tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post114661068352088763..comments2024-03-27T15:34:14.749-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: The Self-Refutation Argument Against EliminativismVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-92068838944459128912008-11-04T17:12:00.000-07:002008-11-04T17:12:00.000-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Amy Melserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00129896143799625954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-1146771001322362572006-05-04T12:30:00.000-07:002006-05-04T12:30:00.000-07:00Your editing is great: you have made me sound more...Your editing is great: you have made me sound more coherent than I actually am.<BR/><BR/>The key is this claim in your response:<BR/><I>The trouble I have is that these states pick out propositions. They can be true or false in virtue of their relationship to their propositional contents.</I><BR/><BR/>It is not obvious to me that the neural states pick out, or have, propositional contents. (I'm not sure what it means to 'pick out' a proposition).<BR/><BR/>Does a map of the streets of San Diego have propositional contents? I am frankly not sure. If you think they do, then you'll think that Churchland's theory is just an implementation of propositional attitudes. If they do not, then you'd be an eliminativist. Note this isn't the same as saying that <I>we</I> can make statements (in language) about the map that are true or false. We can do the same with our phenomenal experience, which you have admitted has nonpropositional contents. The key, then is, is the <I>maps</I> representational format propositional or nonpropositional?<BR/><BR/>Churchland thinks they are nonpropositional, and that neural spaces have the same type of content as maps. To the extent that we can judge a map's accuracy, it is based on the relative locations of points on the map, not the properties of individual points.<BR/><BR/>You could say that the objective spatial coordinates on the map (e.g., this point X,Y on the map means you are at location X in the world) don't have this relational feature, but it is again not clear that this is the right way to speak of a continuous spatial map: couldn't we just as easily say that such a representation uses a continuous space, which is inimical to propositions, which quantify over elementary meaningful symbols?<BR/><BR/>One final thing to think about. Leeches have internal maps of the location where they were touched, and they use these neuronal maps to guide their behavior with respect to the stimuli. Would this imply that leech nervous systems have propositional contents because we can evaluate them wrt their accuracy? If so, then we should be applying propositional attitude psychology to leeches. If not, then why, in more complicated organisms, do maps gain propositional contents? This is not pie-in-the sky: I mapped out the leech representation of tactile space for my doctoral dissertation. <BR/><BR/>I realize it's easy to make fun of this stuff when we talk about leeches, but one of the assets of Churchland's view is that he starts out with the realization that language is a recent, unusual, and specialized aspect of neuronal function. Our neuronal theory of behavior should be more general, applicable to many creatures with nervous systems, but with some parameters tweaked to give rise to the cognitive abundance we see around us.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.com