tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post1694527404407089329..comments2024-03-27T15:34:14.749-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: If Physicalism Then DeterminismVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger46125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-78641916154432613092016-07-26T09:36:23.896-07:002016-07-26T09:36:23.896-07:00@David Brightly:
"That the glass beaks seems...@David Brightly:<br /><br />"That the glass beaks seems to be a necessary consequence of the physical. But aren't I responsible for breaking the glass? If it were your glass, I'd apologise. So can we bring out the sense of the quoted sentence so as to make it true? I contend that this requires considerable expansion on the meaning of 'responsible', which is where I came in."<br /><br />And I contend that I have already addressed this; but it is now obvious that you are not addressing or responding to me (or anyone recognizable actually) so there is nothing to add.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-49941190270979919552016-07-26T05:52:02.585-07:002016-07-26T05:52:02.585-07:00David Brightly: "Nobody has explained why, in...<b>David Brightly:</b> "<i>Nobody has explained why, in a causally closed physicalistic world, provided that this allows thought and feeling, there cannot be creatures like us whose lives are guided by conceptions of choice and responsibility. I agree it's a big proviso, but that's altogether another question.</i>"<br /><br />This absurdity, this anti-logical and anti-ratiional bullshit, never stops with these people. <br /><br />Time and time again, many ot the "theists" who comment here have <i>explained</i> just why it is that "<i>in a causally closed physicalistic world ... there cannot be creatures like us whose lives are guided by conceptions of choice and responsibility</i>"<br /><br />So, how does the "high-information" 'atheist' deal with these many arguments, over many months and years, showing that his worldview is utterly false to what we *all* know to be true about our own individual selves? Why, he just ramps up the illogic -- "<i>Nobody has explained why, in a causally closed physicalistic world, [if we assert that 'causally closed physicalistic world' does not entail absolute determinism], there cannot be creatures like us whose lives are guided by conceptions of choice and responsibility. I agree it's a big proviso, but that's altogether another question.</i>"<br /><br />Well, yes. If we assert that '<i>A</i>' = '<i>not-A</i>', then we can "reason" our way to any "conclusion" that we wish.<br /><br />These "high-information" pretend-atheists are not <i>stupid</i>, and they are not <i>ignorant</i> ... they are <i>intellectually dishonest</i>.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-64170535280261672242016-07-26T05:12:07.241-07:002016-07-26T05:12:07.241-07:00OK. Let's not pursue the relevance question. ...OK. Let's not pursue the relevance question. One difficulty we face is that Victor's argument is highly compressed. He says, <i>Nor are we responsible for the necessary consequences of the physical.</i> I think this must be intended as a common assumption concerning our nature and the physical and some sense of 'responsibility'. Suppose I drop a glass a metre above a stone floor. That the glass beaks seems to be a necessary consequence of the physical. But aren't I responsible for breaking the glass? If it were your glass, I'd apologise. So can we bring out the sense of the quoted sentence so as to make it true? I contend that this requires considerable expansion on the meaning of 'responsible', which is where I came in.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-5609751635191976222016-07-26T03:54:05.587-07:002016-07-26T03:54:05.587-07:00@David Brightly:
"I have put forward two sen...@David Brightly:<br /><br />"I have put forward two senses for 'responsibility'. Now we have in addition 'moral responsibility' and 'true responsibility'. Yet we can show that, in an argument leading to paradox, there is no equivocation on 'responsibility'?"<br /><br />If this is in response to what I wrote, there is really nothing to add to what I said earlier because whatever it is, it is not an actual response.<br /><br />But I will still add this. So *you* makle (an irrelevant) distinction between two senses of responsibility (I have not added any, contrary to what you *seem* to be implying) and on that count charge the OP with "equivocation"? Methinks that you do not know how equivocation works.<br /><br />"Nobody has explained why, in a causally closed physicalistic world, provided that this allows thought and feeling, there cannot be creatures like us whose lives are guided by conceptions of choice and responsibility."<br /><br />Are you asking why in a "causally closed physicalistic world", provided it allows for selves with rational thought and choice (for reasons I will not go over, rational though is the pre-condition, both necessary and sufficient, for Free Will), there cannot be creatures like us, selves with the capacity for thought and the power of choice? What type of answer are you expecting?grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-76654174568627674822016-07-26T03:06:23.979-07:002016-07-26T03:06:23.979-07:00'Weak responsibility', aka 'cause'...'Weak responsibility', aka 'cause', is irrelevant? Can A be responsible for B without some causal connection between them? Example? <br /><br />I have put forward two senses for 'responsibility'. Now we have in addition 'moral responsibility' and 'true responsibility'. Yet we can show that, in an argument leading to paradox, there is no equivocation on 'responsibility'? <br /><br />Nobody has explained why, in a causally closed physicalistic world, provided that this allows thought and feeling, there cannot be creatures like us whose lives are guided by conceptions of choice and responsibility. I agree it's a big proviso, but that's altogether another question.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-76345299807507851732016-07-23T06:20:09.438-07:002016-07-23T06:20:09.438-07:00@David Brightly:
"The weak sense of 'cho...@David Brightly:<br /><br />"The weak sense of 'choice' is the objective one I outlined above. The bacterium can swim towards the light or away from the light. Depending on circumstance, it chooses one or the other. The weak sense of 'responsible for' is 'causes', as when I say that my neighbour's leylandii are responsible for the arid patch on my side of the garden fence."<br /><br />From which it entails that every substance with causal powers (that is everything, from an electron to a human being) is responsible in the weak sense, ergo the weak sense is irrelevant, contrary to your expectation.<br /><br />And it is irrelevant for a second reason; your neighbor is a cause but an *instrumental* one (on naturalism). His actions, his causal power, is made possible and actual, by causes external to him and in principle traceable back to the Big Bang. If I coerce your neighbor to kill you, your neighbor is still the cause of your death, but moral responsability lies on me, which is precisely what you cannot say. By the same logic, on physicalism, no one is truly responsible for their actions. And this shows by the way, why there is no equivocation going on in Victor's post.<br /><br />Now you could object here that your neighbor, in being coerced, was acting against his will so there is a difference. But to justify that difference you need what you yourself called the "strong" sense of responsability. And even then it does *not* work, because on naturalism your wills and desires are also determined by forces external to you.<br /><br />"Our ordinary conception of ourselves is intrinsically dualistic, with a physical component and a mental component. The mental component may supervene on the physical but we cannot see how. We observe ourselves making choices and being responsible for actions (weak senses) but have no understanding of how this happens. Accordingly, we postulate an entity outside the physical realm that is the source of choice and responsibility."<br /><br />In here it is summarized with uncommon clarity why both naturalism and Cartesian dualism are really siblings, the daughter of the same error (roughly, a mechanist conception of the universe at large, and of human nature in general). Cartesians posit a *proper* part of the human being, necessarily immaterial, as the seat of the mental powers. The naturalist, a dualist of sorts, takes the brain, a *proper* part of the human being, and endows it with magical properties that allows him to be the seat of our rational capacities.<br /><br />A pox on both houses.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-69087772051047831682016-07-23T05:48:22.965-07:002016-07-23T05:48:22.965-07:00These are hard questions. Some initial thoughts: ...These are hard questions. Some initial thoughts: We praise and blame very little children when they do and don't say their pleases and thankyous, but this is surely more akin to conditioning by reward and punishment, with smiles and glowers being instinctively understood as such. This would be the weak sense of praise and blame. At some point in our childhood we 'get' the concept of being an autonomous individual with free will and I suspect the strong adult concepts of praise and blame are somehow dependent on this earlier notion. Similarly, I think that as young children we must simply accept what parents and others tell us and act on it. At some point we 'get' the concept that we are agents acting on beliefs largely supplied by others, and that we can be deceived by them, for good or ill. We lose our innocence. From then on we are cautious and seek ways of verifying what we learn by description from others. So there is a weak sense of belief as some internal representation that somehow guides action and a strong sense in which I recognise my belief as mine, that I can hold it up and examine it, and maybe discard it and even challenge its source.<br /><br />I think it's a mistake to see these strong senses, under the pressure of physicalism, as illusory. That's not the right word. They are no more illusory than are the colour and solidity of Eddington's table under pressure from the scientific image. They are the concepts in which are lives are immersed and without which we can hardly be. Maybe we are obliged to be dualists in some sense, but not Cartesians.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-86372105237000427412016-07-22T12:43:26.021-07:002016-07-22T12:43:26.021-07:00But can you support concepts such as praiseworthin...But can you support concepts such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness on the "weak" sense?<br />Can you support the idea of "belief based on evidence" in this way? I don't think so. Strict naturalism is bound to treat the strong sense as an illusion. Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-74195150205063473622016-07-21T05:23:38.528-07:002016-07-21T05:23:38.528-07:00Getting back to the main argument, here is a sugge...Getting back to the main argument, here is a suggestion that may be relevant: the terms 'choice' and 'responsible for' have a weak sense and a strong sense. The weak sense of 'choice' is the objective one I outlined above. The bacterium can swim towards the light or away from the light. Depending on circumstance, it chooses one or the other. The weak sense of 'responsible for' is 'causes', as when I say that my neighbour's leylandii are responsible for the arid patch on my side of the garden fence. The strong senses are the weak senses with an additional factor: the sense that the subject is subjectively aware (standard meaning) of the choice or responsibility. The strong senses contain an essentially mental component and apply only to human subjects, but the weak senses apply to non-human animals, plants, inanimate things, even events like the weather. <br /><br />Victor's argument has the feel of a reductio ad absurdum because we take the senses of 'choose' and 'responsible for' to be the strong ones. There would be no contradiction if we took the weak senses. But this we cannot do (without deliberate effort). Our ordinary conception of ourselves is intrinsically dualistic, with a physical component and a mental component. The mental component may supervene on the physical but we cannot see how. We observe ourselves making choices and being responsible for actions (weak senses) but have no understanding of how this happens. Accordingly, we postulate an entity outside the physical realm that is the source of choice and responsibility. It's this entity that chooses and is responsible in the strong senses and to which we refer collectively as 'we' in passages like Victor's post. In effect, the argument equivocates on 'we' between a physical sense (our bodies) and a mental one, and between the corresponding weak and strong senses of 'choice' and 'responsibility'.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-3449079905674979532016-07-20T21:07:46.194-07:002016-07-20T21:07:46.194-07:00Hey David, thanks for the response! A bit difficul...Hey David, thanks for the response! A bit difficult to wrap my mind around though.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05994120856768426664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-20166304682835654362016-07-20T20:45:33.272-07:002016-07-20T20:45:33.272-07:00B Prokop,
"it doesn't actually explain an...B Prokop,<br />"it doesn't actually explain anything, right? "<br />sure it does. That sky is blue has actually been explained: molecules in the air scatter blue light from the sun more than they scatter red light. Why the molecules do so is also understood. Gyanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09941686166886986037noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-70072808150937544912016-07-20T20:40:41.828-07:002016-07-20T20:40:41.828-07:00B Prokop,
"Then how does it know how to react...B Prokop,<br />"Then how does it know how to react to the vicinity of another particle?"<br /><br />The term "know" does not apply to electrons. Electron, not being a person, can not be said to "know" anything. Physicists use these terms in a loose sense but we should not be carried away by their usage.Gyanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09941686166886986037noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-26188469037780990792016-07-20T16:20:54.163-07:002016-07-20T16:20:54.163-07:00"a physicalistic world view ... merely descri..."<i>a physicalistic world view ... merely describes how they do in fact behave</i>"<br /><br />So-o-o, it doesn't actually <i>explain</i> anything, right? <br />It's basically on the order of <br /><b>Q:</b> "Why is the sky blue?" <br /><b>A:</b> "Because it is!"B. Prokophttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10548980245078214688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-11536707789542208992016-07-20T13:51:48.310-07:002016-07-20T13:51:48.310-07:001. How does a rock know how to fall down a mountai...1. How does a rock know how to fall down a mountain!<br /><br />2. The discussion is about the implications of physicalism. In particular, is it consistent with choice and responsibility? So we are assuming a physicalistic world view. Such a view gets by without asking how particles 'know' how to behave. It merely describes how they do in fact behave.<br /><br />3. It's not clear how the phenomenon I'm calling---for want of a better word---'awareness' relates to the phenomenon we call 'knowledge'. Obviously, I think that awareness is a kind of primitive knowledge, minus the subjective factor we normally associate with that term. But some things are just too simple to possess knowledge. I'm not advocating a 'pan-cognitivism'.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-75755017338149344692016-07-20T09:44:28.513-07:002016-07-20T09:44:28.513-07:00How does a radioactive atom, such as C14, know whe...How does a radioactive atom, such as C14, know when its particular half-life is up? To put it another way, how does an individual C14 atom know that it can't "go off" just yet, given that a C14 atom on the other side of the world just did, since if it were to do so that would "violate" the half-life ratio of C14 to C12?Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-11576832255794582352016-07-20T09:26:20.303-07:002016-07-20T09:26:20.303-07:00Then how does it know how to react to the vicinity...Then how does it know how to react to the vicinity of another particle?B. Prokophttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10548980245078214688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-81449768282040585962016-07-20T05:30:18.934-07:002016-07-20T05:30:18.934-07:00No, an electron has no internal structure. It lack...No, an electron has no internal structure. It lacks the wherewithal to reflect internally changes in its proximity to other particles. So an electron has no awareness.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-80244043661444077782016-07-20T04:10:08.187-07:002016-07-20T04:10:08.187-07:00"Generally, if something happens inside an in..."<i>Generally, if something happens inside an individual that causally correlates with something happening outside then that individual is aware of that outside something.</i>"<br /><br />An electron changes its course when it comes into the vicinity of a proton, and heads toward the proton. In a similar manner, when it approaches another electron it will alter its course to move away from it. At no point is there any physical contact between the particles. Therefore, the electron is somehow "aware" of the presence of other particles. <br /><br />But it does not appear to have any choice in the matter of how it will react to this awareness.B. Prokophttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10548980245078214688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-9929946923988536292016-07-20T03:42:07.948-07:002016-07-20T03:42:07.948-07:00... then in positing an "awareness", are...<i>... then in positing an "awareness", are we not positing some kind of dualism?</i> I don’t think so. I think of the predicate 'is aware of X' in this special sense as an abstraction from concrete observations: A tree slows its growth rate in winter. Therefore, it is aware of the seasons. A rock shows no change from month to month. Therefore it is unaware of the seasons. Generally, if something happens inside an individual that causally correlates with something happening outside then that individual is aware of that outside something.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-79912522647563393872016-07-20T03:41:05.104-07:002016-07-20T03:41:05.104-07:00Thanks. I had become fixated on an early modern i...Thanks. I had become fixated on an early modern interpretation of 'mechanistic'. Am I working within this framework? Yes, I think so. My present view is that each of purpose, intentionality, value, and reason can <i>partly</i> be reduced by mechanistic physical explanation leaving a residue of subjectivity that proves intractable. Hence the project of everywhere 'bracketing off' subjectivity. For example, it seems perfectly conceivable that machines could communicate with one another about things in the world in a language replete with referring terms such as proper names. However, their kind of intentionality would lack the element of subjectivity that we normally associate with the term.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-86726999890102322292016-07-19T05:11:39.800-07:002016-07-19T05:11:39.800-07:00VR: "... make those kinds of explanations ba...<b>VR:</b> "<i>... make those kinds of explanations basic is to violate the "no skyhooks" rule."</i>"<br /><br />Since when has logical and intellectual consistence *ever* mattered to any 'materialist' or 'atheist' who finds himself in a pinch?Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-52378248693304640502016-07-18T22:12:49.052-07:002016-07-18T22:12:49.052-07:00"Even trees are aware of seasonal.. changes&q..."Even trees are aware of seasonal.. changes"<br /><br />Are they? Now, is this awareness no different from "the whole?" -- that is to say, are they merely 2 different terms that refer to the *same thing*? Because that would seem absurd, but who knows, you may have already fleshed this out.<br /><br /> If not -- if they aren't the same thing -- then in positing an "awareness", are we not positing some kind of dualism?<br /><br />I'm not as smart as anyone here. I am just genuinely interested. I am catholic though.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05994120856768426664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-44753966346447861912016-07-18T20:55:46.397-07:002016-07-18T20:55:46.397-07:00At the level of basic physics, the elements of pur...At the level of basic physics, the elements of purpose, subjectivity, intentionality, and normativity are not present. Explanations using these terms are placeholders for explanations on a deeper level of analysis that lack them. To make those kinds of explanations basic is to violate the "no skyhooks" rule."Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-37879343649355305852016-07-18T11:26:19.284-07:002016-07-18T11:26:19.284-07:00Can you elaborate a bit on that third constraint?Can you elaborate a bit on that third constraint?David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-57308995988983626992016-07-18T10:55:39.013-07:002016-07-18T10:55:39.013-07:00On the view developed by Hasker and myself, which ...On the view developed by Hasker and myself, which is often accepted by naturalists like Blue Devil Knight, there are three components to a genuinely physicalistic or even naturalistic view. One is a closure constraint, the second is a supervenience constraint. But the third constraint is that the physical be mechanistic, and by mechanistic I mean that purpose, subjectivity (first person awareness), intentionality, and normativity. <br /><br />Are you working within this framework? Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.com