tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post1940912956077992554..comments2024-03-18T11:10:18.708-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: Is the mental on the ground floor? Victor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger118125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-47850825867081108882013-11-12T05:26:04.868-07:002013-11-12T05:26:04.868-07:00Excellent effort to make this blog more wonderful ...Excellent effort to make this blog more wonderful and attractive. <a href="http://www.hamptons.co.uk/forsaleoffice/liphook/1583/" rel="nofollow">Cadee</a><br />Sir Thomahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15455424040876102961noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-70303203322646731792013-04-07T07:33:52.733-07:002013-04-07T07:33:52.733-07:00It doesn't say anything that contradicts anyth...It doesn't say anything that contradicts anything I've said. There are a few defenders of reductive physicalism, but in philosophy, <i>nothing</i> is ever truly dead in the way it is in science. But as far as philosophy goes, identity theory is dead. And with good reason. Do you <i>really</i> think it plausible that only human beings can have minds, and <i>nothing</i> else can? Does that even seem prima facie plausible at all? <br /><br />And see Kripke's argument that actually logically refutes it, without multiple realizability. Double shot to the head. Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-38937726838169631882013-04-07T07:01:01.655-07:002013-04-07T07:01:01.655-07:00Not based on authority of Talbot, but on the argum...Not based on authority of Talbot, but on the arguments against it. Multiple realizability has been empirically confirmed (brain cells can pick up the slack left when other brain cells are damaged; different brain cells are found to play the same role in different species; etc). If you think its reasonable to believe, before empirically confirming it, that aliens and A.I. can never have mental events, that only humans can, then go right ahead and be a reductive physicalist. You'll be an outlier, but have fun.<br /><br />Also, see Kripke's argument against it, in the Oxford seminar. Talbot doesn't even make mention of multiple realizability in her seminar.<br /><br />Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-53227143056990691412013-04-07T05:13:14.967-07:002013-04-07T05:13:14.967-07:00Zach,
>such arguments have been long refuted
...Zach,<br /><br />>such arguments have been long refuted<br /><br />I'm sorry, but this is just completely false. Most physicalists are now non-reductive physicalists, due partially to Hilary Putnam's argument.<br /><br />See <a href="http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/part-1-identity-theory-and-why-it-wont-work-slides-document" rel="nofollow">here</a> for an Oxford University seminar on reductive physicalism and it's failure. Marianne Talbot calls it one of the shortest lived theories in philosophy.Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-27175337127478210672013-04-07T01:49:30.164-07:002013-04-07T01:49:30.164-07:00Errata: insert "the arguments" between &...Errata: insert "the arguments" between 'see' and 'diverge' in the 2nd sentence; and insert "immaterial" between 'fundamental' and 'components?' At the end of the first paragraph. c emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04148726859110510447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-90481988500639846532013-04-07T01:41:27.928-07:002013-04-07T01:41:27.928-07:00I arrive late to many parades, as I have here. I f...I arrive late to many parades, as I have here. I found it very interesting to see diverge or converge. Can anyone tell me at what point(s), if any, VR and Nagel disagree or diverge as to the notion that the 'mental' may have non-materialist but reductionist properties all to itself? That's my take on <i>Mind and Cosmos</i>, but I'm not sure Dr. Reppert reduces consciousness or the mental to more fundamental components? <br /><br />Meanwhile, Prof. Oerter has just raised a different possible take on dividing the supernatural into two possible categories (overnatural and transnatural) - Supernatural Times Two:<br />http://somewhatabnormal.blogspot.com/2013/04/supernatural-times-two.htmlc emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04148726859110510447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-49552398266374893572013-04-06T21:47:25.936-07:002013-04-06T21:47:25.936-07:00Martin wrote:
Reduction says that the mind IS the ...Martin wrote:<br /><i>Reduction says that the mind IS the brain, in the way your article says. But this form of materialism is dead and buried, and has been so since the 1970s. Look up Hilary Putnam and "multiple realizability" if you don't believe me. </i><br /><br />Martin, such arguments have been long refuted, so no. It is not dead. It is quite alive. Even if it is wrong, it is alive. A cursory Google search should be sufficient. Or look up Polgar, Bickle, etc.. <br /><br />Bringing up old 1970s rejected arguments...not very impressive my old friend from the West.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-39256965798054656972013-04-05T13:16:52.590-07:002013-04-05T13:16:52.590-07:00>Do you not believe and agree with the views yo...>Do you not believe and agree with the views you have been expressing? If you do, then how can you not take intellectual responsibility for them? <br /><br />I believe and agree with the classifications of the various positions, because I defer to the expertise of professional in the field. I have no way of knowing that elephants and hyraxes are related, but I accept that they are because biologists, experts in the field, tell me they are.<br /><br />Which one of these is correct? I have no idea. If I were forced to give an answer, I'd say some form of hylomorphism is most plausible to me. Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-8500088881325662832013-04-05T12:38:27.690-07:002013-04-05T12:38:27.690-07:00Am I the only one here who thinks that the No True...Am I the only one here who thinks that the No True Scotsman Fallacy is not a fallacy? After all, the old man was right. No "True" Scotsman would have done such a deed.<br /><br />Can't argue with that!B. Prokophttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10548980245078214688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-26512251976778974122013-04-05T11:31:39.888-07:002013-04-05T11:31:39.888-07:00>Looks like you are making the true Scotsman fa...>Looks like you are making the true Scotsman fallacy.<br /><br />By "me" you of course mean "every philosophy of mind textbook I have", because as I said, nothing here is from me. <br /><br />>And it certainly is not meaningless to be an anti-supernaturalist which is the type of physicalism that Dupre (and myself and many others) think is warranted. For then one can reject the claim that "the mental is on the ground floor."<br /><br />It's far from clear what these terms naturalism and supernaturalism even mean. David Chalmers accepts that the mental is on the ground floor, as a kind of "element" alongside quarks and electrons and other elements. He thinks it's just one more thing alongside others that science can study. Yet, he is a non-theist and rejects personal immortality. Is he a "supernaturalist?" I have no idea. The terms are so vague that I don't think anyone's been able to give a good definition of them.<br /><br />>You really need to take a look at that article I linked to on consciousness above if you wish to address my position and not a strawman version of it.<br /><br />I'm not really addressing your position so much as I am simplifying what, according to my textbooks, physicalism means and what, again according to my textbooks, the position you and Dupre describe fits with. <br /><br />If my books say that one form of property dualism is "emergence", and that this positions says that non-physical properties of the mind rise up out of the structure of the brain, then that is how all my books describe property dualism.<br /><br />If you don't like that, then take it up with the field. Not me. Nothing I've said here is even slightly original to me.Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-9443685525662544912013-04-05T10:52:07.481-07:002013-04-05T10:52:07.481-07:00Then their definition of physicalism is very broad...Then their definition of physicalism is very broad. So broad as to be almost meaningless. According to my textbook (several of them, in fact), physicalism means that everything is describable in terms of the concepts and terms used by the physical sciences. <br /><br />If one accepts the real existence of forms above and beyond those described by physical sciences, then one is not a physicalist. If one accepts the real existence of properties above and beyond those described by the physical sciences, then one is not a physicalist.<br /><br />This not per me, this is per several of my philosophy of mind textbooks I have at home.<br /><br />By accepting form, Dupre is falling under either the property dualist or the hylomorphist point of view, whether he realizes and accepts that or not.<br /><br />According to the definition given in the video, it seems like it is the usual misunderstanding of dualism and other theories, where they thing that dualists are saying that there is another kind of very thin stuff, like ectoplasm or something. Which is not accurate, and is really just another form of materialism (ectoplasm being just another kind of unusual matter). The materialists are transforming dualism into a kind-of materialism, because they can't think outside the box that everything must be made of "stuff", whether quarks or ectoplasm.Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-18037344705872541702013-04-05T10:13:59.160-07:002013-04-05T10:13:59.160-07:00>Do you deny that he is a physicalist?
Yes. In...>Do you deny that he is a physicalist?<br /><br />Yes. In fact, he explicitly states it right here: "But the explanation of mind does not, of course, lie in matter but in form."<br /><br />If he believes in matter + form, then he is, by definition, a hylomorphist (hyle means "matter", and morph means "form"). This is Aristotle's viewpoint, and so he parts ways with both dualists and materialists. Materialists deny the existence of form/structure above the level of what physical science tells us exists (Higgs field, quarks, etc).<br /><br />This is what Feser is always saying. The only way to make the physicalist viewpoint even remotely plausible is to surreptitiously pull from the Aristotelian side of the fence, without naming it of course. <br /><br />Or, alternatively, he is a property dualist because he specifically states this as well: "It is then the relations that these forms make possible with other molecules and then up the scale of increasing complexity that underlie the emergence of the capacities that so impress us."<br /><br />I could not have described property dualism better myself. The structure or form of the brain gives rise to new properties that are not the properties of matter or physical science (such as qualia, intentionality, etc).<br /><br />He may label himself a physicalist, but the words he speaks makes it clear he is either an Aristotelian or a property dualist.<br />Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-20426996162027856232013-04-05T08:48:53.633-07:002013-04-05T08:48:53.633-07:00I don't know what to tell you. Those are right...I don't know what to tell you. Those are right out of (several) philosophy of mind textbooks. I didn't make up those categorizations. I'm just repeating them here. If you have a problem, take it up with the field, not me.<br /><br />The video you linked to doesn't seem to dispute it. Reduction vs non-reduction. <br /><br />Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-58754151117651868052013-04-05T08:27:12.539-07:002013-04-05T08:27:12.539-07:00The options are:
A. Physicalism
1. Reductive (Ide...The options are:<br /><br />A. Physicalism<br />1. Reductive (Identity theory, behaviorism)<br />2. Non-reductive (Functionalism, anomalous monism, supervenience)<br />3. Eliminativism<br /><br />B. Dualism<br />1. Substance Dualism<br />2. Property Dualism (Emergence, epiphenomenalism)<br /><br />C. Non-Standard<br />1. Hylomorphism<br />2. Pessimism<br />3. Instrumentalism<br /><br />If you accept emergence (non-physical properties arise out of an arrangement of physical matter), then you fall under category B2, not anything in A.<br /><br />See <a href="http://rocketphilosophy.blogspot.com/2012/07/materialism-of-mind-list-of-theories.html" rel="nofollow">here</a> for my blog with more details on physicalism, and <a href="http://rocketphilosophy.blogspot.com/2012/09/dualism-list-of-theories.html" rel="nofollow">here</a> for more details on dualism.<br /><br />Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-86220703458771916252013-04-05T08:07:49.353-07:002013-04-05T08:07:49.353-07:00If entirely novel properties are produced by the b...If entirely novel properties are produced by the brain (properties that are not described by physical science), then this is property dualism, by definition.<br /><br />And the argument from intentionality is an attempt to show that physicalism is false. If property dualism is true, then physicalism is false, by definition.Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-70373874337181291512013-04-05T07:08:11.196-07:002013-04-05T07:08:11.196-07:00>You still have not addressed my point that whe...>You still have not addressed my point that when matter takes on new forms and relationships it also exhibits new capacities or properties.<br /><br />That sounds like you are talking about emergence, which is property dualism, and that would be thus to concede the argument.Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-84737601095038146302013-04-05T06:30:57.372-07:002013-04-05T06:30:57.372-07:00>Why should there be?
Well, I just gave one e...>Why should there be? <br /><br />Well, I just gave one example: if there is no teleology at all on the lower levels, then they can't pass any intentionality "up". And so the higher levels don't have it either. <br /><br />See <a href="http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/11/original-and-derived-intentionality-circles-and-regresses.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>.<br /><br />"The point is quite simple. If the regress terminates with base entities utterly devoid of intentonality, then no higher level entities will be intentional. For the higher-ups get their intentionality only from the ones lower down in the hierarchy. If the ones at the very bottom have no intentionality, then they can't transmit it up. But if, on the other hand, the ones at the very bottom possess intentionality, then it is false that all intentionality is derived."Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-46818332524968374922013-04-05T05:58:31.392-07:002013-04-05T05:58:31.392-07:00Hal,
Martin's statement is just a blatant cas...Hal,<br /><br />Martin's statement is just a blatant case of the fallacy of composition.<br /><br />I, or my dog, can act with a purpose. But that does not mean that my atoms are acting with a purpose.BeingItselfhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13196126096999779200noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-34710220731929653862013-04-04T18:07:46.401-07:002013-04-04T18:07:46.401-07:00im: the random number has no meaning (beyond its ...im: the random number has no meaning (beyond its value) except when the meaning is assigned by a mind. I would add that the generation of the random number was probably arranged by a mind, so even then the number's being a value within certain parameters is dependent on a mind or minds. The computer has no meaning except as designed or assigned by a mind. Williamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12533263841520213358noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-19288802311933183382013-04-04T16:02:34.173-07:002013-04-04T16:02:34.173-07:00"But I couldn't even get you to understan..."But I couldn't even get you to understand even the problem. I don't know why."<br /><br />I couldn't get you to understand what I had to say about it. And I think I know why.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-34907883518423878532013-04-04T15:55:20.948-07:002013-04-04T15:55:20.948-07:00You didn't try at all. You failed to understan...You didn't try at all. You failed to understand the simplest philosophy 101 problem. And the thing is, I wasn't even trying to get you to believe that physicalism is wrong. I was just trying to describe the basic puzzle that ALL physicalist philosophers accept and try to solve through various means. Dan Dennet, Jaegwon Kim, you name it. If they are a professional in philosophy of mind, they are aware of the problem of intentionality and as a result offer up their own solutions.<br /><br />But I couldn't even get you to understand even the <i>problem</i>. I don't know why.<br /><br />Why do you participate on these blogs if you are incapable of even understanding the simplest ideas?Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-57394676807289046562013-04-04T15:49:43.278-07:002013-04-04T15:49:43.278-07:00Sorry I tried.Sorry I tried.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-81975747505306352122013-04-04T15:24:42.615-07:002013-04-04T15:24:42.615-07:00>And that wasn't even relevant to my refuta...>And that wasn't even relevant to my refutation<br /><br />You didn't make a refutation because you never even understood the basic point.<br /><br />The rocker only means "1" or "0" because the outside intelligence assigned that meaning to an otherwise meaningless hunk of wood, or logic gate.<br /><br />So it does no good to point to computers as an example of a physical mind, because the circuits inside of them do not refer to anything (such as "1" or "0") in virtue of just their physical properties. They require users to assign the meaning of "1" or "0" to them when they first designed them.<br /><br />>I repeatedly pointed out. I was talking about the meaning (or lack of meaning) of a random number, and the fact that that number refers to something. <br /><br />Numbers do not refer to things. Symbols (such as "4") refer to numbers, but numbers themselves don't refer to anything. Your point here doesn't even make sense.<br /><br />>So just keep babbling about the electrical state of transistors.<br /><br />It's extremely relevant to the point. Electrical circuits are just that: electrical. Electrons move this and that, but they don't <b>mean</b> anything unless someone says "Hey, these electrons over here will mean '1', and these electrons over here will mean '0'".<br /><br />So by accusing me of "babbling", you are in fact ignoring and obfuscating the point.<br /><br />>You aren't even beginning to address the issue I have raised.<br /><br />You haven't raised any issue at all. You keep mixing up the word "meaning" to think that it means "meaning in a larger context". You don't even understand the simplest and most basic point: that physical matter only has meaning (in the sense that it is a symbol, or representation, of something else; like when a logic circuit <b>means</b> 1) if someone assigns that meaning to it.<br /><br />>A reasonable person might even get the impression that you don't understand it.<br /><br />You don't understand anything I've said so far.Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-66252441367454674722013-04-04T15:12:44.515-07:002013-04-04T15:12:44.515-07:00"I'm ONLY talking about how the rocker (o..."I'm ONLY talking about how the rocker (or logic gate) can have the meaning "1" rather than "0". How it can have any meaning at all."<br /><br />And that wasn't even relevant to my refutation, as I repeatedly pointed out. I was talking about the meaning (or lack of meaning) of a random number, and the fact that that number refers to something. So just keep babbling about the electrical state of transistors. You aren't even beginning to address the issue I have raised. A reasonable person might even get the impression that you don't understand it.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-35236907141985509492013-04-04T15:00:47.113-07:002013-04-04T15:00:47.113-07:00>So what's the meaning of the random number...>So what's the meaning of the random number that has supposedly been "derived from an external intelligence"?<br /><br />I told you, at least five times now, that I'm not talking about "meaning in a larger context." <br /><br />I'm ONLY talking about how the rocker (or logic gate) can have the meaning "1" rather than "0". How it can have any meaning at all.<br /><br />And the answer is: because a designer assigned that meaning to the rocker.<br /><br />Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.com