlikely to ever take place stops mattering when you're given infinite chances."<br />Mattering how? <br /><br />You said that the laws of probability are skunked, but I already explain that if our universe has infinitely many galaxies, it's still extremely improbable that my neighbor quantum tunneled into my room. <br /><br />Or are you saying that what happens is that what's utterly improbable to have happened in connection to us would happen <i>somewhere, in some universe</i>? <br /><br /><br />Crude: "Stop misinterpretations like this, please."<br />Stop accusing me, implicitly or explicitly, of deliberately misrepresenting what you said. <br />If you've been unclear (the 'skunked' part, in this case), you can always clarify; if I misunderstood due to my mistake, you can also clarify. <br /><br />But I've not claiming that you claim what you didn't. You misrepresented my positions repeatedly and even after clarification (readers: that's on record), and I still wouldn't accuse you of doing that deliberately. You have enough experience in internet debates to reckon that miscommunication is rampant. <br /><br />Crude: "Well, this wasn't a secret for Zeus."<br />Not my point, but that Dawkins' objection to godhood is a common one; there seem to be plenty of different usages of the word. <br /><br />Crude: "Sure, but again, I'm not trying to convince you. Are you trying to convince *me*?"<br />No, I'm just entertaining your points since you seem to want to argue for a thesis about the meaning of 'god' and we were already debating. <br /><br />Crude: "But I think it's some measure of support that Dawkins, not exactly a biased in my favor observer here, rejects the puny charge."<br />In the sense that he disagrees that those aliens would be puny, not about whether <i>we</i> are puny, or about whether puny entities like us would be gods. <br />If someone were to present to Dawkins a scenario in which, say, 20 years from now, human scientists create a universe over which they have no control, I think he would not say that they would be god-like to us. <br /><br />Crude: "In fact he rejects it to the point where he wants to discard properties talk as the standard."<br />Rejecting that a certain amount of power is sufficient for them to be gods is not the same as rejecting that a certain amount of power is necessary.<br /><br />But that aside, you're supposing that there is <i>a</i> standard, which is somehow related to power. It may be that having some amount of power in combination with some other conditions is enough, but not without them. But as I mentioned, my impression is that 'god' is more like 'similar to that one, etc.'.<br /><br />Crude: "It doesn't even need to be deliberate, as I've repeatedly said. I think his standard is silly, and represents a strange break from the past. The fact that Dawkins talks about how those gods would need explanations, indicating he doesn't even realize most gods did, is enough to indicate some ignorance on his part. Ignorance isn't intentional misleading, but hey, again - not necessary."<br />Okay, so no charge of deliberate attempts. <br />I'd still ask for evidence that he (or some other atheist) is the one who came up with that idea, causing a shift (as opposed to just learning from examples that aliens who evolved from something like us aren't gods). Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-45965965932337816802012-12-03T10:26:50.942-07:002012-12-03T10:26:50.942-07:00Crude: "I've supported my claims about wh...Crude: "I've supported my claims about what qualifies as a god by multiple historical references from Zeus to deists to Hume to otherwise. Aside from the Tegmark case, your response has been to make what I consider to be some pretty lame objections (see: puniness), and keep falling back onto your intuition. That, plus demanding definitions exhaustively, then peppering me with limit cases, since you're convinced you can always defeat definitions."<br />Now <i>that</i> is a misrepresentation of the debate. But I believe you believe it. Which is part of what makes the whole thing kind of hopeless. <br /><br />Crude: "But if you want bravado, I'll give you some in turn: you lost on Tegmark. You're losing on all other multiverse scenarios with hopeless objections and stalling, and you've tipped your hand by implying you were hoping I'd just kind of get frustrated at the length of this and drop it by now. "<br />You mean <i>more</i> bravado? <br />It's another set of misrepresentations. <br />1. I did not lose anything on Tegmark. <br />I said that <i>if</i> (conditional) what Tegmark means by a level 4 multiverse is what you believe he does, then there would be gods on a number of conceptions. That is not a loss, since I never claimed otherwise. <br /><br />2. I'm actually winning on other scenarios (the case of human scientists making a universe in the future is an obvious case). <br /><br />3. I didn't 'tipped my hand' by implying any of the sort; I did not imply that, either. <br />I said I got more evidence that you <i>believe</i> you're winning, which is nothing like saying that I was hoping you would get frustrated, but rather that my hopes that you would <i>eventually desist because you have no case</i> further diminished. <br /><br />Side note: Perhaps, if you didn't like my reply, you should have refrained from making more accusations of deliberate misrepresentation. I'm still keeping the tone civil enough, but I'm definitely not amused. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-56430301510091488112012-12-03T10:24:33.886-07:002012-12-03T10:24:33.886-07:00Crude: "I've pointed out what people acce...Crude: "I've pointed out what people accept as gods, what has been uncritically accepted as gods and deities in the past, and pointed out that there's no good reason offered to call various things that meet extremely similar criteria to be 'not gods'. Your response has been to say your intuition is different, or that simulators don't count because they're 'puny'. I don't find either reply compelling."<br />1. You claimed that some things would have been accepted in the past, but that's not the same as showing it. <br />2. There is no good reason to pick some over others in the past, either, other than the arbitrary categorization of their time. I already pointed out that Michael and Lucifer were usually not accepted, but Loki was. A number of other entities are called 'spirits' or 'monsters', etc., in other religions, despite having similar levels of power. <br />3. A more plausible criterion would be something like 'a god is something more or less like that one, that one, that one, that one, etc...., but not like that one, that one, etc.', where two long lists are given. The differences might or might not be based on power. <br /><br />Crude: "Where, at any point, did I say the use of the word 'god' was somehow contradictory?"<br />When you said "it's obvious, if they're going to call Zeus a god for non-arbitrary reasons, these beings would be gods as well.", that gives me the impression that you're saying that they're using the word in a contradictory manner. But if not, okay. What was the point of that claim? <br /><br />Crude: "I didn't say they couldn't be tricked. I pointed out that even Zeus could be tricked. I was making a point about Zeus' power, while he was still recognized as a god."<br />Okay, but no one suggested that gods cannot be tricked, so what's your point? <br />In any case, Zeus is still far more powerful in our environment than we are in ours.<br /><br />Me: "Again, comparing humans in our environment with Zeus in his, we're way puny."<br />Crude: "No, we're not. Disagree? Take it up with Dawkins."<br />1. Fine, then, I disagree with Dawkins too, if that's what he meant. So? <br />2. Your claim that we're not puny in our environment compared to Zeus in his only leads more evidence to the conclusion that by your proposed criterion for godhood, if human scientists in the future manage to create a universe like ours but over which they have no control, they would be gods. <br />Why not? <br /><br />Crude: "Yes, I do think this debate is going my way - not that that matters at all, since I'd be glad to continue it even if I didn't. Were you waiting for me to concede? You really shouldn't let it be known that you approach these things with an eye on winning or outlasting who you're talking with - rather makes the whole thing seem little petty timewasting. "<br />I'm not waiting for you to concede, but for the debate to eventually end; refraining from insisting in some lines of argumentation, whether it's repetition of claims already addressed or further accusations of misrepresentation, is not the same as posting a concession, which I would never expect. <br />And yes, going back and forth, rebutting very similar claims, etc., does look kind of like a waste of time. <br /><br />Crude: "That's frankly untrue, and a misrepresentation on your part."<br />Whether you're making unsupported or false claims can be assessed by reading the debate carefully, so I need to go no further on that. <br />Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-51686566049250127552012-12-03T10:01:35.581-07:002012-12-03T10:01:35.581-07:00Crude: "It's not obvious even in Bostrom&...Crude: "It's not obvious even in Bostrom's scenario. Bostrom deals specifically with ancestor simulations (I need not be as specific as that), but it's not 'obvious' to some of them, just as it wouldn't be 'obvious' to us, as per Dawkins."<br />Not obvious to all of the ancestors, which is one most of the time there is no simulation of microscopic properties, distant stars have no detail, etc.; the computer only adapts before they engage in some kind of scientific experiment that would reveal the simulation to them. <br />In any case, the simulation is meant to look to the simulated people like their universe looked to the ancestors of the programmers, down to the microscopic level and up to distant stars and galaxies, but without simulating those things most of the times. <br /><br />Crude: "It's enough like a universe to get Brian Greene devoting a chapter to it in his book about multiverses. It's a simulated universe, granted."<br />To the Bostrom scenario? <br />If so, I've not read that book, but I'm pointing out that it would be a deceit like a holodeck or the Matrix, and explaining why. Explanations beat authority, but you're welcome to quote Greene on this if you think that he gives reasons supporting the idea that it was a universe. <br /><br />Crude: "Even in Bostrom's universe, the resources available are unclear. He openly speculates about an infinite stack of simulations, with no 'top level'."<br />True, but he does not claim that that is supported by what we know about physics. <br /><br />Crude: "There's nothing deceitful about such a simulation in and of itself. As for a definition of a universe - for the purposes here, 'a seemingly distinct and/or isolated world'."<br />Of course, it's deceitful. <br />Purely for example, there is an intent to keep the people in it believing (for instance) that there are microscopic viruses that cause different illnesses, whereas in reality the computers are making some of them feel ill, and made an image of a virus appear only when they're using a microscope. <br /><br />Crude: "That's assuming there's a base universe. Even with a stacked universe, it's only a barrier insofar as there's enough processing power required against a lack of computing power - and even then, a slow-running simulation wouldn't seem slow-running to the inhabitants necessarily. "<br />You could adjust the scenario to remove a barrier, but you need a number of additional assumptions for that, like no base universe like our own, or that self-awareness can exist at any processing speed. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-42219198202692080602012-12-03T04:21:42.495-07:002012-12-03T04:21:42.495-07:00That's like saying that putting someone in a h...<i>That's like saying that putting someone in a holodeck and make her believe she's outside it (as in many 'Star Trek' scenarios) is not a deception. But clearly it is.</i><br /><br />Not at all, and your mistake is 'putting someone on a holodeck', which implies taking someone and purposefully fooling them. But creating beings in a simulation who are 'natives', and who develop theories and ideas about their world? That'd be like saying the world was intentionally deceiving geocentrists. No, there was no deception involved in such a case - just people who made a mistake.<br /><br />Even your own example requires intention on the part of the simulators to trick the simulated inhabitants - 'Heh heh, they think they're in reality, but they're not!' But that's not required at any point. The simulation, in principle, just *is*.<br /><br /><i>Okay, you're saying that Dawkins beliefs support the simulation, or apparently, the creation of universes like ours by some beings. I do not see how you derive that.</i><br /><br />I didn't say that at all. I said I used Dawkins for partial support in terms of properties.<br /><br /><i>No, sorry. </i><br /><br />Apologies, but yes.<br /><br /><i>The conclusion is clear, from that criterion. If, in the future, some human scientists found a way to make a universe", with planets, beings and all, then humans too would become gods, by your standard.</i><br /><br />So, yes, I did establish a criterion. And by Hume's standard and many others, yes, they would be. Now, throughout this conversation I've pointed at having programmer-control over those beings as a major point in my argument. I also pointed out on this question that said beings may have front-loading capability with their universe, which gives them some serious indirect control.<br /><br />But I did say it was a live option that gods could come to exist even in our universe, so that's hardly a surprise.<br /><br /><i>Again, my point is that the conclusion is that, by your standard, human scientists would be gods if they make a universe.<br />What is your answer? </i><br /><br />Already answered, but since you apparently need to hear it again: yes, it's possible. I'm willing to raise the bar higher and qualify that said beings should be able to have some control over that universe - hence my focus on simulations - but by Hume's standard, that's not necessary.<br /><br /><i>Still, historical considerations do not support your claim, given that a situation in which human scientists make a universe was never considered. If Hume were asked about human scientists making a universe, would he say they'd be gods, using the word as he understood it? </i><br /><br />Of course they support my claim. Hume already was willing to entertain that the creators were far from perfect, that they were numerous, that they were no longer around, etc. But he never questioned their being deities. What you're asking is if Hume would change his mind - but alas, those sorts of questions can't be answered. Maybe in the next life.<br /><br />Or you can make a good simulation. ;)<br /><br /><i>In the Bostrom case, they do not exist 'wholly in the simulation'. Their 'brains' (computers) are not there; they're made of different stuff, but hooked in a deception one way or another.</i><br /><br />It's not a deception. <a href="http://consc.net/papers/matrix.pdf" rel="nofollow">Read some Chalmers</a> for an extended argument, but really, I suspect you'll just say 'my intuition is different' and that'll be that.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-78311680729293012282012-12-03T04:21:34.779-07:002012-12-03T04:21:34.779-07:00If the laws of probability are skunked, it's g...<i>If the laws of probability are skunked, it's game over; belief in such infinite multiverse is epistemically suicidal.</i><br /><br />Stop misinterpretations like this, please.<br /><br /><i>Reminds me of some science fiction stories.</i><br /><br />Well, this wasn't a secret for Zeus. In fact, it wasn't a secret for plenty of gods. Especially with polytheism, most of them have some kind of origin and were themselves created, often out of chaos or primordial matter-stuff. And yet, they were gods.<br /><br /><i>I did not say that my intuitive usage matched Dawkins theory about the meaning, if he meant to propose one.</i><br /><br />Sure, but again, I'm not trying to convince you. Are you trying to convince *me*? But I think it's some measure of support that Dawkins, not exactly a biased in my favor observer here, rejects the puny charge. In fact he rejects it to the point where he wants to discard properties talk as the standard. Do you think that's reasonable?<br /><br /><i> But if you're suggesting he's deliberately changing the meaning of 'god' from the way he understood the word before (or even changing it at all, deliberately or otherwise), you have a lot of work to do to support the claim.</i><br /><br />It doesn't even need to be deliberate, as I've repeatedly said. I think his standard is silly, and represents a strange break from the past. The fact that Dawkins talks about how those gods would need explanations, indicating he doesn't even realize most gods did, is enough to indicate some ignorance on his part. Ignorance isn't intentional misleading, but hey, again - not necessary.<br /><br /><i>Again, you never claimed that to be necessary. And you don't do it now, either. There was no need to sacrifice the criterion. </i><br /><br />I never claimed it was necessary. I expressly said I was using this particular standard of world creation/control because, even though the bar was possibly higher than it needed to be for a being to qualify as a god, it would keep things focused. I don't need to quibble about whether, say, non-world-creating-being X is a god, when my focus is on world-creating-beings.<br /><br /><i>But no point in going in circles about who misrepresented whom and when. It's all on record. </i><br /><br />Yes, it is. And in the unlikely event someone goes and reads through this entire conversation, they'll see my statements supported.<br /><br /><i>No, it's not, since we do not live in a Bostrom simulation; I'm discussing the consequences of a scenario, not accepting it as a serious possibility. </i><br /><br />You don't have to - but it's not a question of what you accept. Nor do you know we don't - really, even Dawkins admits he doesn't. Even Bostrom admits he doesn't. If you insist you've devised a test, I suppose that's quite nice.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-73875029166171327362012-12-03T04:21:10.312-07:002012-12-03T04:21:10.312-07:00The category 'gods' seems to be arbitraril...<i>The category 'gods' seems to be arbitrarily defined, by similarity to some beings (like Zeus), in some environment. You've not provided reasons to conclude that that wasn't the case in the past.</i><br /><br />I've pointed out what people accept as gods, what has been uncritically accepted as gods and deities in the past, and pointed out that there's no good reason offered to call various things that meet extremely similar criteria to be 'not gods'. Your response has been to say your intuition is different, or that simulators don't count because they're 'puny'. I don't find either reply compelling.<br /><br /><i>But now you don't seem to be making a claim about a shift in meaning, but rather, a claim that the use of the word 'god' is somehow contradictory? </i><br /><br />Where, at any point, did I say the use of the word 'god' was somehow contradictory?<br /><br /><i>The programmers of a Bostrom simulation of course can be so tricked, since they have no computing power in their brains to run the simulation, let alone do so consciously of all that's happening.</i><br /><br />I didn't say they couldn't be tricked. I pointed out that even Zeus could be tricked. I was making a point about Zeus' power, while he was still recognized as a god.<br /><br /><i>Again, comparing humans in our environment with Zeus in his, we're way puny. </i><br /><br />No, we're not. Disagree? Take it up with Dawkins.<br /><br /><i>this also gives more evidence to me that you actually believe that the debate is actually going your way, which makes the changes of an end in a reasonable amount of time diminish, unless I leave</i><br /><br />Yes, I do think this debate is going my way - not that that matters at all, since I'd be glad to continue it even if I didn't. Were you waiting for me to concede? You really shouldn't let it be known that you approach these things with an eye on winning or outlasting who you're talking with - rather makes the whole thing seem little petty timewasting.<br /><br /><i>But you're making unsupported (or just false) claims, and we're stuck in this debate it seems.</i><br /><br />That's frankly untrue, and a misrepresentation on your part. I've supported my claims about what qualifies as a god by multiple historical references from Zeus to deists to Hume to otherwise. Aside from the Tegmark case, your response has been to make what I consider to be some pretty lame objections (see: puniness), and keep falling back onto your intuition. That, plus demanding definitions exhaustively, then peppering me with limit cases, since you're convinced you can always defeat definitions.<br /><br />But if you want bravado, I'll give you some in turn: you lost on Tegmark. You're losing on all other multiverse scenarios with hopeless objections and stalling, and you've tipped your hand by implying you were hoping I'd just kind of get frustrated at the length of this and drop it by now.<br /><br /><i>a. Could you please explain what kind of actually proposed multiverse, other than a Tegmark level 4 multiverse, skunks them, and why?</i><br /><br />Because judging an event to be very unlikely to ever take place stops mattering when you're given infinite chances.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-85088571918599510362012-12-03T04:20:29.500-07:002012-12-03T04:20:29.500-07:00Angra,
Well, obvious to some of those in the simu...Angra,<br /><br /><i>Well, obvious to some of those in the simulation, but I was explaining Bostrom's scenario</i><br /><br />It's not obvious even in Bostrom's scenario. Bostrom deals specifically with ancestor simulations (I need not be as specific as that), but it's not 'obvious' to some of them, just as it wouldn't be 'obvious' to us, as per Dawkins.<br /><br /><i>But the point remains that even if they can't figure it out, the simulation is hardly a universe. It's more like the Matrix.</i><br /><br />It's enough like a universe to get Brian Greene devoting a chapter to it in his book about multiverses. It's a simulated universe, granted.<br /><br /><i>I was going by Bostrom's scenario (though he does seem to make an error; I think the scenario is self-defeating, but then, not my scenario).</i><br /><br />Even in Bostrom's universe, the resources available are unclear. He openly speculates about an infinite stack of simulations, with no 'top level'.<br /><br /><i>A deceitful simulation does not seem to be one, but then, no definition of 'universe' was provided, either. Do you have any definition in mind? </i><br /><br />There's nothing deceitful about such a simulation in and of itself. As for a definition of a universe - for the purposes here, 'a seemingly distinct and/or isolated world'.<br /><br /><i>I was explaining Bostrom's scenario, and actually, there is a barrier to stacked simulations, which is computing power in the base universe.</i><br /><br />That's assuming there's a base universe. Even with a stacked universe, it's only a barrier insofar as there's enough processing power required against a lack of computing power - and even then, a slow-running simulation wouldn't seem slow-running to the inhabitants necessarily.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-8930248631703147462012-12-03T02:47:06.304-07:002012-12-03T02:47:06.304-07:00Crude: "You've already asked this, I'...Crude: "You've already asked this, I've already answered. If you want to ask more questions, feel free, but this is simply not a new inquiry. "<br />Answered how? <br /><br />Again, my point is that the conclusion is that, by your standard, human scientists would be gods if they make a universe. <br />What is your answer? <br /><br />Crude: "As above, I don't need an exhaustive definition - the criterion does the trick. You say the criterion isn't plausible to you intuitively - that's fine. I think your intuition should be trumped by the historical considerations and the context. If it's not, so be it - I never get into these discussions where 'convince the other person' is the make or break."<br />1. My intuition comes from present-day usage, not past usage. <br />2. Still, historical considerations do not support your claim, given that a situation in which human scientists make a universe was never considered. If Hume were asked about human scientists making a universe, would he say they'd be gods, using the word as he understood it? <br /><br />Crude: "This is like saying that a multiverse is technically a single universe, just with a larger scale and different features than originally conceived. Technically true, in practice irrelevant. "<br />No, it's like saying that if Star Trek scenarios in which people are put on apparent 'planets' in a holodeck, and deceived into believing they're on an actual planet (they're on a ship) is a deception, not a planet. <br /><br />Crude: "Depends. Are the inhabitants of the Matrix exclusively embodied beings who were put in there via a neural hookup? Grey area. Are there inhabitants of the Matrix who exist wholly in the simulation and are mindful beings, etc? Then sure - that's just a Bostrom simulation with additional inhabitants."<br />1. Grey area? <br />Okay, I'd say clearly no gods as I use it. <br />2. The scenario is as in the movie. Of course, there are beings who have no human bodies...but of course, their 'brains' (computers) exist outside; they create the simulation, or are part of it. <br />In the Bostrom case, they do not exist 'wholly in the simulation'. Their 'brains' (computers) are not there; they're made of different stuff, but hooked in a deception one way or another.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-23810618118819402202012-12-03T02:36:52.608-07:002012-12-03T02:36:52.608-07:00Crude: "Considering I've been stressing, ...<br />Crude: "Considering I've been stressing, this entire conversation, a primary emphasis on world creation at the least, I don't think I've been unclear on that front. Even in the very context of that conversation, I was addressing your 'puny' objection, not sacrificing the world building criterion."<br />Again, you never claimed that to be necessary. And you don't do it now, either. There was no need to sacrifice the criterion. <br /><br />Also, again, your first point about the threshold (various powers, capabilities, etc), was vague enough. <br /><br />But no point in going in circles about who misrepresented whom and when. It's all on record. <br /><br />Crude: "Incorrect.<br /><br />1) Re: Worlds like our own. It's question begging in this context to assume our world isn't simulated itself. Further, 'like our own' doesn't mean a 1:1 correspondence. If the world lacks an Angra, it doesn't suddenly not qualify. I think what I've meant by simulations is clear. "<br />No, it's not, since <i>we do not live in a Bostrom simulation</i>; I'm discussing the consequences of a scenario, not accepting it as a serious possibility. <br /><br />Crude: "2) It's not a deception, and your example helps demonstrate that. The inhabitants account for their observations in terms of a theory, and that theory may be wrong. But that doesn't make their observations 'deceptions'. It simply makes them wrong."<br />That's like saying that putting someone in a holodeck and make her believe she's outside it (as in many 'Star Trek' scenarios) is not a deception. But clearly it is. The simulation is programmed to deliberately make them see things that aren't there, and hold <i>false</i> beliefs even in the absence of epistemic error. Tricking someone into having false beliefs is a deception. <br /><br />Crude: "I've been doing this throughout the conversation: I've made it clear what I meant by a simulation, I've explained why said simulation would qualify, I've pointed at relevant historical standards. I've even rallied Dawkins for partial support in terms of properties."<br />Okay, you're saying that Dawkins beliefs support the simulation, or apparently, the creation of universes like ours by some beings. I do not see how you derive that. His position seems to be agnostic about it, but if you think some of his beliefs entail it, okay, please proceed. <br /><br />Crude: "I used the deism example as historical support for the claim that a being who creates a populated world is a deity, even while details about that deity (Does the deity care? Is he alone, or did he work as a team? What was his origin? Is he still around? Etc) were unsettled.<br /><br />You are asking me to provide a definition of deity - but I don't need an exhaustive definition for the purposes of my argument. I simply need to explain the threshold and defend it. I've done so. "<br />No, sorry. <br /><br />a. You made it very clear that the deistic creator was a god in the traditional sense you have in mind, regardless of how puny he was in his own universe. For instance, you said "Hume was able to be skeptical of many things about the creator of the world - imperfect, possibly immoral, possibly unlike us, possibly too much like us, possibly numerous rather than singular - but, from what I recall reading, at no point did he say 'and who knows, maybe the deity/deities created this world aren't deities'. <br /><br />b. Again, the condition you gave was that "Here's an example of a typical threshold I think one could and would use to establish a god: a being who is capable of creating populated planets and worlds like our own."<br /><br />The conclusion is clear, from that criterion. If, in the future, some human scientists found a way to make a universe", with planets, beings and all, then humans too would become gods, by your standard.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-75879964152460020372012-12-03T02:12:19.495-07:002012-12-03T02:12:19.495-07:00Crude: "Also, time to rally some Dawkins.&quo...<br />Crude: "Also, time to rally some Dawkins."<br />Which claims of yours you're trying to support by quoting him? <br /><br />Crude: "Some observations.<br /><br />1: "But the laws of probability..." And in an infinite multiverse with the right variation, the laws of probability are skunked."<br /><br /><br />a. Could you please explain what kind of <i>actually proposed</i> multiverse, other than a Tegmark level 4 multiverse, skunks them, and why? <br /><br />b. If the laws of probability are skunked, <i>it's game over</i>; belief in such infinite multiverse is epistemically suicidal. There is no need to go further, investigating gods. <br /><br />Crude: "2: The gods 'coming from somewhere' is not a concern. Remember: Zeus was a third generation (I believe) entity, whose ancestors were ultimately spawned from chaos."<br />Reminds me of some science fiction stories. <br />A more or less recent example: <br /> <br />The Ori (Stargate) had millions, or billions of worshipers. The heroes of the story told some of those people that the Ori weren't gods because they evolved from something like humans. Most people didn't believe it. One guy did, concluding they weren't gods. Similar claims were made earlier in the series about other beings. <br />Perhaps, the writers didn't have Zeus in mind. Or perhaps, the feel of a Zeus-like universe is different (who knows; the category 'god' is picked arbitrarily; it's 'something like that guy in that place, but not like that other guy, but like that other guy, etc.'). <br /><br />Crude: "3: So much for puny: Dawkins apparently doesn't agree. In fact, in this section, he refuses to make the argument that the properties are relevant. It's the provenance. And that distinction, I maintain, is pretty damn arbitrary."<br />I did not say that my intuitive usage matched Dawkins theory about the meaning, if he meant to propose one. <br /><br />Crude: "There's a lot more wrong with this little snippet of Dawkins' book, but those are the points I'll focus on.<br /><br />So what's Dawkins' move? He seems to concede right away the existence of god-like beings, who would seem godlike to us, in *this* universe. Putting aside questions of his credulity, he suggests that the key distinction that would make them 'not gods' is provenance: 'They had to come from somewhere.'<br /><br />But so did Zeus. So did Odin. So did plenty of other gods."<br />He does not make a mistake about what exists. If he's making a mistake on this particular issue (i.e., why they're not gods), it's about his theory about the meaning of 'god', assuming he's proposing such a theory. But if you're suggesting he's deliberately changing the meaning of 'god' from the way he understood the word before (or even changing it at all, deliberately or otherwise), you have a lot of work to do to support the claim. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-8131939503030495802012-12-03T01:43:29.430-07:002012-12-03T01:43:29.430-07:00Crude: "Actually, you've been saying that...Crude: "Actually, you've been saying that a being creating whole populated worlds of conscious beings, over whom he has ridiculous power, is not a god if he's 'puny' - and I've been pointing out the obvious problem that Zeus was entirely capable of being beaten up/tricked/etc (tricked by humans, no less), and that 'puniness' is a terrible measure to use, given technological advances both current and future."<br />1. The programmers of a Bostrom simulation of course can be so tricked, since they have no computing power in their brains to run the simulation, let alone do so consciously of all that's happening. Their gigantic computers can 'see' everything, but they can't. <br /><br />2. Yes, you have a different simulation in mind, but there is no condition (you didn't specify) that they can't be tricked. <br /><br />3. Again, comparing humans in our environment with Zeus in his, we're way puny. But I guess it's a moot point now. <br /><br />Crude: "My point about reduction to analytical claims actually isn't related to this conversation - obviously, since you've been devoting most of your time to disputing what I think is obvious. Really, the better route for you to go would be to deny that Zeus is a god, on the grounds that he was humiliated or beaten up multiple times, and gods shouldn't have such experiences."<br />Leaving aside your claim about what I devoted my time to, your suggestion of a 'better route' reveals that despite repeated clarifications, you're still attributing intentions and beliefs to me, which are not remotely related to the ones I have (also, unfortunately, this also gives more evidence to me that you actually believe that the debate is actually going your way, which makes the changes of an end in a reasonable amount of time diminish, unless I leave). <br /><br />Again, I do not care about the word 'god'. I dispute some of the points that are unsupported, or false. Obviously (to me), what looks obvious to me does not look not obvious to you. And vice versa. <br />Also, again, I use the word 'god' when others use it, but I would rather use more precise terms myself. I do not care much whether there was a shift in meaning in the way you say it. But you're making unsupported (or just false) claims, and we're stuck in this debate it seems. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-74115225044599722812012-12-03T01:42:40.089-07:002012-12-03T01:42:40.089-07:00Crude: "Also incorrect on several counts.
F...<br />Crude: "Also incorrect on several counts. <br /><br />First, you assume that investigation would make it 'obvious' that someone is living in a simulation. That requires them to be able to take a given anomaly and conclude 'Ah, I'm in a simulation!' Good luck trying to find an anomaly that would force that conclusion, as opposed to 'that's a weird fact of nature' or the like - other than a highly contrived example."<br />Well, obvious to some of those in the simulation, but <i>I was explaining Bostrom's scenario</i>. <br />If you want to change the argument, include beings who can't figure it out, etc., fine by me; now I get you have a different scenario in mind. <br />But the point remains that even if they can't figure it out, the simulation is hardly a universe. It's more like the Matrix. <br /><br />Crude: "Third, computing power varies depending on the universe in question - so 'not enough' is unsupported."<br />I was going by Bostrom's scenario (though he does seem to make an error; I think the scenario is self-defeating, but then, not my scenario). <br />So, okay, now I see you have in mind another simulation. But how does it <i>follow</i> from the premises of some atheists (who?) that those simulations would exist? <br /><br /><br />Crude: "Fourth, 'a universe' is not something that you can judge by (say) mass, such that it needs at least X amount of mass or it's not 'really' a universe."<br />A deceitful simulation does not seem to be one, but then, no definition of 'universe' was provided, either. Do you have any definition in mind? <br /><br />Crude: "There's no barrier to stacked simulations, so there's no problem here either."<br />I was explaining Bostrom's scenario, and actually, there is a barrier to stacked simulations, which is computing power in the base universe. <br /><br />Crude: "I'm not saying that there was a grand conspiracy theory in play. I'm pointing out that given A) people accepting gods like 'Zeus', etc, to be gods, B) given what we know about said gods, and C) given the sort of reality that would be in play given these simulations, that D) it's obvious, if they're <br />going to call Zeus a god for non-arbitrary reasons, these beings would be gods as well. It's a little like jaywalking. Someone may jaywalk and not know it's against the law. But when you tell them jaywalking is against the law and they do so anyway, or they try to BS, they're in a different position of culpability.<br />"<br />1. The category 'gods' seems to be arbitrarily defined, by similarity to some beings (like Zeus), in some environment. You've not provided reasons to conclude that that wasn't the case in the past. <br />2. But now you don't seem to be making a claim about a shift in meaning, but rather, a claim that the use of the word 'god' is somehow contradictory? (I'll ask for clarification). I do not know exactly what you mean there, but it's not clear at all that the arbitrariness of the definition is a recent development, or in any way related to atheists. <br />3. Let me make give an example. If Alice learns how to use the word 'god' by looking at some paradigmatic examples of gods (e.g., Zeus, Yahweh) and powerful non-gods (supervillains, Q,), then there is a pretty good chance that she will not regard programmers evolved from something like humans and who make a Matrix-like simulation gods, regardless of whether she believes in the existence of some powerful being. <br />4. Obvious to whom? <br />It's a very often a mistake to infer intent by thinking that what looks obvious to one will be obvious to others. For instance, it's obvious to me that Yahweh does not exist, and it looks obvious to me even if I try to put myself in the head of my Christian interlocutors (i.e., given what they seem to know, believe, etc.). <br />It's clear, however, that that does not look obvious to them. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-53873809558452738422012-12-03T01:34:05.823-07:002012-12-03T01:34:05.823-07:00So, given that, it seems that if, in the future, s...<i>So, given that, it seems that if, in the future, some human scientists found a way to make a universe", with planets, beings and all, then humans too would become gods, by your standard. </i><br /><br />You've already asked this, I've already answered. If you want to ask more questions, feel free, but this is simply not a new inquiry.<br /><br /><i>You haven't even proposed a definition of 'god'. You have proposed a sufficient criterion, and a vaguer also sufficient criterion. Your criterion does not seem intuitively plausible to me. </i><br /><br />As above, I don't need an exhaustive definition - the criterion does the trick. You say the criterion isn't plausible to you intuitively - that's fine. I think your intuition should be trumped by the historical considerations and the context. If it's not, so be it - I never get into these discussions where 'convince the other person' is the make or break.<br /><br /><i>However, a simulated universe is not a universe; Bostrom simulations are simulations, but they're deceptions, not universes, even if the deceptions are populated by mindful beings. It's more like The Matrix.</i><br /><br />This is like saying that a multiverse is technically a single universe, just with a larger scale and different features than originally conceived. Technically true, in practice irrelevant.<br /><br /><i>The programmers of the Matrix do not seem to meet your threshold, but then, you did not offer a necessary condition for godhood, but only a sufficient one. Would you call the programmers of the Matrix 'gods', by the usage of 'god' that you defend?</i><br /><br />Depends. Are the inhabitants of the Matrix exclusively embodied beings who were put in there via a neural hookup? Grey area. Are there inhabitants of the Matrix who exist wholly in the simulation and are mindful beings, etc? Then sure - that's just a Bostrom simulation with additional inhabitants.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-69521606448504784902012-12-03T01:34:00.858-07:002012-12-03T01:34:00.858-07:00There is no deliberate misrepresentation of what y...<i>There is no deliberate misrepresentation of what you said. Your claim was about Zeus' powers over his surroundings, which you obviously compared negatively to ours. Also, your first point about the threshold (various powers, capabilities, etc), was vague enough. </i><br /><br />Considering I've been stressing, this entire conversation, a primary emphasis on world creation at the least, I don't think I've been unclear on that front. Even in the very context of that conversation, I was addressing your 'puny' objection, not sacrificing the world building criterion.<br /><br /><i>That was your second proposal, this time about a specific threshold, which was apparently a sufficient but not necessary condition (e.g., you accept Loki, who does not meet the standard). </i><br /><br />I accept Loki and point out others accept Loki. I was giving a sufficient condition for godhood in this conversation, and that sufficient condition is the same I've been suggesting throughout this conversation.<br /><br /><i>The programmers in the Bostrom scenario do not meet that threshold (at least, it does not follow from their capability for making the Bostrom simulation), since they're not creating planets and worlds like our own. They're creating a deception. For example, the simulated people believe that they can see the microscopic structure of their world, but that's just because the computer adjusts a little and creates the microscopic details when someone is about to attempt to look.</i><br /><br />Incorrect.<br /><br />1) Re: Worlds like our own. It's question begging in this context to assume our world isn't simulated itself. Further, 'like our own' doesn't mean a 1:1 correspondence. If the world lacks an Angra, it doesn't suddenly not qualify. I think what I've meant by simulations is clear.<br /><br />2) It's not a deception, and your example helps demonstrate that. The inhabitants account for their observations in terms of a theory, and that theory may be wrong. But that doesn't make their observations 'deceptions'. It simply makes them wrong.<br /><br /><i>As I said, I would ask you to please describe the simulation, who has beliefs that support it, and explain why those beliefs support it.</i><br /><br />I've been doing this throughout the conversation: I've made it clear what I meant by a simulation, I've explained why said simulation would qualify, I've pointed at relevant historical standards. I've even rallied Dawkins for partial support in terms of properties.<br /><br /><i>While you mentioned sometimes having power inside the simulation, that was not part of that threshold, as you originally proposed it. You even offered Deism as an example, obviously implying that a deistic creator would be a god in the sense you have in mind. But you added that the power that the god in question might have in his own realm would not prevent him from meeting it, so any level of power (even human power in his environment) would do. Yet, deism does not require that God has power inside the universe, either. </i><br /><br />I used the deism example as historical support for the claim that a being who creates a populated world is a deity, even while details about that deity (Does the deity care? Is he alone, or did he work as a team? What was his origin? Is he still around? Etc) were unsettled.<br /><br />You are asking me to provide a definition of deity - but I don't need an exhaustive definition for the purposes of my argument. I simply need to explain the threshold and defend it. I've done so.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-58405146780988577682012-12-03T00:56:14.152-07:002012-12-03T00:56:14.152-07:00Crude: "I think that many people tend to thin...Crude: "I think that many people tend to think of aliens or gods as an either-or proposition, wrongly."<br />Yes, I do get that you think that. <br />I'm asking whether you think that if they say "they're not gods, they're aliens", in the context in which you considered that, they just mean to say "they're not gods, they're beings not from Earth" <br />I guess that may be so, but in that case, their error would appear completely transparent. Still possible, though. <br /><br />Crude: "First off, with regards to atheists, my point has been that atheists trivially grant that Zeus, etc, are gods, while often granting two particular points which, if granted, would absolutely lead them to conclude that gods do exist, given what I think is the definition of 'god' you have left over from analyzing those who they do accept as gods."<br />You haven't even proposed a definition of 'god'. You have proposed a sufficient criterion, and a vaguer also sufficient criterion. Your criterion does not seem intuitively plausible to me. <br /><br />Crude: "As for simulations, I've spelled out, clearly, just what I'm talking about. Are you truly saying that the meaning of the word 'simulation' still eludes you, despite talking about it with me at length for days now?"<br />You brought up Bostrom scenarios, but later you said that what you meant is "A simulated universe populated by mindful beings". <br />However, a simulated universe is not a universe; Bostrom simulations are simulations, but they're deceptions, not universes, even if the deceptions are populated by mindful beings. It's more like The Matrix.<br />The programmers of the Matrix do not seem to meet your threshold, but then, you did not offer a necessary condition for godhood, but only a sufficient one. Would you call the programmers of the Matrix 'gods', by the usage of 'god' that you defend? <br />Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-50818928974241249892012-12-03T00:55:56.656-07:002012-12-03T00:55:56.656-07:00Crude: "That is a complete, and in my view in...Crude: "That is a complete, and in my view intentional, misrepresentation of what I said. It's not like I've been assigning a numerical power list and, oops, looks like we've gone past it. I was replying to your claim that humans are 'puny'."<br /><br />There is no deliberate misrepresentation of what you said. Your claim was about Zeus' powers over his surroundings, which you obviously compared negatively to ours. Also, your first point about the threshold (various powers, capabilities, etc), was vague enough. Given that, I was saying that that level of power would make us gods. It was a reasonable interpretation, even if I may have got it wrong. <br /><br />Crude: "My standard has been consistent throughout this discussion: a being capable of creating a world populated by beings, etc. In response you said that wouldn't count because, in addition to having that power, Zeus had power over his environment and that we're puny. I pointed out that THAT variety of power is a relative case, and that no, we're not 'puny' in comparison to Zeus."<br /><br />That was your second proposal, this time about a specific threshold, which was apparently a sufficient but not necessary condition (e.g., you accept Loki, who does not meet the standard). <br /><br />But alright, let's take a closer look at that threshold ("an example of a typical threshold I think one could and would use to establish a god: a being who is capable of creating populated planets and worlds like our own"). <br /><br />1. The programmers in the Bostrom scenario do <i>not</i> meet that threshold (at least, it does not follow from their capability for making the Bostrom simulation), since they're not creating planets and worlds like our own. They're creating a <i>deception</i>. For example, the simulated people believe that they can see the microscopic structure of their world, but that's just because the computer adjusts a little and creates the microscopic details when someone is about to attempt to look. <br />Yes, now you'd said that you have a different simulation in mind. As I said, I would ask you to please describe the simulation, who has beliefs that support it, and explain why those beliefs support it. <br /><br />2. While you mentioned sometimes having power <i>inside</i> the simulation, that was not part of that threshold, as you originally proposed it. You even offered Deism as an example, obviously implying that a deistic creator would be a god in the sense you have in mind. But you added that the power that the god in question might have in his own realm would not prevent him from meeting it, so any level of power (even human power in his environment) would do. Yet, deism does not require that God has power inside the universe, either. <br /><br />So, given that, it seems that if, in the future, some human scientists found a way to <a href="http://arstechnica.com/science/2006/08/5027/" rel="nofollow">make a universe"</a>, with planets, beings and all, then humans too would become gods, by your standard. <br /><br />Given 1. and 2., the Bostrom scenario seem an irrelevant issue, when it comes to assessing godhood by your proposed criterion. <br /><br />Crude: "Incorrect on two counts: first, the simulation is 'not very limited' in the context I'm discussing."<br />Well, then please explain what your simulation is, which premises support it, and who has them. But let me point out that you brought up Bostrom simulations, and those do not imply having any great power in their universe. <br />Then again, in light of 1. and 2. above, it seems it's a moot point. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-65826695805050215632012-12-03T00:24:23.584-07:002012-12-03T00:24:23.584-07:00Also, time to rally some Dawkins.
With emphasis a...Also, time to rally some Dawkins.<br /><br />With emphasis added by me. Any spelling errors, likely due to me.<br /><br /><i>Whether we ever get to know about them or not, there are very probably alien civilizations that are superhuman, <b>to the point of being god-like in ways that exceed anything a theologian could possibly imagine</b>. Their technical achievements would seem as supernatural to us as ours would seem to a Dark Age peasant transported to the twenty-first century. Imagine his response to a laptop computer, a mobile telephone, a hydrogen bomb or a jumbo jet. As Arthur C. Clarke put it, in his Third Law: 'Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.' The miracles wrought by our technology would have seemed to the ancients no less remarkable than tales of Moses parting the waters, or Jesus walking upon them. <b>The aliens of our SETI signal would be to us like gods</b>, just as missionaries were treated as gods (and exploited the undeserved honor to the hilt) when they turned up in Stone Age cultures bearing guns, telescopes, matches, and almanacs predicting eclipses to the second.<br /><br />In what sense, then, would the most advanced SETI aliens not be gods? In what sense would they be superhuman but not supernatural? In a very important sense, which goes to the heart of this book. The crucial differences between god-like extraterrestrials lies not in their properties <b>but in their provenance</b>. Entities that are complex enough to be intelligent are products of an evolutionary process. <b>No matter how god-like they may seem when we encounter them, they didn't start that way.</b> Science-fiction authors, such as Daniel F. Galouye in Counterfield World, have even suggested (and I cannot think how to disprove it) that we live in a computer simulation, set up by some vastly superior civilization. But the simulators themselves would have to come from somewhere. <b>The laws of probability forbid all notions of their spontaneously appearing without simpler antecedents.</b> They probably owe their existence to a (perhaps unfamiliar) version of Darwinian evolution: some sort of cumulatively ratcheting 'crane' as opposed to 'skyhook', to use Daniel Dennett's terminology. Skyhooks - including all gods - are mgic spells. They do no bona fide explanatory work and demand more explanation than they provide. Cranes are explanatory devices that actually do explain. Natural selection is the champion crane of all time.</i><br /><br />Some observations.<br /><br />1: "But the laws of probability..." And in an infinite multiverse with the right variation, the laws of probability are skunked.<br /><br />2: The gods 'coming from somewhere' is not a concern. Remember: Zeus was a third generation (I believe) entity, whose ancestors were ultimately spawned from chaos.<br /><br />3: So much for puny: Dawkins apparently doesn't agree. In fact, in this section, he refuses to make the argument that the properties are relevant. It's the provenance. And that distinction, I maintain, is pretty damn arbitrary.<br /><br />There's a lot more wrong with this little snippet of Dawkins' book, but those are the points I'll focus on.<br /><br />So what's Dawkins' move? He seems to concede right away the existence of god-like beings, who would seem godlike to us, in *this* universe. Putting aside questions of his credulity, he suggests that the key distinction that would make them 'not gods' is provenance: 'They had to come from somewhere.'<br /><br />But so did Zeus. So did Odin. So did plenty of other gods.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.com